Tailored Nuclear Deterrence vs Assured Total Destruction?

The following piece, written by Peter Huessy, first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the subsequent seventy-eight-year nuclear age has thankfully not witnessed the “next” use of such terrible weapons. But this did not happen by accident, as no bending arc of nuclear history moves in any particular direction.

What happened was a number of extraordinary Americans—Harold Brown, Edward Teller, General Bernard Schriever, General Curtis LeMay, Johnny Foster, General Larry Welch, Admiral Richard Mies, General Norton Schwartz, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger—painstakingly helped build and deploy a US nuclear deterrent under the direction of multiple American Presidents.

The resulting strategy of deterrence was not static, as the US moved from massive retaliation and mutually assured destruction to a flexible response, including damage limitation, and then what some described as tailored deterrence while adding to the strategic environment a creative mix of arms control and missile defenses and robust conventional capability so that the conflicts after World War II such as the Korean and Vietnam wars never spread to general war between the superpowers.

With the end of the Soviet empire, it was generally assumed great power conflict was a thing of the past, with the hope that Russia under Yeltsin promised a cooperative, not antagonist, relationship with the United States, what Francis Fukuyama described as the emergence of a final liberal order and the “end of history.” It was even assumed by some administrations that Russia and China would help the United States to ensure no nuclear weapons fell into the hands of terrorists and rogue states, that counter and non-proliferation would hold, and the ongoing arms control process under START would move the world inevitably toward significantly lower stockpiles including eventually reaching the magic summit of the abolition of nuclear weapons altogether.

The Holiday from History

However, after the assumed end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies went on what can only be described as a holiday from history where it was assumed modernizing our nuclear deterrent was no longer necessary. From 1997 when the B-2 acquisition was terminated at 20 aircraft vs. the planned 120 buy, it will be some 32 years later before the US initiates its much-needed “in the field” modernization and some 45 years before the US plans to finish the deployment of a modernized nuclear deterrent including the “Columbia” submarine, (2042) the “Sentinel” intercontinental ballistic missile (2035) and the B-21 “Raider” (2029).

This extensive four-decade-long period was a “holiday” the United States took from its historically understood obligation to protect the nation from its foreign enemies, especially those that were nuclear-armed. Only with the end of the anti-terrorist campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan did US attention come back to nuclear-armed Russia and then China, as both were modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces at a pace not seen even at the height of the Cold War.

A New Consensus

With sound leadership and spurred by the Russian and Chinese nuclear threats, the United States has largely settled the debate over the modernization of its nuclear deterrent. Congress has strongly supported the current plan, fully understanding that sustainment of legacy systems accounts for nearly two-thirds of the annual $55 billion in Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear programs and the $18.5 billion the US spends annually on research, development, test, evaluation, and acquisition of our modern nuclear Triad is affordable. Annual spending will peak around 2030 and will ensure the United States has a robust deterrent until 2080. The average annual acquisition cost through 2080 comes in at a very modest $9.3 billion, a bargain for keeping the peace and preventing nuclear weapons from being used.

Emerging Challenges

But just when a political consensus had developed to support nuclear modernization, particularly in the post-2010 period, the challenges to and complexities of deterrence rose markedly. This was due to a dozen important factors involving what were clearly the four rogue states of Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia, what one might term the “brothers’ mayhem.”

• (1) North Korea deployed a growing nuclear arsenal.
• (2) China was projected to deploy 1500 warheads by 2035 or a decade plus.
• (3) Russia continued to grow its own nuclear forces, with 90 percent of the force modernized.
• (4) Iran enriched uranium to over 80%, close to the level needed for a nuclear bomb.
• (5) Putin invaded Ukraine and subsequently repeatedly threatened Ukraine with multiple strikes with nuclear weapons.
• (6) China’s messaging increasingly pointed to preparations for war against Taiwan.
• (7) The US’s ability to produce warheads or pits diminished markedly from the Cold War days (although it is now recovering).
• (8) The US had to simultaneously modernize all elements of the United States Triad, increasing its projected costs and potential industrial base issues
• (9) There emerged a gap in the US vs Russia theater or regional nuclear capabilities that could potentially lead to the limited Russian use of such weapons.
• (10) Russia has suspended its obligations under the 2010 New START arms treaty.
• (11) China has dismissed all entreaties to engage in arms control discussions; and
• (12) A continued clamor in the USA for disarmament or “global zero” has significantly curtailed necessary technology developments that could enhance US deterrent capabilities.

The Rogues Work Together

While of varying degrees of danger, each of these twelve nuclear factors poses challenges to the current US deterrent strategy. In 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review assessed the US needed only around 1550 deployed nuclear weapons to credibly deter our adversaries and support our allies with extended deterrent promises. At the same time, it was widely assumed Russia and China could be counted on to assist the United States in keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of such rogue states as Iran and North Korea.

By 2023, things worked out quite differently. Russia and China had become closely allied with the very rogue states we were most worried about. As Tom Reed, the former Secretary of the Air Force, revealed in his 2009 book “The Nuclear Express,” both China and Russia had decided in 1981-2 to secretly proliferate nuclear weapons technology.

In China’s case, nuclear technology migrated to Pakistan, North Korea, Libya and Iran. On top of that, decades later, it became clear that Putin had taken seriously the Yeltsin 1999 decree calling for Russia to develop small-yield, very accurate battlefield nuclear weapons. This strategy was subsequently described by General John Hyten, the American Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an “escalate to win” nuclear strategy. Russia adopted the strategy to overcome US conventional strength as had been illustrated to the whole world with the US rapid takedown of Saddam’s military and that of the Taliban in 2001-2002.

Five Decision Baskets

Within the context of these twelve emerging threats, the US has five baskets of decisions to make soon on (1) arms control, (2) a hedging strategy, (3) deterrence requirements, (4) proliferation needs, and (5) regional or theater nuclear force options.

Is arms control dead, given the pending end of the New START process and the Chinese rejection of even arms discussions? Are we back to 1945-72 when there were no ceilings or limits on deployed nuclear weapons? When did the total number of US and Soviet arsenals reach forty thousand or more?

Next, the US must decide whether nuclear numbers matter. If yes, the current US hedge strategy needs revision. The idea of having reserve warheads to build up (if arms control build-downs don’t continue) was last put together in 2010 and didn’t take into account the new and emerging Chinese build-up.

So, not only does the US have to think about a new hedge, but the country also has to decide what new level of deployed warheads we need to maintain to implement a possible new kind of deterrence. As we are facing for the first time in our history two nuclear-armed peer competitors, the current and just retired commanders of US Strategic Command have underscored the US may have to rethink the nation’s deterrent strategy.

On proliferation, a cascade of new nuclear powers may emerge. Since 1962, when President Kennedy worried that such a cascade of nuclear-armed nations would soon emerge, the world has been relatively lucky. Only nine nations are nuclear armed, an additional three since 1962. But, with Iran possibly going nuclear, Turkey, the KSA, and other Middle Eastern powers might probably follow suit.

One US administration official warned a Hudson audience earlier this year that in the Western Pacific, up to 12 additional nations could rapidly go nuclear. And with relatively few regional nuclear forces available to the United States, and with Russia having 1900-2000 such warheads and China building such a force as well, the United States must review what new regional and shorter-range nuclear weapons—if any—does the US needs to check Russia and China. And new rogue nuclear actors as well.

US Options

The nuclear deterrent professionals in the US are grappling with all these issues and are bringing together top experts to determine the path forward. On the table are adding more Columbia submarines to the 12 we are planning to acquire; adding the 50 MMIII reserve silos to the force; adding warheads to both the D-5 and MMIII missiles, including all 24 missiles for deployment and at upwards of 8 warheads per missile; adding nuclear armed Tomahawks to the US inventory; significantly adding to the currently planned deployment of missile defense interceptors; and accelerating the deployment of an SLCM-N.

Initial estimates are that over a four-year period, the US could deploy some additional warheads, using some of the non-deployed warheads that are now in our stockpile. The good news is that the USA has added some seven new plutonium pits so far this year, with an eventual goal of producing eighty per year. However, the big challenge is now not only putting a new hedge together but also integrating conventional and nuclear capabilities while preserving nuclear deterrence.

The LLNL and Sandia laboratories addressed these tough issues at a recent symposium in Washington, D.C. These issues were also examined at a subsequent Triad Symposium held last July 20 by the Hudson Institute and LSUS.

Summary

As one senior military leader recently summarized things, the US is facing two nuclear-armed peer competitors simultaneously, and for the first time since the Regan administration, nuclear modernization is not being discussed in the context of further nuclear reductions.

To assure the protection of the US and its allies, America needs to strengthen our future deterrence, even as the nuclear forces the US has today are doing the job. That may indeed require a new build-up.

And Russia still remains the key existential threat, with nuclear forces 90 percent modernized. And designed to carry out a policy of nuclear coercion—-to use nuclear weapons not to deter but to sustain aggression.

China may follow suit with a similar strategy.

Given the range of new nuclear challenges outlined here, it is imperative the USA continue the modernization and sustainment of our nuclear enterprise and examine the additional elements of deterrence we need to initiate. The last thing we should do is unilaterally cut any element of our Triad or NC3 or infrastructure. As Admiral Richard warned us prior to his retirement as Commander of US Strategic Command, we have two choices: recapitalize the nuclear force or go out of the nuclear business.