Ukraine Struggles With an Epidemic of Desertion

The Ukrainian army is experiencing an epidemic of desertion. Even the most committed soldiers are breaking after more than three years of continuous combat without relief. Whole units are abandoning positions without orders. This isn’t necessarily because they are bad soldiers. On the contrary, the best Ukrainian soldiers are excellent troops, often with more combat experience than their Western advisers. French trainers have a 1:1 trainer-to-trainee ratio. Why? The French commander says some Ukrainian “trainees” have more experience in high-intensity combat than French troops who have only seen action on safari in North Africa.

So why are we seeing this epidemic of desertion? To understand this, we need to know something about the Ukrainian soldier, and something about the Ukraine war.

The AFU Soldier

One day in 2022, the Russians surrounded an Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) unit. The Ukrainians were trapped by the Russians’ favorite tactic – a double envelopment closed into a cauldron. The AFU were almost out of ammunition. The Russians called on the AFU to surrender. The response came back: “Russians don’t surrender.”

The Russians wiped out the AFU unit, who fought to the last bullet and the last man. In those early days, Russians considered Ukrainians brother Slavs and preferred to take prisoners. There were often family ties – Russians had relatives in Ukraine, and vice-versa. The most senior Russian and Ukrainian flag officers graduated from the same Soviet military academies. In many respects, the Ukrainian war is a civil war.

Russians will never denigrate the fighting ability of the most committed Ukrainian soldiers. They are courageous and fierce. If the Russians make a mistake, the Ukrainians will kill them. They reserve the highest respect for elite AFU formations like the Ukrainian Marines. They respect the Azov and Kraken as well, but view them differently. Those units were formed from the Ukrainian National Guard, the private militias of hard-right political parties. The Azov and Kraken are examples of Ukrainian nationalist troops committed to a certain fanatic twentieth-century ideology. Russians regularly check POWs for tattoos in case they remove unit insignia or change uniforms (see Figure 1). The tattoos identify bearers as Azovs and Kraken.

If the Russians can cut Ukrainian Marines a break, they will. The Azovs are a different matter. In the immortal words of William Shakespeare, “They hate alike.” (From Coriolanus, by William Shakespeare)

The war is now in its third year. Most Ukrainian officers and NCOs have been killed or invalided out of service. Even the elite Azov units (now rebadged as “The Third Assault Brigade” to avoid negative connotations) have launched extensive recruitment drives to fill their depleted ranks.

The best volunteers still go into the Azov units, the Marines, armored brigades with western vehicles, and the “Airmobile” brigades (that have no aircraft). Ukraine has turned to extensive conscription, which usually amounts to impressment. “Recruitment officers” go to bars, church masses, concerts and cruise the streets. When they see likely conscripts, they bundle them into vans, issue them uniforms and rifles, and send them to the front. Despite the numerous announced “waves” of mobilization, this activity goes on continuously.

Conscripts sent to the front have limited life expectancy. In some battles, their life expectancy is measured in hours. More fortunate conscripts, who are “mobilized” rather than impressed, may be sent to a NATO country to receive training. In 2022 and 2023, this meant as much as three months in the UK, France or Germany. They were sent back to Ukraine with fanfare and mementos like cigarette lighters (see Figure 2). More recently, following the disastrous AFU offensive of summer 2023, training time has sometimes been reduced to three weeks.

Any soldier knows one would be hard-pressed to teach recruits the manual of arms and close-order drill in three weeks. Never mind care and maintenance of weapons and marksmanship. And they are being asked to learn how to operate Challenger II, Leopard II, and M-1 Abrams tanks. M-777 howitzers. Patriot batteries. Western writers think we can just shovel all these weapons over there, and “they’ll figure it out.” No. That’s why the most sophisticated weapon systems like radars and air defense are operated by Western “contractors.”

Troops need to be trained to function as organized formations. The brigade commander of the “elite” 47th Mechanized Brigade at the time of the 2023 summer offensive was 28 years old. He was presented as a wunderkind. Really? He would have been an O-3 in the US Army. Is he supposed to command a force of 3,500 men?

The average age of the Ukrainian soldier is 45 (Fortune, May 26, 2024). None of us can do at 45 what we could do at 18 or 21. The human body doesn’t work that way. Older men can’t carry the same loads, or march as far, or at a fast pace. They can’t recover from a forced march and move straight into battle.

The French kept mobile phone numbers of the men they trained. Six months later, they received no response from efforts to call or message their students.

Ukrainian troops fall into three broad categories. 1) Veterans in elite units – hardened, competent, committed, and dwindling. 2) Impressed conscripts – used to fill out depleted ranks. Many will never get a chance to fire their weapons. 3) Mobilized conscripts – in receipt of varying degrees of training. They are usually used to fill in depleted ranks, but have a better chance of surviving long enough to make a difference.

As the Russians continue to shell, bomb, and drone the AFU, casualties mount. 80% of casualties on both sides are due to artillery (Reuters July 19, 2024). Russia holds at least a 5:1 advantage in artillery (Forbes February 2, 2024). This figure is conservative. At times of acute shell shortage, Ukrainians labor under a 10:1 disadvantage. These ratios make Ukrainian claims of killing 10 Russians for every Ukrainian dubious, to say the least. Zelensky’s numbers change up and down every time he is asked. Russian battle formations have always been artillery-heavy compared to NATO formations.

That leaves us where we are today. Ukraine is losing the war, and losing it badly. It is out of air defense, artillery, armor, and, most of all, troops. You cannot laser-print trained soldiers. While Ukraine claims an army of one million men, the actual number of active fighting troops is actually about 350,000 and dropping fast (Kyiv Post, December 2, 2024).

Whatever Russia’s casualties, no one can deny Russia’s population is 7 times larger than Ukraine’s. Ukraine is expected to lose another 5 million people this winter. 90% of the country’s power generation has been destroyed, and refugees are streaming west. Russia is paying contract soldiers premium wages and building up its army at a breathtaking rate. Why? It no longer needs so many men to defeat Ukraine. It is building up to fight NATO.

Zelensky makes the rounds with his begging bowl, pleading for weapons and money. What he really wants are NATO boots on the ground. Ukraine has been bled white.

The Desertion Epidemic

Throughout the war, Russia has managed to regularly rotate its combat units. Its troops have been given leave to visit family. Exceptions have been the Wagner units during the battle of Artymovsk (Bahkmut). The Wagner units were bolstered by convicts who were promised pardons in exchange for service. But regular Russian army has generally been kept well-fed and well-rested for combat. This has been facilitated by a large and growing regular army force.

In the early days of the war, the AFU outnumbered the Russians. This situation changed in early to mid-2023 as Russia mobilized more troops and flowed them into the theatre. Unlike Ukrainian conscripts, who receive from three hours to three months of training, Russian enlisted contract soldiers enter a six-month training pipeline away from the front. They are then integrated into their units, where they receive further specific training.

Now, Russia’s problem is that the number of enlisted contract troops in reserve far exceeds the number engaged in combat. Troops held back are chomping at the bit to see action. Russia has been paying bounties for Western vehicles captured and other prizes, ‘nuff said. They want theirs.

In contrast, Ukraine has been unable to rotate its best fighting units. The handful of elite units it has are treated as fire brigades. They are rushed from one hot spot to another to shore up crumbling defenses.

As of summer 2024, Ukraine’s commanding general, Syrsky, stated that the contact line extended at least 625 miles (Ukrinform, August 20, 2024). Unlike the Ukrainians, who attempted “big arrow offensives” planned by their NATO advisers, the Russians applied relatively even pressure all along the front. When a point of weakness crumbles, they exploit it. The Ukrainians then rush the Azov Brigade, the 47th Mechanized Brigade, the 82nd Airmobile Brigade, or some other elite unit to push them back. This leaves the elite forces’ previous positions exposed. The Russians then stepped up attacks on the weakened positions.

The result is elite fire brigades that never get any rest. Furthermore, the elite brigades serve as “motivational troops” for the regular army and conscripts. Without the motivational troops to stop them, the conscripts often run.

Ukraine does not have enough men to cover the entire front. The recent Kursk offensive was a short-term tactical success but a strategic debacle. To carry it out, Ukraine concentrated all of its elite troops into one fist and threw them against a lightly defended section of the front. They invaded Russia but were quickly contained by border guards, conscripts, Chechen Special Forces, and Naval Infantry. The area was lightly defended because there was nothing of value there.

The Kursk II offensive did three things. 1) It extended the front line, thus spreading Ukraine’s forces further. 2) It pulled Ukraine’s best troops away from the Donbas. Regular army and conscripts are being rapidly overrun. 3) Attacking Kursk pissed off the Russians. Kursk is holy ground. There are murals in Russian cathedrals depicting the first battle of Kursk. The Battle of Pokrovka, where T-34s rammed Tigers to get mobility kills. The crews of both tanks got out and fought hand-to-hand.

Even the most highly motivated Ukrainian soldiers break under the constant stress of combat. Since the beginning of the war, over 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been charged with desertion (Source: Ukraine General Prosecutor’s Office, Associated Press November 29, 2024). Crucially, 60,000 of these cases were opened in the first 10 months of 2024, easily exceeding the number in the previous two years (Source: Ukraine General Prosecutor’s Office, Kyiv Post December 2, 2024).

The 123rd Infantry Brigade simply abandoned their positions in Vuhledar. The troops fled to Mykolayev, where they publicly went on strike. They claimed they were not given the support promised. They were promised 150 tanks and had to make do with 20. All they had were rifles (Kyiv Post, December 2, 2024).

No fighting force gets everything it wants. They make do. What is worrisome is that the case of the 123rd Brigade is not isolated. It is repeated time and again everywhere along the front. In some cases, AFU brigades have accused each other of cowardice on their Facebook pages.

A remarkable incident occurred during the Battle of Avdivka (Forbes April 23, 2024). The AFU 47th Mechanized Brigade is one of Ukraine’s elite. It had been fighting in the Avdivka area – a place called Ocheretyne – and was begging for a break. It had 2,000 men out of its original 3,500 – 57% effective. That is high for a Ukrainian unit. Most are 50% effective or less. The 47th was promised relief by the 115th Mechanized Brigade, but the 115th didn’t show up. The 47th waited and waited and waited. Finally, they said “heck with it” and pulled out. As one officer of the 47th said, “Certain units just fucked off.”

A Russian motor rifle brigade attacked and nearly broke through. The 47th had to rush back and fend them off. Frankly, the 47th should never have left without being properly relieved. Avdivka didn’t fall that day, but it did fall after more fighting, shelling, and glide-bombing. The loss was disastrous.

The story is not about any one engagement. It is a pattern of brave troops outnumbered, pushed to exhaustion, and past the breaking point. That story, and worse, is being repeated everywhere along the front.

The 100,000 cases reported are those brought to the prosecutor. By some estimates, the total number of desertions exceeds 200,000. With an active fighting force of 350,000, that’s material.

In the early days, deserters were summarily executed in the field. Now, with manpower at a premium, there is more flexibility. In some cases, first-time offenders are given an opportunity to return to their units. Most prefer to be charged because they prefer jail terms to the front. They consider the front a death sentence.

Morale is low and falling. Ukraine is resorting to various means to inspire its troops. In the Kursk salient, President Zelensky says he knows there are up to 100,000 North Korean troops in the field, he knows some have been killed and wounded, he just doesn’t have any proof. President Biden used the narrative of North Korean troops to justify launching long-range missiles into Russia. Zelensky is desperate to hold onto the shrinking Kursk salient – he has been told he can use it as a bargaining chip once Trump becomes president.

Zelensky is ordering his troops in Kursk to hold. And capture North Koreans. He is offering his troops rewards of extra leave if they capture a live North Korean, preferably with documents.

The BBC interviewed Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the Kursk salient (BBC December 3, 2024). They were not excited by the bounty.

“I haven’t seen or heard anything about Koreans, alive or dead,” Vadym responded when BBC asked.

“It’s very difficult to find a Korean in the dark Kursk forest,” Pavlo chimed in. “Especially if he’s not here.”

Vadym and Pavlo are staying to fight.

For now.

About the Author

You may reach Cameron at: [email protected]

Cameron Curtis has spent thirty years in the financial markets as a trader and risk manager. He was on the trade floor when Saddam’s tanks rolled into Kuwait, when the air wars opened over Baghdad and Belgrade, and when the financial crisis swallowed the world. He’s studied military affairs and warfare all his adult life. His popular Breed series of military adventure thrillers are admired for combining deep expertise with propulsive action. The premises are realistic, the stories adrenaline-fuelled and emotionally engaging.

Check out the books here: Cameron Curtis’s Amazon Page

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