The flanking element than ran into a body of water (9:13 on the video), but got eyes on the enemy force that had ambushed them and returned fire, killing several of militants who belonged to ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS). Captain Perezoni then observed a large enemy force moving towards him consisting of militants on dirt bikes and riding in technicals (pickup trucks with machine guns mounted on them) so he broke contact with his four Nigerien troops and fell back to the convoy at 11:57AM. He then ordered the convoy to pick up and drive south so that they would not be outflanked by the large enemy force he had spotted.
It is stated in the DOD video that the Team Sergeant and other ODA members had to rally and organize their host-nation counterparts who were taking cover in the woods behind the convoy, which implies that they were simply hiding rather than being decisively engaged in the firefight. By the time everyone was up and moving, it was too late and they were flanked by the enemy force that captain Perezoni had been trying to avoid. Two Nigerien vehicles hurried away and left the rest of their convoy behind. This now means that three truckloads of soldiers had left the main element behind, taking each of those men out of the firefight and giving the enemy less vehicles to focus their fires on.
The last vehicle in the new order of movement was one of the American pickup trucks where Staff Sergeants Black, Wright, and Johnson were located. The DOD video states that captain Perezoni signaled (presumably via a hand and arm signal as they would not have heard much over the sound of gunfire) that they were to depart. Staff Sergeant Johnson is said to have acknowledged this with a thumbs-up. At this point, one of the Americans threw a smoke grenade in order to obscure their movements from the enemy. This is right about where the helmet cam footage captured by the ISIS-GS element and uploaded online begins.
The other two American vehicles than depart and drive away heading south. The last vehicle, driven by Staff Sergeant Wright slow rolled forward while Staff Sergeants Black and Johnson moved behind the vehicle, using it as cover while returning fire on enemy positions (10:30 mark on the video). At this point there is a huge break in contact between the American elements of the convoy and they are no longer able to effectively provide mutually supporting fires. Staff Sergeant Black was then shot and killed by the enemy. Wright then exited the vehicle and he and Johnson returned fire until they were overwhelmed by enemy gunfire. With few options left remaining, they decided to escape and evade.
While running in the opposite direction of the enemy forces, Johnson was shot about 85 meters away from their vehicle. Wright was not going to leave his team mate behind and ran back to Johnson’s position, continuing to fire on the advancing enemy forces. Both soldiers were shot and killed.
It was only when the other two American vehicles with the two remaining Nigerien vehicles arrived at a security halt 800 meters away that they realized that they were missing one vehicle along with Wright, Johnson, and Black. At the security halt, they tried to radio back to the missing vehicle but received no response, likely because those team members had already been killed. The security halt was also beginning to come under enemy fire. At this point two ODA members volunteered to run back (12:00 minute mark) and try to find them. This was undoubtedly very brave of these two men, however that these men were ever in this position is horrifying. Why did the entire security halt not pick up and return to the kill zone instead of sending just two men?
About ten minutes later, two additional ODA members left the security halt to try to go and find the other two men who had departed and help them find their missing team mates. Sergeant La David Johnson was manning the M240 on one truck and returning fire at enemy positions. What becomes clear throughout the video is that ODA 3212 and their host-nation counter-parts were separated again, and again, and again. The convoy was broken down into smaller and smaller elements which were easier to kill by enemy forces. Had the convoy stuck together and functioned in a coordinated manner, it is unlikely that the enemy would have had nearly as much success as they did.
It got so bad that the American element was broken down into buddy teams, and later down to one soldier left alone.
The first buddy team of Special Forces soldiers moved towards the kill zone and made contact with the enemy. They received enough effective enemy fire that they broke contact and ran into the second buddy team that had left the security halt. This moment had a high potential for friendly fire, but thankfully this didn’t happen. At this point there are a lot of individual moving elements on the battlefield that are now separated from one another and do not know where their other friendly elements are or what they are doing. For the ODA members, this situation must have been chaotic and confusing. None the less, the four Special Forces soldiers began planning a new route to move forward and locate Johnson, Wright, and Black.
Back at the security halt, the two U.S. and two Nigerien vehicles were now coming under sustained enemy fire from two directions so captain Perezoni ordered a withdrawal (13:20). The two Nigerien vehicles peeled off and departed the battlefield. Perezoni’s vehicle picked up U.S. and Nigerien troops before heading back towards the kill zone, in the direction that the four ODA team members had gone in. Meanwhile, La David Johnson and two Nigeriens were unable to board their vehicle due to the intense amount of enemy gunfire. Perezoni’s vehicle did not realize this and gunned it towards where they had initially made contact with the enemy, leaving La David Johnson behind.
Facing armed ISIS-GS members on dirtbikes and technicals, with his M240 machine gun out of ammunition, La David Johnson had little option but to attempt to escape and evade with the two Nigeriens he had been left with. The three ran south west to try to escape around 12:30 in the afternoon. The two Nigerien troops were soon cut down by enemy fire about 400 meters away from their vehicle.
La David Johnson was now alone and outgunned, being chased down by dirt bikes and technicals across the flat and largely featureless terrain of the Sahel. He ran another 450 meters and found a thorny tree, the only available cover and concealment. Johnson stayed in the fight and returned fire up until an enemy technical got within 100 meters (15:30) and fired on him with a machine gun. Johnson was fatally wounded.
The ODA was effectively shattered and spread out across the battlefield, fighting individually or in pairs rather than as a team.
As Captain Perezoni’s vehicle raced back towards the kill zone under enemy fire. Five of the seven passengers were wounded. Perezoni was shot and thrown from the bed of the pickup, forcing them to turn around to retrieve the captain. The vehicle then drove into the woodline and became stuck in the mud. This was when the four ODA members who had left to look for their team mates spotted the remaining American vehicle and ran towards it where they linked up. The Americans again came under enemy fire and radioed to their headquarters that they were being overrun.
Believing they were all about to be killed, the team initiated their destruction plan. In what is likely to be a controversial decision, the ODA members destroyed their radios and probably other sensitive items to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. This action would keep classified military secrets out of the hands of ISIS-GS, but now the ODA was isolated without any way to call for further help, communicate with other ground elements, or talk to air assets which would eventually arrive.
The remaining seven Americans and several Nigeriens escaped and evaded through the woodline (17:09) under enemy gun and mortar fire. They trudged through a swamp and successfully broke contact with the enemy for a few moments. Now they established a hasty security perimeter at the edge of the woodline at approximately 12:50PM. At this time, the Americans used their personal devices to send messages to loved ones, final farewells as they believed they would soon be killed.
The use and presence of personal devices on the battlefield is concerning because of OPSEC considerations, as DOD has finally become aware of and acted on by banning Huawei cell phones from military installations. The use of personal fitness devices also compromised clandestine American bases in Syria recently. However, what is more concerning in this moment is that the soldiers had given up hope. They viewed their situation as so dire that they had become fatalistic.
At 13:11, two American unmanned aerial vehicles arrived over the battle space and established contact with the team and arriving French aircraft. That communications were established with the team means that at least one radio was kept, perhaps a smaller E&E radio, but this is unknown. Minutes later, the French Mirage fighter jets did several flyovers, shows of force to signal to the enemy that fast movers had arrived. The French fighter jets did not engage the enemy however, because they could not yet establish which elements on the ground were friendly. The fly overs did work though, and the enemy cut off their pursuit of the American ground element. At 16:00 French helicopters arrived and began looking for the team.
At 16:40, the SOCAFRICA commander recommended to the AFRICOM commander that they initiate missing personal recovery contingencies. An alert was sent up to 1st SFOD-D, commonly known as Delta Force at Fort Bragg. Operators were called in for a hasty briefing and then a package that included elements of 160th Special Operations Aviation got on aircraft bound for Niger.
In the meantime, a Nigerien military element arrived on the battlefield (19:25) and mistook the surviving ODA team members for enemy forces and fired on them with machine guns until the situation could be defused. With the Nigeriens securing a landing zone, French helicopters were finally able to evacuate the American team members at 16:55.
Back on the battlefield, Nigerien troops located and secured the remains of Johnson, Wright, and Black. La David Johnson was still missing as Delta Force landed in Niger. At the time, there were reports that a personnel beacon had be activated and it was believed that ISIS-GS may have been scrambling La David Johnson to a bordering nation. These reports turned out to be false.
Delta Force was now going into their mission planning sequence and preparing for a hostage rescue operation. La David Johnson was still missing and ground elements had not located his remains because he ran run nearly a kilometer from his last known position and was under a dense thorn tree. When Nigerien forces finally found Johnson’s remains, Delta was stood down and ordered to return to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In the end, four American and four Nigeriens had been killed in the firefight. Estimates of enemy killed in action range from 20-25.
Conclusions
That DOD put together a report to explain to the American public why our soldiers are in Niger and why four soldiers were lost that day is something to be commended. This should happen more often, and in previous cases could have helped avert many asinine conspiracy theories that rose up around events such as the Extortion 17 crash in Afghanistan or the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi.
Some main points for improvement that are easily identifiable from a tactical perspective are related to inter-team communication as well as command and control. Officers should not be leading flanking maneuvers into battle or jumping into the stack of assaulters outside a door about to be breached. If they are this demonstrates a lack of faith in junior team members, a lack of trust that alludes to deeper issues. Throughout the firefight the ODA allowed themselves to be separated and broken down into smaller and smaller elements, ending up in buddy teams or in La David Johnson’s case, alone with two Nigeriens. If team cohesion had not fallen apart and the Americans and Nigeriens fought as one, the outcome of this firefight probably would have been very different.
Equally disturbing reports have emerged from the higher headquarters elements above ODA 3212, ones that the Pentagon is unwilling to take any responsibility for. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford were reportedly troubled that the Pentagon’s 6,000-page report blames captain Perezoni and his ODA for what happened or failed to happen during the firefight, while senior officers escape any scrutiny. This type of “leadership” is reprehensible. As Special Forces members told SOFREP, they loved the Niger mission but despised their chain of command.
As acknowledged in the DOD video, the ODA was simply going where they had been directed to go and do what they had been directed to do. The team did not “go rogue” as some self-serving Pentagon leaks have implied. Captain Perezoni had also warned his bosses that they were not equipped or placed in a manner to conduct these type of missions but was ignored.
DOD’s bunker down mentality in the face of a scandal is not to support their soldiers but rather to institute further risk mitigation, a politically correct term for tying the hands of Special Forces soldiers all across Africa. Special Forces teams in Niger are said to be pulling their hair out in frustration and are baffled to be told that they are now to stay on their bases and train brigade staff elements, which is not what ODA’s do.
SOFREP recently interviewed African security specialist Eeben Barlow who served in South Africa’s border war before founding Executive Outcomes which deployed military contractors to Angola and Sierra Leone. More recently, he was the chairman of a company called STTEP that deployed contractors to serve alongside soldiers in Nigeria who successfully fought back Boko Haram.
“Watching the footage of those four guys who were shot in Niger, we looked at it,” Barlow said. “I have to admit we were really, really horrified by what we saw because that was a classic example of doctrinal failure, not understanding the terrain, and not understanding the enemy.”
“Watching that I thought, that is so, so tragic and could have been avoided,” Barlow said in frustration. “I think those guys, for want of a better word, were sacrificed in many ways.”
Featured image: Nigerien soldiers practice vehicle contact movements while participating in a special forces training exercise during Exercise Flintlock 2018 in Agadez, Niger, April 18, 2018. Flintlock is an annual, African-led, integrated military and law enforcement exercise working with multinational special operations groups. The exercise is designed to strengthen the ability of key partner nations in the region to counter violent extremist organizations, protect their borders, and provide security for their people. (U.S. Army photo by Richard Bumgardner/Released)
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