The media is buzzing with warnings about Iranian sleeper cells in the U.S., especially following recent U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But let’s be clear: sleeper cells didn’t just materialize in response to those strikes—or because of Iran alone. They’ve been here for years. What’s changed—and what should concern us far more—is how these networks are now converging, coordinating, and adapting under a shared operational vision.
Yes, Iran poses a threat. Not all the Iranian agents on U.S. soil are here though as ‘sleepers’ to carry out attacks—some are intelligence operatives collecting on us. But the real danger lies in losing the strategic picture. While we fixate on the most recent spark, we’re overlooking the fire that’s been burning under our feet for years.
The October 7th attacks in Israel should have shattered any illusions about terrorist group silos. Hamas may have led the execution, but the attack was a layered collaboration: Iran’s IRGC and proxy militias provided planning, vision, and logistics; al-Qaeda affiliates led training and supplied weapons; and the Taliban hosted the operational kickoff meeting and the fatwa declaration. It was, in short, a battlefield preview of what a unified jihadist ecosystem can achieve when united in a common goal.
That convergence is no longer informal—it’s now institutional. Over the past year, al-Qaeda has established the Council for Coordination with Jihadi Organizations, also known as the United Islamic Council or the Islamic Army. Led by Saif al-Adel—a senior al-Qaeda strategist, longtime guest of Iran’s IRGC, and now operating back in Afghanistan. Saif’s strong backing from the IRGC secured his appointment for a three-year term. The council brings together senior figures from multiple terrorist groups with a shared mission: unify global terrorist groups under a shared campaign plan. Its target: the West. It’s goal: expansion of the Islamic Caliphate.
Meanwhile, the U.S. hasn’t even begun to tackle or comprehend the massive number of terrorists embedded within our communities. Since the fall of Kabul in 2021, over 8,000 individuals linked to terrorist groups are believed to have entered the U.S.—some across the southern border, others with valid visas or through refugee pipelines. ISIS alone claims over 2,500 of its operatives are already here illegally. Incoming NCTC Director Joe Kent recently reported that at least 1,400 Afghan evacuees have known ties to terrorist groups like Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP).
Al-Qaeda—particularly the Bin Laden family—is also actively shaping operational plans for a large-scale attack on the U.S. homeland, one intended to eclipse the strategic and symbolic impact of 9/11. Al-Qaeda’s homeland strategy reflects its global reach: up to 1,000 operatives from a host of backgrounds and a variety of terrorist groups, including individuals of Afghan, Pakistani, Syrian, Libyan, Saudi, Egyptian, and Yemeni origin. This diversity isn’t random—it’s a deliberate strategy designed to disrupt how the U.S. government categorizes and tracks terrorist threats, break the intelligence cycle, and ensure plausible deniability. Al-Qaeda intends for future operations launched from Afghanistan and Syria to remain covert. Terrorists want us chasing lone wolves and fixating on sleepers and ghosts—just like the obsession with Chechen terrorists years ago.
Kinetic strikes on Iran have little bearing on the threat posed by terrorist actors already entrenched in our communities. The convergence of IRGC proxies, Taliban facilitators, ISIS operatives, Haqqani suicide bombers, al-Qaeda strategists, nation-state enablers like China, and transnational criminal organizations such as cartels represents a strategic-level, multidimensional homeland threat. Yet our law enforcement and intelligence communities are not aligned to tackle these crossovers among threat actors and groups.
So, let’s stop treating sleeper cells like they’re something new. They’re not. What’s new—and far more dangerous—is that these groups are now operating in concert. If our strategy remains focused on short-term threats and headline-driven fear, we’ll miss the deeper, coordinated plotting already underway. The time for collecting and monitoring is over. The threat is real. It’s already inside. And the time to thwart what is coming is now.
The media is buzzing with warnings about Iranian sleeper cells in the U.S., especially following recent U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But let’s be clear: sleeper cells didn’t just materialize in response to those strikes—or because of Iran alone. They’ve been here for years. What’s changed—and what should concern us far more—is how these networks are now converging, coordinating, and adapting under a shared operational vision.
Yes, Iran poses a threat. Not all the Iranian agents on U.S. soil are here though as ‘sleepers’ to carry out attacks—some are intelligence operatives collecting on us. But the real danger lies in losing the strategic picture. While we fixate on the most recent spark, we’re overlooking the fire that’s been burning under our feet for years.
The October 7th attacks in Israel should have shattered any illusions about terrorist group silos. Hamas may have led the execution, but the attack was a layered collaboration: Iran’s IRGC and proxy militias provided planning, vision, and logistics; al-Qaeda affiliates led training and supplied weapons; and the Taliban hosted the operational kickoff meeting and the fatwa declaration. It was, in short, a battlefield preview of what a unified jihadist ecosystem can achieve when united in a common goal.
That convergence is no longer informal—it’s now institutional. Over the past year, al-Qaeda has established the Council for Coordination with Jihadi Organizations, also known as the United Islamic Council or the Islamic Army. Led by Saif al-Adel—a senior al-Qaeda strategist, longtime guest of Iran’s IRGC, and now operating back in Afghanistan. Saif’s strong backing from the IRGC secured his appointment for a three-year term. The council brings together senior figures from multiple terrorist groups with a shared mission: unify global terrorist groups under a shared campaign plan. Its target: the West. It’s goal: expansion of the Islamic Caliphate.
Meanwhile, the U.S. hasn’t even begun to tackle or comprehend the massive number of terrorists embedded within our communities. Since the fall of Kabul in 2021, over 8,000 individuals linked to terrorist groups are believed to have entered the U.S.—some across the southern border, others with valid visas or through refugee pipelines. ISIS alone claims over 2,500 of its operatives are already here illegally. Incoming NCTC Director Joe Kent recently reported that at least 1,400 Afghan evacuees have known ties to terrorist groups like Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP).
Al-Qaeda—particularly the Bin Laden family—is also actively shaping operational plans for a large-scale attack on the U.S. homeland, one intended to eclipse the strategic and symbolic impact of 9/11. Al-Qaeda’s homeland strategy reflects its global reach: up to 1,000 operatives from a host of backgrounds and a variety of terrorist groups, including individuals of Afghan, Pakistani, Syrian, Libyan, Saudi, Egyptian, and Yemeni origin. This diversity isn’t random—it’s a deliberate strategy designed to disrupt how the U.S. government categorizes and tracks terrorist threats, break the intelligence cycle, and ensure plausible deniability. Al-Qaeda intends for future operations launched from Afghanistan and Syria to remain covert. Terrorists want us chasing lone wolves and fixating on sleepers and ghosts—just like the obsession with Chechen terrorists years ago.
Kinetic strikes on Iran have little bearing on the threat posed by terrorist actors already entrenched in our communities. The convergence of IRGC proxies, Taliban facilitators, ISIS operatives, Haqqani suicide bombers, al-Qaeda strategists, nation-state enablers like China, and transnational criminal organizations such as cartels represents a strategic-level, multidimensional homeland threat. Yet our law enforcement and intelligence communities are not aligned to tackle these crossovers among threat actors and groups.
So, let’s stop treating sleeper cells like they’re something new. They’re not. What’s new—and far more dangerous—is that these groups are now operating in concert. If our strategy remains focused on short-term threats and headline-driven fear, we’ll miss the deeper, coordinated plotting already underway. The time for collecting and monitoring is over. The threat is real. It’s already inside. And the time to thwart what is coming is now.
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