Op-Ed

The Bolduc Brief: Iran Conflict Observation and Assessment

Airpower has hit its limits, and unless Washington is ready to own the consequences of putting boots on the ground, this war is sliding into a costly stalemate Iran is fully prepared to sustain.

Brigadier General (Ret.) Donald C. Bolduc, U.S. Army Special Forces veteran and former commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command. (U.S. Army)

The US-Israel air campaign against Iran has demonstrated limitations, with Iran retaining the ability to launch missiles despite assertions of total destruction. While the Trump administration declared victory, severe damage, and obliteration to Iranian infrastructure, Tehran has shown adaptability, utilizing decentralized leadership and underground facilities to withstand the campaign.

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This conflict has highlighted that while airstrikes can damage key nodes, they face limitations in completely removing a decentralized and experienced adversary’s capacity to respond. By initiating a heavy air campaign without a clear path to regime change or total neutralization, the administration has hardened Iran’s resolve.

If the air campaign has reached its ceiling of effectiveness, the next phase usually involves either a risky ground component or a pivot to a “containment” strategy that accepts a more armed and hostile Iran.

The conflict has transitioned from a localized air campaign into a broad regional war of attrition. Despite the Trump administration‘s claims of degrading 86–90% of Iran’s launch capacity, the “last 10%” of Iranian capabilities is proving highly resilient and lethal.

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The reality is that the air campaign has largely stalled, and as of late March, the U.S. is reportedly considering a ground mission to seize Kharg Island to cut off Iranian oil exports entirely—a move that could trigger even more drastic asymmetric retaliation across the Gulf.

There is a “red line” for the American public. While there is a segment of the population that supports “standing firm” or using air power to degrade threats, the appetite for a ground war in the Middle East is almost non-existent.

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The Trump administration likely views the air campaign as “maximum pressure,” but if that pressure does not lead to capitulation, the only remaining military cards are high-risk ground moves that offer no clear “exit ramp.”

Ownership of the Problem: This transition risks a “forever war.” Once ground troops are deployed, the 60-day window under the War Powers Act begins to tick, but the administration has already signaled it may ignore or legally challenge these time limits. The result is a strategic stalemate where the U.S. “owns” the conflict’s outcome, but the Iranian leadership is openly welcoming a ground assault, claiming their forces are “waiting” to engage American soldiers in a protracted war of attrition.

As of March 29, 2026, my assessment is that a “locked-in” executive strategy is the current reality in Washington. Despite intense debate, the Trump administration has successfully navigated or bypassed congressional hurdles to maintain and potentially expand military operations.

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Analysis of the Air Campaign Limitations (as of March 2026):

  • Persistent Capabilities: Despite claims by the Trump administration that 82% of missile launchers were “killed” by late March, Iranian missile and drone strikes continued, demonstrating enough capability to maintain regional disruption.
  • Faulty “Victory” Narrative: A Washington Post analysis notes that while Operation Epic Fury initially targeted air defenses, the administration’s declarations of complete obliteration contradict intelligence showing Iranian adaptation and continued capability.
  • Infrastructure Durability: Iran’s reliance on heavily fortified and underground sites means key missile stockpiles and launchers have been hidden or maintained, preventing a purely aerial campaign from destroying their operational capacity.
  • Intelligence Warnings: Prewar assessments concluded that military intervention was unlikely to cause regime change in Iran, suggesting that the air campaign may not achieve the long-term, decisive victory aimed for by the administration.
  • The “Sovereignty” Trap: For Tehran, giving up missile or nuclear programs now would likely be viewed as unilateral surrender under fire. Historically, nations under direct kinetic attack tend to double down on their most effective deterrents (missiles/proxies) rather than trade them away.
  • Proxy Evolution: The fact that proxies are moving from defensive “harassment” to offensive capabilities suggests that the air campaign hasn’t severed the supply lines or command structures. Instead, it may have incentivized Iran to “outsource” the front lines to avoid direct decapitation of its own conventional forces.
  • The Diplomatic Deadlock: Negotiation requires leverage, but it also requires a “face-saving” exit for both sides. If the Trump administration’s narrative is “complete victory” while Iran’s reality is “continued resistance,” the middle ground for diplomacy disappears.
  • Regional Backfire: Rather than stabilizing the region, the hostilities appear to have created a high-frequency missile exchanges, making the original goal of a “shorter, safer” conflict increasingly unreachable.
  1. Debut of Offensive Proxy Weaponry

Iranian proxies have shifted from simple harassment to high-impact offensive operations, utilizing upgraded and “smuggled” technology:

  • Hypersonic Capabilities: Iran has reportedly debuted the Fattah-2, an advanced hypersonic missile capable of maneuvering at high speeds to bypass Western-made interceptors like the Patriot and THAAD.
  • Russian-Upgraded Drones: Recent intelligence indicates Russia has begun supplying “upgraded” Geran-2 drones to Iran. Some of these are now equipped with Verba MANPADS (shoulder-fired missiles), allowing the drones themselves to target and shoot down the very aircraft or drones sent to intercept them.
  • The “Proxy Shield” (Sayyad-3G): Tehran recently unveiled the Sayyad-3G, a mobile naval air defense variant. Scaled-down versions of this technology have been integrated into proxy “Bavar” architectures, using Chinese BeiDou satellite data for targeting, which makes them significantly harder for the U.S. to jam than older GPS-reliant systems.
  • Houthis Enter the Fray: Houthi forces have officially entered the conflict with direct missile attacks on Israeli military sites, demonstrating an expanded reach.
  1. Regional Ally Reactions: Saudi Arabia and the UAE

The initial “calculated caution” from Saudi Arabia and the UAE has hardened into a more aggressive, yet trapped, posture:

  • Shifting to “For the Kill”: Behind the scenes, both nations have reportedly urged the Trump administration to go “for the kill” and finish the Iranian regime. The UAE ambassador to the U.S. recently argued that a simple ceasefire is no longer enough to guarantee safety.
  • Direct Hits on Infrastructure: Iranian strikes have damaged the Ras Tanura refinery in Saudi Arabia and industrial sites in Abu Dhabi, forcing both countries into an “armed non-belligerence” phase where they provide basing and logistics to the U.S. while suffering the brunt of retaliation.
  • Exhaustion of Interceptors: There is a growing logistical panic. High-intensity waves of Iranian drones and missiles are depleting the stockpiles of Patriot and SM-3 interceptors faster than they can be manufactured, leaving Gulf energy hubs increasingly exposed.
  • Diplomatic Recalibration: Despite their push for a decisive U.S. victory, officials in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are participating in emergency regional summits in Pakistan and Riyadh to explore de-escalation, fearing the conflict has become a “permanent state of threat”.

If the administration moves from the air to the ground—specifically with a mission like seizing Kharg Island or establishing “buffer zones” the strategic and political stakes change instantly:

  1. From “Cleanup” to “Quagmire”

An air campaign can be framed as a surgical, temporary action. A ground presence, however, requires a massive logistical tail, permanent bases, and constant defense against insurgent tactics. The Trump administration would “own” the result. History shows that once U.S. boots are on the ground, withdrawing them becomes a political liability, often leading to a “forever war” scenario.

  1. The Economic and Human Cost
  • The Price Tag: A ground campaign against a nation of 88 million with mountainous terrain would dwarf the costs of the Iraq or Afghanistan wars. With the U.S. already facing internal economic pressures, a multi-trillion-dollar conflict would be a hard sell to even the most loyal supporters.
  • Casualties: Unlike drone strikes or high-altitude bombing, ground operations guarantee a steady stream of American casualties. In a hyper-polarized political environment, this would likely lead to massive civil unrest and a “Vietnam-style” credibility gap for the White House.
  1. Diplomatic Isolation

Currently, some regional allies (Saudi Arabia, UAE) are quietly cheering for the degradation of Iran’s military. However, a full-scale U.S. ground invasion would likely terrify them. They fear the “spillover” of millions of refugees and the permanent radicalization of their own populations. Even the most hawkish allies might distance themselves to avoid becoming targets of a decades-long insurgency.

  1. The Iranian Response

Iran’s military doctrine is specifically designed to fight a superior force on the ground through asymmetric warfare. They would likely:

  • Use their “Deep Cities” (underground tunnel networks) to hide leadership and mobile launchers.
  • Activate every proxy cell from Lebanon to Yemen to hit U.S. interests globally.
  • Turn the conflict into a war of attrition that the U.S. political cycle simply cannot sustain.
  • Use the Jihad ideology to attract violent extremists to join the fight and attempt attacks on the homeland and our allies.
  1. 5. The Failure of Congressional Checks
  • Blocked Resolutions: For the third time this month, the U.S. Senate rejected a war powers resolution (53-47) that would have required explicit congressional authorization for continued strikes. This effectively provides the administration with “backdoor sanction” to continue the campaign without a formal declaration of war.
  • Partisan Unity: While some high-profile Republicans like Rand Paul have joined Democrats in voicing constitutional concerns, the vast majority of the President’s party has voted to block these measures, viewing the campaign as a necessary response to an “imminent threat.”
  • Veto Power: Even if a resolution were to pass both chambers, it would require a two-thirds supermajority to override a certain presidential veto—a threshold that current voting patterns suggest is unattainable.
  1. 6. The Shift Toward “Boots on the Ground”

Evidence is mounting that the administration is preparing for the ground transition you fear, using executive authority to position assets:

  • Arrival of Marines: The USS Tripoli, carrying roughly 3,500 Marines, arrived in the Middle East this weekend. This is part of a larger buildup that includes preparing the 82nd Airborne Division for potential paratrooper deployments to secure specific land or resources.
  • Targeted Missions: The Pentagon has reportedly drawn up plans for “weeks of ground operations” that stop short of a full invasion but target strategic assets like

Kharg Island

Executive Justification: The administration continues to cite Article II of the Constitution (Commander-in-Chief powers) and the 2002 AUMF as legal cover for these moves, arguing that wait-and-see diplomacy is no longer a viable option following Iranian missile strikes on U.S. assets like the Prince Sultan Air Base.

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