Balancing Safety and Accomplishing the Mission

The Times article painted a picture of blind indifference to losses in training to suggest that a culture of brutality extended also to navy leadership in noting that 11 aspiring SEALs have died in training since 1953. There are occupations in the navy where far more deaths occur without claims that these deaths are the result of indifference to risk, drug use, or cheating on established standards.

From 2013 to 2017. aviation mishaps in just the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornets and Super Hornets took the lives of some 133 pilots and other service members. In just this one type of aircraft. These losses occurred in spite of everything the navy can think of doing to make naval aviation safe in an environment that really cannot be made safe. Planes fly off of the shortened runways of aircraft carriers at night and in bad weather. They operate at high speeds and low altitudes with heavy loads.  These aircraft are often flown at the limits of their engineered specifications. The men who fly them are preparing for war. In Ukraine, the appalling casualties of Russian soldiers illustrates how deadly and unforgiving war can be to hastily trained troops.

The difficulty of making unsafe things like carrier aviation safe can also be applied to navy SEALs and their mission according to one retired SEAL we spoke to,

“There is no way to make SEAL training safe.  We board submarines and exit them using their torpedo tubes into freezing water. We jump from an airplane at 35,000 feet wearing oxygen and free fall to under one thousand feet before deploying our parachutes. We train with weapons and explosives and even place mines on ships to blow the bottoms out of them in defended harbors. The only way you can make things like this safe, is not to do them. So, selection and training is hard on purpose, because if the first time you run into something hard and dangerous is on an actual mission, you will fail in that mission and you’ll die along with your teammates.”

The Navy Reacts

The death of any service member automatically triggers an extensive safety and process investigation in the service branches.  It’s an examination of processes and regulations which are mostly written as the result of other incidents resulting in death or serious injuries. They are also looking to identify unforeseen circumstances that require new safety regulations be put in place.

“The circumstances surrounding the tragic death of Seaman Kyle Mullen remain under investigation. Naval Special Warfare Command continues to examine events leading up to his death, including medical practices, prohibited performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) testing, and BUD/S safety protocols to identify and address areas that may have contributed to the loss of our teammate.  We are committed to a thorough, accurate, and impartial investigative process. The safety of our SEAL candidates remains paramount during every evolution of NSW’s demanding Assessment, Selection, and Training pathway.”

In a series of follow-up questions, we asked NSWC to share with us any policy changes the navy may be considering in the wake of the unusual death following the end of Hell Week. They offered the following, which is printed without edits;

The word SIPE appears in the above quote and it refers to Swimming Induced Pulmonary Edema, a condition where fluid collects in the lungs. It is generally triggered by swimming in colder open water. In addition to surface swimming, SIPE is also found to occur during scuba diving, snorkeling, and free diving. The Symptoms of SIPE include coughing, shortness of breath, tightness or pain in the chest, and in some cases hemoptysis (blood in the sputum). It can be fatal in some cases, but symptoms generally lessen after leaving the water and are gone entirely within 48 hours. Not a great deal is really known about SIPE, it was first identified in scuba divers in 1981 and the number of studies done on the condition is sparse because it is rarely fatal and the symptoms clear up rather quickly once someone is out of the water. Studies of the condition(admittedly limited in number) have not found any known deaths from SIPE.

In BUD/S training, instructors not only see SIPE occur in trainees but many have experienced it themselves.  While Seaman Mullen suffered from an underlying acute Strep infection, the symptoms he presented while training looked very much like SIPE, a non-life threatening condition with a very low incidence of death, especially in young fit males.

Screening for Performance Enhancing Drugs is not a new policy. These substances are not illegal narcotics in the military like marijuana or cocaine and the normal drug screenings performed on personnel will not detect PEDs.  The World Anti-Doping Agency standard mentioned above includes a 20-page list of substances prohibited to competitive athletes and the list is updated every year as new drugs are introduced. And the tests are not cheap, they cost about $400 for each one administered. The question then becomes how often such tests are administered during the two-year training program and at what point are they administered? What about after training when these new Naval Special Warfare Operators go to the Teams?  In the information released above the navy states that this year they have already conducted some 794 PED tests on trainees and found only 33,  or just over 4% tested positive.

Can 4% disobeying clearly stated regulations about using PEDs be fairly called a “culture” of drug abuse? Given the trainees limited exposure to the SEAL community in a few weeks is BUD/S the reason for this culture or are trainees bringing these habits with them when they arrive?

We asked the spokesman at the Naval Special Warfare Center what the consequences would be for a trainee or later SEAL caught using PEDs. They stated that a second test would be done to confirm the positive results and then the service member would be processed for an administrative separation from the Navy. This differs from the Bad Conduct or Dishonorable Discharge given to service members caught using illegal narcotics which represents criminal offenses, but it is also a zero-tolerance policy. Get caught and you are out of the navy whether in training or actively serving on the Teams.

A Culture of Brutality

SOFREP asked about Instructors being negligent in handling trainee safety and we were told by our source who was an instructor at BUD/S,

“Virtually every second of BUD/S training is carefully scripted in great detail.  We exercise almost no discretion when it comes to going past proscribed limits in training.  Trainees spend 15 minutes in the ocean, no more no less, then 20 minutes of calisthenics on land, then another 8 minutes in the water, no more no less.  We might make it seem to the trainees that they will be in the water forever, but the time limits represent safe limits and we stick to them very carefully, We could get everyone to quit or just die by leaving them in the cold ocean for hours, but we aren’t trying to do that.”

Medical personnel monitor the condition of trainees and are present during the entirety of Hell Week Training. There are even ambulances standing by in case of an emergency.  As Hell Week progresses the medical checks become more and more frequent.

When asked about why Mullens didn’t ask for or seek medical attention during Hell Week, the Chief told us, “These guys try to hide how sick they are sometimes because they want to push themselves through.  We aren’t going to tell them what their limits are unless it’s obvious to us they are no longer able properly assess that for themselves.  We had a trainee on the fourth day of Hell Week dislocate his shoulder and was still pressing on.  We noticed the way he was moving and I and the other instructors had a brief conference about his condition.  We weren’t sure what the problem was at the time, but something was definitely wrong with one arm. We pulled him out and sent him to medical”

SOFREP asked if this injury meant the trainee would have to recycle and repeat Hell Week, did he fail?  “Oh no, we passed him. It was Day 4, and this guy wasn’t willing to quit with a dislocated shoulder. That’s the kind of determination we are looking for in a Navy SEAL.”

In a recent Salon interview, the writer of the New York Times piece, Dave Phillips stated that some of his sources were trainees who had quit BUD/S and that they would be good sources because they would be upset they did not pass the program. Of course, the problem with these men as sources is that many of them left the program in the First Phase of BUD/S during Hell Week which is the fourth week of actual training. A few weeks in SEAL training before they quit the program and returned to the fleet is all some of Mr. Phillips’ sources know about what goes on in BUD/S, a program that takes some two years to produce a SEAL ready to go to an operational team for even more training.

“One of the things I learned really quickly is the front door is not a good way to report. In this BUD/S selection course, the statistic they’re most proud of is only 25 percent of people who show up make it through. The vast majority quit. I was like, “Oh, the vast majority quit! They’re not SEALs, but they were there.” That’s a heck of a lot of people who have a pretty good idea of the dynamic there is, and probably have reason to talk because maybe they felt like they weren’t treated very well. So, that’s really the angle I started working. It’s just a mass attack on these former candidates and reaching out to them cold. My failure rate on that approach is really, really, really high—95 percent, if not more. But you don’t need that many to get a beachhead. If I can get one or two guys and talk, not only is that really good firsthand information about what happened, but if I talk to someone for two hours, I have a much higher success rate with someone they know than I do with a cold call. So slowly, piece by piece, you build this landscape where you can figure out what happens. Bit by bit, I get enough to tell a story.”-Dave Phillips, New York Times

Brandon Webb, publisher of SOFREP spent more than 13 years in the navy, was a navy SEAL for most of it, a Chief Petty Officer, and the program manager for their elite sniper program.

“The Teams have gone a long way to clean up their public image in the last four years and it’s well known inside and out of the community that all illicit drugs are off limits. That extended to other legal supplements when I was a SEAL. I’ve been through high-risk instructor training and worked Hell Week as a guest instructor. The cadre is tough but extremely sensitive to medical issues, and if any instructor understood the severity of Mullen’s condition they would have sent him to the hospital immediately.  Students sometimes hide injuries to their detriment. They call it high-risk training for a reason. You can’t make diamonds unless they are subjected to extreme pressure over time. This is BUD/S.”