Introduction

The US has progressively suspended the provision of different types of aid to Ukraine. The first was financial aid, followed by Biden administration military aid in transit, then various types of ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) information. The suspension of ISR is most critical. We will describe the various types of aid that have been suspended and the impact of that suspension on Ukraine’s war effort. Note this constitutes a snapshot at the time of writing and events are moving swiftly.

 

Types of Assistance and their Impact

Pre-Reading: While not essential, it is recommended that the reader study the SOFREP article How We Execute Long-Range Missile Attacks

The reader will see from that article that the most critical ISR capability (up to 90% or more in many cases) is only available from the US. US operators are involved at every phase of the targeting process from start to finish. It is important to understand that even if Ukraine has missiles, the missiles are useless without the ability to accurately target them.

European allies and the UK have limited or no ability to fill in this capability, particularly in the case of missile targeting. Neither Europe nor the UK can remotely match the US satellite constellations and their capabilities. The US does share intelligence information with its allies, but has asked allies to not distribute US intelligence to the Ukrainians. In an injudicious statement, a British official told the Financial Times that the UK might quietly share such data through its agents in Ukraine. This statement was noticed by the US administration and drew a stinging rebuke and a warning not to undermine US policy.

1. ISR – Satellite Imagery

  • This is US satellite imagery (military grade, weapons-monitoring grade, the highest resolution possible) from the US Geospatial Agency. It is one or two orders of magnitude sharper than the best commercial grade. To give you an idea, Maxar Corporation resolution is a bit under 1m/pixel. US intelligence satellite resolution is classified, but could easily be one or two orders of magnitude sharper, likely 10 cm/pixel or better.
  • Commercial satellite imagery – Maxar Corporation has discontinued provision of satellite imagery to Ukraine at any price. The company says this is due to a request from the US administration to restrict Ukrainian access to this intel.
  • Commercial imagery, while of lower quality than military-grade, is still useful to the Ukrainians in tracking the movements of Russian formations. Without it, they will be unable to spot Russian units maneuvering in the field and marshaling for attacks. Ukrainian intel will be limited to what their own drones can gather.
spy satellite
The United States’ spy satellite capability is unmatched.

2. ISR – ELINT, COMINT, and Radar Mapping

  • This is obtained by Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) flights like the RC-135 Rivet Joint. The objective of these is to collect data on Russian communications and Russian radar transmissions in order to construct a radar threat database.
  • The threat database is critical for the effective function of aircraft radar warning receivers. It is also critical for the programming of aircraft radar jamming pods and digital stealth.
  • The threat database is also important to missile targeting as discussed in the previous section. It is used to create a threat map of enemy radars for the target region. US technicians in Ramstein or the continental US program flight paths and courses for missiles to exploit holes in enemy radar coverage. Without this assistance, which can ONLY be provided by the USA, these missiles are either grounded or inaccurate at longer ranges. The Ukrainians would be restricted to targeting with their indigenous drone capability. They are firing blind.
US RC-135 Rivet
US RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic intelligence gathering aircraft

3. Target identification and missile targeting

  • Satellite intel and electronic intelligence are used to identify targets for ATACM, Storm Shadow, and HIMARS strikes.
  • This intel is used to plot courses for missiles that exploit existing “holes” in Russian radar coverage. Electronic warfare is used to create holes that did not previously exist. Programs are written to translate those courses into language that a missile’s computer brain can understand. Trained operators encrypt those programs for transmission to C2 centers in the field.
  • In the field, US operators upload the encrypted programs to the missiles. The upload is performed using a proprietary US-encrypted interface (required even for British and French Storm Shadows and SCALPs). This means British and French missiles cannot be fired without involvement of the US in all phases except, perhaps, the driving of the launch truck. The US has a monopoly on the targeting process.
Storm Shadow missile
The UK’s remaining Storm Shadow missiles have been rendered useless by the US data sharing ban.

4. Radar identification of incoming Russian missiles

  • Detection of Mig-31 and TU-95 strategic bomber takeoffs. These aircraft carry air-launched cruise missiles. They are based deep in Russia, fly to launch points closer to Ukraine, then fire their payloads. US radar and satellite assets detect their takeoff, monitor their flight paths, and warn Ukraine of likely targets and missile arrival times. This information cues Ukrainian air defense. At times, the Americans are able to give the Ukrainians several hours warning. Even as Ukrainian air defense becomes progressively degraded, early warning still allows people to take shelter.
  • US early warning does not only apply to airborne threats from Russia proper. Early warning is also provided of launches from Russian naval assets in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. Contrary to what is presented in western media, the Russian Black Sea fleet remains a powerful force in being and a missile threat to Ukraine from the south and east.
  • Coordination of US radars based in Poland with Patriot radars in Ukraine. It remains impossible to shoot down hypersonic Kinzhals, Zirkons, and Iskanders. The US has been working to coordinate radars based in Poland with radars based in Ukraine in an effort to determine improved firing solutions for Patriot batteries.
  • As Ukraine’s supply of Patriot launchers and interceptors shrinks, its air defense becomes progressively degraded and all this activity becomes less significant.

5. Starlink

  • Last week, Ukraine reported “rolling” Starlink blackouts
  • Elon Musk stated provision of Starlink to Ukraine had not been halted.
  • Later reports suggest all Starlink service to Ukraine has indeed been halted, but this is derived from Ukrainian sources and has not been confirmed. However, there is no reason for Ukrainians to lie about this, so we treat is as true until there is evidence to the contrary.
  • Without Starlink, Ukrainian communications, command and control, and offensive drone management it either cut off or severely impaired.
soldier sets up military communication
Ukraine uses Starlink for communications and offensive drone targeting
  • Elon Musk has never been comfortable with the use of Starlink for offensive purposes. He accepted the use of Starlink for communications, but was unhappy with its use for the control of offensive drone attacks.

 

Conclusion

Ukrainian air defense has already been significantly degraded by Russian missile strikes. In addition to the strikes, Ukraine simply cannot get enough air defense missiles to make a difference. The mathematics are against it. Russia is firing too many missiles. Statistically, it takes two or three interceptors to have any chance of bringing down a single incoming Russian missile. After three years of fighting, Russia has not run out of missiles. In fact, it launched one of its biggest missile attacks only last night. Indeed, it is NATO that has run out of interceptors and launchers to give Ukraine.

Ukraine’s air defense will be impacted by the suspension of deliveries of interceptor missiles. Beyond that, there is no defense against hypersonic missiles. The efforts of the US to coordinate radars in Poland with radars in Ukraine may have been of indeterminate promise, but suspension of assistance has stopped this work for the duration.