Army Identifies China’s Emerging “Precision-Attack” Strategy

These scenarios form the basis of what a significant new Army intelligence report describes as emerging Chinese Concepts of Operation regarding long-range precision attack . This Chinese tactic, or ambition, is identified in a detailed Army Training and Doctrine Command G2 intelligence assessment referring to what it calls China’s “intelligentized C2 and ISR structure.”

“The PLA is exploring longer-range precision strike systems enabled by a robust, informatized (current) to intelligentized (future) C2 and ISR structure that enhance their anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These are tenants of the PLA’s core operational concept known as Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW),” TRADOC G2 told Warrior, referring to its published report … The Operational Environment 2024-2034 Large-Scale Combat Operations.” (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, G2),

The G2 report, which includes a published analysis of current and anticipated future wars, closely examines technological trends and innovations to best characterize the expected “operational” warfare environment in the coming 10 years. The text of the report explains this Chinese strategy as “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare. (MDPW). When asked by Warrior about discussions of China’s growing ambition to improve “ultra-long-range precision-strike” as explained in the intelligence report, TRADOC G2 further explained China’s apparent technological intent and concept of operation.

“MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities,”  TRADOC G2 told Warrior in a written statement.

China’s Intelligentized Warfare: A Machine-Driven Approach

This seems quite significant in a number of respects pertaining to long-range attack, operationalized AI and multi-domain networking. Perhaps most of all, China’s “intelligentized” MDPW appears like somewhat of a copycat effort to replicate the Pentagon’s now-being-implemented Joint All Domain Command and Control  (JADC2) effort, yet with an arguably more aggressive concept of  leveraging AI for offensive, lethal attacks with long-range projectiles.

The main difference between China’s MDPW and DoD’s JADC2 seems to relate to ethics, target-strike-accuracy and concepts of operation.

The Pentagon and military services are already using AI to network critical information across domains for targeting, yet the exercise of lethal attack requires human command and control. Through its Project Convergence experiment, for example, the Army has shown an ability to operationalize AI to shorten sensor-to-shooter attack windows from 20 minutes … down to a matter of seconds.

What distinguishes the US approach is that, among other things, it prioritizes human-machine interface. As far back as 2020, an AI-empowered system called FireStorm showed an ability to receive incoming sensor data from otherwise disparate sources or pools of information, organize it and analyze it in relation to an overall combat picture or scenario to “recommend” an optimal “shooter” or “effector” for a given target situation. An AI-system does this by bouncing incoming data off of a vast database to solve problems, draw conclusions and perform near real-time analytics… yes the US concept of operation involves a “recommendation” to a “human” performing command and control to leverage the optimal blend of machine and human interface and ensure humans decide about lethal force. It does not appear as though the PLA’s MDPW operates within similar parameters. The PLA’s fast-tracked effort to match, copy or replicate the Pentagon’s emerging multi-domain network relies heavily upon AI for lethal, offensive strikes without seeming to require human intervention.

Many emerging US weapons technologies involve an ability for projectiles to adjust course in flight or respond to new information as it arrives. The Air Force’s “Golden Horde” collaborative bombing program, for example, is showing the ability for AI-enabled weapons to gather, process and network data with one-another “in-flight” to adjust to changing target information. It may not be clear or known if the PLA is matching or trying to replicate this, yet it does seem clear that MDPW seeks to connect AI and high-speed, multi-domain ISR to redirect or improve the accuracy of long-range precision weapons.

DoD’s (JADC2) has already demonstrated an ability to link and transmit analyzed data across domains using common technical standards, advanced interfaces and what are called “gateway” technologies able to essentially pool and translate data from otherwise incompatible transport layers. Perhaps certain time sensitive threat information arrives from one domain through GPS and needs to be combined, organized and analyzed in relation to other information arriving from another domain through an RF frequency or datalink? Should these processes happen fast enough and with efficiency and accuracy, then ISR data and precision guidance can be integrated into long-range-precision strike, precisely as described by the G2 report.  However, the PLA approach may not mirror US JADC2 in technological performance or sophistication, and it seems to favor the “science” of AI above the need for “human” input. This PLA bias toward favoring the “science” of AI at the expense of human input, is also identified in the G2 report.  This analysis from the report about the PLA and AI was explored in a previous Warrior essay as well. 

From the Report: 

 “Intelligentized warfare demonstrates the importance China places on integrating AI into its military decision making in the pursuit of decision dominance in all aspects of warfare. China’s leadership is concerned about corruption within the PLA’s ranks, especially at the lower levels, and to the extent possible wants to remove the individual soldier from the decision-making process in favor of machine-driven guidance. This is in stark contrast to the U.S. Army’s way of war, which relies heavily on warfare as an artform. The U.S. Army sees its Soldiers as its greatest advantage in battle and relies on their intuition, improvisation, and adaptation to lead to victory.”

….. text of the Army’s Operational Environment 2024-2034, Large Scale Combat Operations

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared in Warrior Maven, a member of the Military Content Group. It is reproduced here with permission.