In accordance with the International Rules of the Nautical Road, the FITZGERALD was in what is known as a crossing situation with each of the vessels. In this situation, FITZGERALD was obligated to take maneuvering action to remain clear of the other three, and if possible, avoid crossing ahead. In the event FITZGERALD did not exercise this obligation, the other vessels were obligated to take early and appropriate action through their own independent maneuvering action. In the 30 minutes leading up to the collision, neither FITZGERALD nor CRYSTAL took such action to reduce the risk of collision until approximately one minute prior to the collision. FITZGERALD maintained a constant course of 190 degrees at 20 knots of speed.”
The Officer of the Deck apparently mistook the Crystal for another, further off vessel in the darkness, and chose to take no action as it approached until it was too late to avoid a collision.
The Officer of the Deck, the person responsible for safe navigation of the ship, exhibited poor seamanship by failing to maneuver as required, failing to sound the danger signal and failing to attempt to contact CRYSTAL on Bridge to Bridge radio. In addition, the Officer of the Deck did not call the Commanding Officer as appropriate and prescribed by Navy procedures to allow him to exercise more senior oversight and judgment of the situation.”
Other officers on the bridge and in the Combat Information Center of the ship were also cited for failing to provide adequate situational awareness and input to the Officer of the Deck.
The Navy ultimately cited failures in training, in Seamanship and navigation, and in the leadership and culture of the vessel for the incident.
The USS John S. McCain
The investigation into the collision between the McCain and the Alnic MC did acknowledge that mistakes were made by the crew following a brief issue with the ship’s steering and propulsion system, but cited the bridge crew for losing situational awareness as they addressed it. The investigation also revealed that the sailors operating that steering and propulsion system lacked the training necessary to serve in that capacity.
At 0519, the Commanding Officer aboard the McCain reportedly noticed,
“…the Helmsman (the watchstander steering the ship) having difficulty maintaining course while also adjusting the throttles for speed control. In response, he ordered the watch team to divide the duties of steering and throttles, maintaining course control with the Helmsman while shifting speed control to another watchstander known as the Lee Helm station, who sat directly next to the Helmsman at the panel to control these two functions, known as the Ship’s Control Console.”
Unfortunately, the shift in controls was not executed properly, causing confusion among the bridge crew. While the Commanding Officer had ordered only the speed control to be shifted from one post to the other, steering control was shifted as well. This confusion was perceived by the bridge crew as a loss of steering all together.
In the confusion, the Commanding Officer ordered a reduction in speed to 10 knots and then to 5, but because the throttles were not properly coupled, the helmsman reduced the throttle input only on the port shaft, leaving the starboard prop running at 20 knots for another 68 seconds. Although steering was never lost, the confusion on the bridge as to how to manage it, as well as the incorrect management of the vessel’s throttle, resulted in the ship taking an uncommanded turn to port.
Although JOHN S MCCAIN was now on a course to collide with ALNIC, the Commanding Officer and others on the ship’s bridge lost situational awareness. No one on the bridge clearly understood the forces acting on the ship, nor did they understand the ALNIC’s course and speed relative to JOHN S MCCAIN during the confusion.”
Similar to the Fitzgerald incident, the Navy ultimately cited a number of issues aboard the McCain for the incident, including a lack of appropriate training for the bridge crew, failures to adhere to navigation procedure and a failure of the command culture aboard the ship.
Images courtesy of the U.S. Navy
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