The time to abolish JCIDS is now
Dan Patt and @AEI‘s William Greenwalt argue eliminating JCIDS is a discrete, immediate reform that addresses a sizable bureaucratic burden to accelerate acquisition. pic.twitter.com/mZcnhxlTp2— Hudson Institute (@HudsonInstitute) February 13, 2025
Eric Felt, a former Air Force space acquisition leader, called the memo a “sledgehammer” to one of the Pentagon’s most broken systems.
“The most successful recent programs have all been JCIDS exempt,” Felt said. “That should tell us something.”
Yet the celebration comes with warnings. JCIDS may have been slow and frustrating, but it at least forced the services to coordinate.
Without that gate, there’s a risk the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines will buy capabilities that don’t fit together, which could possibly mean duplicating effort or leaving gaps in the joint force.
As one senior official put it, “We can go a lot faster now, but the big question is: are we moving faster in the right direction?”
Congress Weighs In
Capitol Hill has been circling the issue as well.
The House Armed Services Committee wants to rebrand the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which managed JCIDS, into a Joint Requirements Council (JRC) focused on evolving threats and force design.
The Senate Armed Services Committee would gut JROC’s validation powers, leaving it only with advisory responsibilities while new Portfolio Acquisition Executives handle service-level requirements.
Neither proposal has yet cleared Congress, but both reflect bipartisan frustration with the status quo.
Lawmakers want to cut the average requirements timeline from the current 800 days down to five months. Whether they end up backing the Pentagon’s new model or blending it with their own reforms in the upcoming defense policy bill, the trend line is unmistakable: JCIDS is finished.
The Risk of Going Too Fast
While almost no one is defending JCIDS, some warn that rigor could be the casualty of speed.
The JROC once served as the visibility point for combatant commanders to ensure the services weren’t buying capabilities misaligned with theater needs. Without a comparable safeguard, critics worry the new process could turn into a free-for-all.
Take drones as an example: the Army might focus on smaller systems ideal for short-range fights, while Indo-Pacific commanders actually need long-range systems to cover vast distances. JCIDS at least forced those mismatches into the open.
MEIA may be expected to fill that role, but its effectiveness remains untested.
Greenwalt also flagged uncertainty around how combatant commanders’ feedback will be integrated. If their operational needs don’t flow into the new boards’ priorities, the Pentagon risks fielding weapons faster—but not the ones troops actually need.
Closing Analysis
The Pentagon’s decision to kill JCIDS is more than a bureaucratic tweak. It’s a recognition that the US military can’t afford to spend years validating requirements while rivals outpace them in emerging technologies like hypersonic, autonomous systems, and advanced air defenses.
The reforms aim to tilt the balance back toward urgency: fewer validation hurdles, more direct engagement with industry, and a tighter link between requirements and money.
But the risk is clear. In dropping a cumbersome system, the Pentagon may also be losing one of the last mechanisms ensuring joint alignment.
For now, JCIDS is history. The services have more room to maneuver, the boards have more power to steer resources, and industry may finally get a seat at the table before requirements harden into stone.
The gamble is whether speed without rigor delivers the right weapons to the right fights. If it does, the Pentagon will have finally solved one of its longest-running acquisition headaches.
If not, America’s forces could find themselves moving faster—straight into the wrong future.
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