With all the hype in regards to North Korea, it’s only necessary to have a discussion about how our special operations forces (SOF) would perform in the region if things actually did go south.
While my background is specifically within the Army Special Operations Command, I can shed some light as to how our SOF units would perform in the N. Korean environment, and touch on how other special operations forces within the Navy and Marines may perform, as I have worked with them extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Special Operations Command and Tier Status
Special Operations Forces play a significant role in U.S. military operations, and the Administration has given US SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. Special Operations Forces are elite military units with special training and equipment who can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, and air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them being classified.
SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy special training. Typically, the general public categorizes SOF forces by their tier: the higher the tier, the better the unit. In actuality, this is not a designation of which unit is the best. Instead, the tier status designates units by their mission capabilities. Tier 1 units typically take on the nation’s high priority missions, while Tier 2 and Tier 3 units perform a larger scale of specialized classified operations.
All Tier 1 and Tier 2 units maintain three separate operational groups within their respective units; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ranger Battalion is an example. These groups are essentially identical and deploy within their respective JSOC package. The rotational cycle is generally three months. This allows one group to be deployed overseas, another to be on an 18-hour worldwide emergency deployment notice, and the last group to be training, attending military schools, or on “block leave.” Tier 1 and Tier 2 units take leave together within their respective JSOC package. This term is called “block leave.” Given the wartime tasking of JSOC, an additional deployment package is currently being created. This will allow less operational strain on these units.
Over 80 percent of North Korea is composed of mountains and uplands separated by deep and narrow valleys. All of the peninsula’s mountains reach elevations of 6,600 feet or more, while the majority of the population lives in the lowlands and plains. North Korea also has four distinct seasons, the harshest being the winter and summer. Snowfall averages 37 total days during the winter, while the summer season brings harsh, hot and humid temperatures.
Looking at the region, we can compare it to what our SOF has become accustomed to during the past 11+ years in the Global War On Terrorism. The high altitudes, cold winters, and snow of North Korea are somewhat similar to what I’ve operated in in some parts of Afghanistan. As much as it sucks to operate in these environments, our mission success rate did not decline, and we were still able to operate and function at a high capacity. This is what our guys train for stateside, day in and day out, for months on end.
The humid, hot climates would somewhat resemble Iraq in some manner. Operating in 130+ degree weather in Iraq did create some issues, such as heat casualties, but we were able to redefine our training regimen to allow us to overcome the extreme heat and still be mission effective 100 percent.
The only problem that I would see affecting our men on the ground would be the fact that we would be fighting in a woodland/jungle environment. We had to redefine our way of fighting when we entered the streets of Iraq and Afghanistan, urban and mountain warfare. The last conflict we had in a regions of this nature was Vietnam. Not that this would be much of an issue as our SOF specialize in adapting to any environment, but it would be somewhat of a “shock” in the difference of combat.
North Korean Special Forces
Though North Korea’s military does outnumber the United States’ military by an overwhelming number when you include their reservist, paramilitary, and active duty, we cannot let these numbers fool or discourage us. The last major conflict the North Koreans were in dates back to the 1950s.
The North Korean Special Forces units number approximately 200,000 soldiers. The missions of their Special Operations Forces are to breach the fixed defense of South Korea, to create a “second front” in the enemy’s rear area, and to conduct battlefield and strategic reconnaissance, a far cry from what our men who serve in our Special Operations units conduct on a day-to-day basis. Not only do they lack in overall mission capabilities, they also, once again, lack in operational experience.
After operating overseas on eight different occasions, I can honestly tell you that no matter how extensive your training is, nothing amounts to actual operational experience as when bullets fly both ways. This is something that you cannot train for stateside, it only occurs in combat where the boys separate themselves from the men.
North Korea’s military spending budget amounts to approximately $910 million, according to reports in 2012. This may seem like a lot to some, but when compared to the U.S. military spending budget of $683.7 billion, North Korea’s budget seems minute. Within North Korea’s total military budget, only a fraction is given to their special forces units, while USSOCOM’s budget is estimated to be in the tens of millions, and certain Tier 1 elements have an “unlimited budget.” Sure, the men who are amongst these ranks make the unit who they are, but having a budget to purchase new gear, weapons, training essentials, etc., makes the difference. A lack of a budget will only provide the men with less than par combat essentials.
I’m sure we’ve all seen the big marches on TV of North Korea displaying their military might, but is it what it’s cracked up to be? I would say negative! North Korea’s weaponry is beyond outdated in comparison to our military technology. Most of the weaponry we see on TV is extremely outdated. Although the missiles do display a great sight to the eye, we must not forget that they are dated back to the Cold War, and even with their “new” missiles, they still fail to live up to their prescribed hype. To date, N. Korea’s missile capabilities still fail to reach the Continental United States, and often fail during their test launch.
Who Would Do What?
From my experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I can shed a little insight on who would do what in North Korea.
Our Army SOF units would absolutely play a key role in taking down the infrastructure of N. Korea. Let’s break it down by unit.
First, I’d like to start with the US Army Rangers within the 75th. These men, as described earlier, specialize in taking down key infrastructure, seizing airfields, direct action raids, etc. Before any major ground combat commenced in N. Korea, the men of the 75th Ranger Regiment would conduct airborne operations on these key infrastructures, completely destroying them before turning them over to regular Army forces, rendering the N. Koreans incapable of launching an offensive/defensive strike.
The US Army Rangers would then conduct special reconnaissance raids on US high value targets, in cooperation with other Tier 1 units, completely disrupting the N. Korean’s chain of command. Please note that N. Korea has an estimated of 78 usable airfields. This would be quite a job for the 75th Ranger Regiment, but not impossible. The Regiment trains extensively on such tasks, and is capable of taking over any airfield within an 8 hour time period.
The men of the US Special Forces would more than likely be in the region before any publicized or major offensive. Their mission would be to conduct covert recon operations behind enemy lines, gathering intel on troop movement, key personnel and special infrastructure, such as missile launch pads, designating them for future air and ground attacks. Being that they operate in very small teams and being able to remain unseen would render them key in the over mission success. The SF units would also join in on some direct action raids.
The US Army Tier 1 unit, Delta Force, would do what they do best. In conjunction with SEAL Team 6, they would hit the top leaders of the N. Korean military hard. In addition to capturing/killing key personnel, they would also interrogate and extract information from them, trickling it down to the Tier 2 and 3 elements for future tracking and strikes.
Navy and Marines SOF
The US Navy SEALs would play a very key role in what they do best…working on land, sea, and air. Not only would they destroy key infrastructure on land and in the sea with MARSOC units, they would also perform key, strategic and precise hits on land in cooperation with and alongside US Army Rangers.
The US Navy SEAL Team 6 element would more than likely operate hand-in-hand with the US Army Delta Force, conducting covert operations behind enemy lines, taking out/down key targeted personnel. With a few nuclear sites bordering N. Korea’s coast, I’m sure the SEALs and MARSOC would play a key role in destroying the infrastructure, or displaying a feint maneuver, allowing other SOF’s to conduct operations in the region, similar to the “feint” maneuver displayed in Desert Storm. We may also find the SEALs conducting their historical mission, taking out coastal obstacles, ships, rigs, etc., clearing the the route for conventional forces.
Our SOF Performance
After working with the majority of the units listed, I would assume that the mass hit of SOF units in strategic locations would render the N. Korean military mission capability crippled. Our military now understands very well how to properly deploy our SOF units to their fullest capability, having learned through trial and error (the 90s and GWOT).
Properly deploying them to their areas of specialties at a strategic time, would not only create mass chaos, it would disassemble key elements in power of the regime.
RVN SF VET I am well aware that this response is long overdue as your response is almost 1 1/2 years old. I will assume you are a legitimate former Special Operations veteran whereas I am NOT, I was a vanilla flavored leg Infantry grunt. It should be noted that upon enlisting, me and a buddy went into Benning as 11X. Whilst I do NOT remember how much choice we really had in the matter, we brainstormed and decided we wanted 11B "Light Infantry" us rocket scientists thought we would rather be light infantry and NOT have to hump heavy ass rucks. Well, yes I can wait until your laughter subsides..............................OK not that funny come one................your right, it is funny!!! So our next choice (again not sure how much choice we really had) was 10th Mountain in New York or 2nd Infantry in Korea. More brainstorming and we decided we didn't like mountains and thus we took the Korea option. More laughter? OK we deserve it.... South Korea smells like the arm pit of the world seriously, it hit us the second we got out of Kinpo. We spent about 4 days at Casey. Got to say wasn't all bad and there were girls, lots of them. So right about the time we thought Korea may not be so bad, we were told get our asses on that Huey an off we went. The co-pilot seriously looked like he was 18 at best. Relatively green one could say. Come to find out, Korea is the first destination for all helo pilots, whether Chinooks/Hueys/Blackhawks, they all cut their teeth in the mountains of Korea. Never a good feeling to be in an Air Assault/Air Mobile Infantry unit with a first year pilot on NAP flights. Anyway Korea, freezing in the winter and drop dead disgusting hot and humid in the summer. Before we knew it we were at Camp Greaves and Liberty Bell. We were assigned to Charlie Company 1/506. We were on work up to go on the Mission and had a CALFAX seemed like every other day. Within the month we were on the Mission (3 months patrolling the DMZ) Combat Veterans will know this but man oh man getting jocked up (for lack of a better word) took a long time. Everything and I mean everything is taped down tied off. Being that part of the cease fire from the Korean War, the war isn't over even today, was no fully automatic weapons, no infantry troops (IE..no kevlars) we wore soft covers with MP Arm bands (infantry pretending to be MP's) At that time we were the forward most deployed combat unit in the military (1990) So on patrols, set up ambushes, the ENTIRE time there were loudspeakers on the NK side blasted American lovesongs and NK propaganda 24/7 ( I got so sick of Journey's FAITHFULLY) over and over. Now, RVN SF VET, I am not sure what you saw, but the NK's in my opinion looked like a bunch of malnourished sickly kids essentially. The infiltrators that tried to get past Freedom Bridge/Imjin River weren't much to look at Now one thing I will agree with is every single person whether military or civilian they have an almost insane belief to kill or be killed on behalf of protecting the Dear Leader. That made things very scary knowing that we at best had roughly 1,000 infantry troops on the DMZ whereas the NK had well over 200K within 5 miles of the MDL. If the SHTF, our deal was simple, engage and try to gain fire superiority then ? Well, break contact (center peel) and get the hell outta Dodge. Freedom Bridge (spans the Imjin river) is already pre rigged with explosives. If the bridge was blown prior to us getting out well we would swim get across and muster about 30/40 miles back to pre established fighting positions and establish a defensive perimeter outside of Seoul. So my point (sorry for all the extras) for the most part NK soldiers are worthless longevity wise. Yes they would overwhelm us just by the sheer number and lets not forget the fanaticism, I would guarantee untold suicide charges. Yet they have no viable air assets and whatever they can put in the air would be confetti almost instantly, we would lose massive numbers of soldiers/airman in the early stages but would be an absolute failure on the part of the NK military. No way to keep their soldiers supplied ammo/fuel/food. It is my steadfast belief that our Rangers would have initial problems but would have the majority of airfields within 24 hours. Air Strikes and force multipliers (SOS) would take out their ability to communicate and after extremely high initial casualties on our side, we would no doubt take Kim Jong FATTY out of the equation. With that, my only concern would be China, we already fought them to a stalemate once. I don't know about today
shooten Lurch! lol. Good one. Anyway, yeah, not too bright Mr. Kerry.
shooten Lurch! lol. Good one. Anyway, yeah, not too bright Mr. Kerry.
hjw1dr shooten "maybe will help if you give us some technology>" But China, you've been stealing all that technology from us for years now. And we continue to make it easy for you by using your computer chips & memory in most of our weapons systems & laptops. What more do you want? And they'd say "Listening devices in the Oval Office and throughout the Pentagon and State Dept." And Lurch, I mean Kerry would say "Okay, deal!"
RVN SF VET
With all due respect to a more recent soldier - crappola. I'm surprised that you guys published this. BUT, I could use whatever this guy is smoking. First, his description of our SOCOM forces is amateurish. There have been articles here which are much more accurate and not as grossly superficial. Although the common meaning of the "Tier" structure is close to what he says; the "Tier" system is a SOCOM budgetary device. Amongst other things, I would never refer to the SOAR in common parlance as anything other than "Tier One." Now about North Korea. First, it's a harder nut to crack than North Vietnam and we lost essentially everyone, American and native Vietnamese, on stay in place missions. We were able to do raids such as kidnappings and assassinations as well as wiretaps and similar - but we did not stay more than overnight and rarely that. Also, look at SOG's record after the NVA caught on - it was near suicide and almost always was a hot extraction towards the end. Does that bode well for a real police state with a loyal, throughly monitored populace? I believe that coastal raids with same night extraction are feasible. The AF combat rescue PJs have a decent chance with the type of support we gave them in North Vietnam on call. The author can talk about cold weather and high-altitude all he wants. He can dwell on our fascination with hardware superiority all he wants. It just doesn't signify. Although we were amateurish, our guerrilla efforts in North Korea all ended in death for the Koreans and Americans we inserted to include those who went in on foot. I mention foot insertion because our air operations lacked the precautions used in France. BTW, we had next to zero success on insertions into Nazi Germany. I know one guy who made it and he spoke perfect German and he went in to contact his father - a colonel in the SS. Also, take note of what happened when small units were detected in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the people, not the opposing forces which are the problem. Suggesting that the North Korean SF would be hunting our is a silly estimate of the situation. The people, the police, the militia, the army, and their SF would be hunting our people. Finally, like us, their SF has elites. The infiltrators they tried to send to the Blue House and those who crossed the DMZ put up a hell of a fight and killed some and wounded many of our defenders (including ROK personnel) until we killed them. They were highly trained and had no inclination to surrender. An Army friend of mine got the CIB and the Bronce Star with "V" device for his squads battle with infiltrators at the DMZ. There were two of them and it lasted most of the night and required reinforcements. A mission in North Korea had better be of overriding importance, because coming back is not likely - unless the mission is coastal. These are the types of missions that are part of an all-out war with North Korea where our casualties will be similar to those suffered in the Korean War. Which is why we should nuke their asses if they try anything.