A convoy from Abkhazia delivered 500 tonnes of humanitarian cargoes to the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, the Donetsk news agency said on Saturday. (TASS, December 27)
The signing of the treaty between Abkhazia and Russia has far-reaching ramifications for the security and stability of the Georgian state and, consequently, for the interests of Europe. Instability in the geostrategically important Transcaucasus region can hamper the transport of important energy supplies from the Caspian Sea, affecting markets and energy prices around the world.
Apprehension in Georgia over the apparent inevitability of a similar agreement in South Ossetia is growing. Reports that purportedly detail the plans of Russian and South Ossetian leaders to bind the the breakaway region with Russia have rattled Georgian government officials. Intensifying instability inside the Georgian government has exacerbated the concern over South Ossetia’s assertive move towards renewed independence efforts have exacerbated ties between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia:
New agreement on Russia’s alliance with South Ossetia will lead to the unification of some structures. In particular, Moscow will undertake an obligation to ensure the safety of South Ossetia. It also includes the implementation of the laws and provision of social security within the country. Power structures and army of unrecognized South Ossetia will be part of similar structures in Russia. (APA, December 25)
Max Hess, writing for Registan.com, highlighted the geopolitical significance of the Abkhazian-Russian treaty, noting the importance of Georgian fears of escalating tension after Russian efforts to legitimize Abkhazia’s claim to statehood:
The Kremlin views the conflict in Abkhazia not as a frozen conflict – the term most frequently applied to Georgia’s breakaway regions – nor as one between two sovereign nations, but rather as a active means of counteracting Georgia’s pro-Western path. Moscow has escalated its efforts to disrupt this path through the new Russian-Abkhaz treaty, while the limited nature of the steps taken by the EU and NATO may increase the likelihood of further provocations. Although an adequate Western response does not appear to be forthcoming, without one Georgia’s foreign policy will remain on a direct collision course with Russia’s, an eventuality that has proven all too disastrous for Georgia in the recent past. (Max Hess, Registan.com, December 13)
In neighboring South Ossetia, signs reflecting a pending integration with Russia are emerging and a similar agreement appears likely. The reopening of a key highway linking South Ossetia with Russia, negotiations for a Russian treaty with the breakaway region, and the assessed consequences for any attempt to legitimize South Ossetia’s annexation to Russia or its outright statehood have shaken Georgian policymakers. The staff of The Messenger Online has repeatedly expressed concern over the lack of attention paid to the Abkhaz-Russian treaty and the consequences that it has for similar efforts in South Ossetia:
Tbilisi officials state that any form of cooperation between the de-facto regions and Russia is an aggressive attempt to annex Georgian territory.
President Giorgi Margvelashvili states that after signing the treaty between Russia and Abkhazia, the international community was informed concerning the possible signing of the same type of a document with the Tskhinvali region.
“The memorandums are completely unacceptable for the international community,” Margvelashvili said, adding that conflicts should be solved through dialogue and the use of peaceful measures. (The Messenger Online, December 25)
In context of the recent moves to integrate Abkhazia within the Russian policymaking structure, the alignment of Abkhazia’s foreign policy with that of the Kremlin, and the ineffective response of international government entities in preventing further violations of Georgia’s territorial integrity have seemingly emboldened Russian strategists to pursue similar plans in South Ossetia. South Ossetia may in fact be an easier issue with which to pursue integration similar to that in Abkhazia. Hess again remarks:
Although further integration and a similar treaty with South Ossetia are likely to follow, the Russian-Abkhaz treaty presents a clear and immediate challenge to Georgia’s aspirations. (Max Hess, Registan.com, December 13)
In November, Russia re-opened the strategic Roki Tunnel, an important highway linking South Ossetia with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation. During the war fought between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, the Roki Tunnel proved to be an essential line of communication for the movement of Russian war materiel into Georgia via South Ossetia. The tunnel was damaged during the war campaign and required $400 million, invested by Russia, to repair the road. This past November, that road was reopened, heightening the tension between Tbilisi and Moscow and reigniting fears among many Georgians that Russia was prepared to permanently link South Ossetia with its northern neighbor. The re-establishment of this important line of communication effectively provides for the facilitation of prospective Russian military movements into South Ossetia. The Roki tunnel’s significance for many Georgians is its centralization in Russia’s invasion effort in 2008:
Late on August 7, 2008, Mikheil Saakashvili, then the Georgian president, ordered his troops to retake control of the breakaway republic of South Ossetia, including shelling the regional capital, Tskhinvali. Within hours, Russian troops – who had been conducting exercises on South Ossetia’s border – were pouring through the Roki tunnel beneath the Caucasus Mountains, launching Russia’s five-day war with Georgia. (Neil Buckley, The Financial Times, August 6)
The reopening of the tunnel inspired apprehension and anxiety in many Georgians, reinforcing fears that Russia remains fixated on absorbing large pieces of Georgian territory. Many Georgian officials anticipated that Russia was simply following a well-used playbook, following specific steps to ensure that, should annexation of the breakaway South Ossetia become Russian policy, Russian military support could be easily transported in great numbers to the region, effectively off-setting any Georgian military efforts to re-assert control over the breakaway. More importantly, the recent bilateral negotiations between the leadership in South Ossetia and officials in Moscow carries with it a foreboding sense of reigniting the tension that existed in the year prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008:
An agreement for South Ossetia to join Russia would be vehemently condemned by the United States and the European Union, which support Georgia’s territorial integrity and have imposed sanctions on Moscow for its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March. (RFE/RL, ITASS, and Interfax, December 11)
Conflict in the breakaway regions theoretically inhibits Georgian accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), impedes progress on the European Union Association Agreement (ratified by the EU parliament, pending ratification in the 28 member state parliaments), and increases insecurity for the former Soviet republic. Continued instability in Georgia would almost certainly derail any plans to achieve membership in NATO over the next decade. Many observers assess that this is among the more likely reasons that Russia would continue to sow discontent among the separatists in South Ossetia; border conflicts and Tbilisi’s failure to project its authority over the entirety of its territory would be a main disqualifier of Georgian government aspirations for NATO membership. It is fairly easy to understand why, in the context of Abkhazia’s joint agreement with Russia this past November, that observers are wondering when the proverbial other shoe will drop in South Ossetia.
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