In an effort to extend security and governance beyond areas of Afghanistan where Coalition conventional forces were not operating the U.S. special operations forces organized the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP is a locally-based village or community security force established in mid-2010. Initially the ALP came under the control of U.S. special operations forces [1] but later the ALP was transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI).
Key districts (similar to counties in the U.S) were identified as locations to form up the ALP units (usually around 30-60 personnel). The U.S. SOF had a strict vetting process for recruits that included ‘buy in’ from the local village elders in addition to security checks conducted at the national level. Once the recruits were selected, they received training from U.S special operations teams – sometimes at the local level and other times at a regional location.
The ALP is a local defensive force of policemen with limited legal authority. While they can detain someone they do not have the full powers that a member of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) possesses. The ALP cannot conduct offensive operations unless insurgents are within their local area (district level).
The introduction of the ALP as a local defense force was not well-received by some observers in the international community. Concerns about ALP becoming just another militia controlled by warlords or powerbrokers independent from the Afghan government were expressed by many humanitarian organizations as well as some of the European nations. Some of those concerns were well-placed as reports of ‘unilateral ALP’ and militias calling themselves ALP emerged. [2]
The Afghan Local Police program was linked to the U.S. SOF Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. There were basically three parts of VSO that were implemented by U.S. SOF: security, development, and governance. U.S. SOF worked all three of these lines of effort to establish stability at the district level using a ‘bottom up’ approach. [3]
As time progressed and the ALP program matured – the management of the Afghan Local Police was turned over entirely to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Supervision of the ALP units is exercised through the Afghan District Chiefs of Police and Provincial Chiefs of Police. Funding is provided by the United States to field up to 30,000 ALP. Current strength (mid-2016) is at about 29,000. There are tentative plans to increase this number to 45,000; however the U.S. military is waiting for the implementation of some specific reforms by the MoI in the management of the ALP before requesting the manning increase. [4]
The Afghan Local Police program, for the most part, has been a success. A significant factor of the success of this local defense force was the integration of ALP with the ‘bottom up’ approach of the VSO program. [5] The ability of special operations forces to organize, train, equip, assist, and advise an indigenous local defense force in the middle of a counterinsurgency environment was aptly demonstrated with the ALP program.
Footnotes:
In an effort to extend security and governance beyond areas of Afghanistan where Coalition conventional forces were not operating the U.S. special operations forces organized the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP is a locally-based village or community security force established in mid-2010. Initially the ALP came under the control of U.S. special operations forces [1] but later the ALP was transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI).
Key districts (similar to counties in the U.S) were identified as locations to form up the ALP units (usually around 30-60 personnel). The U.S. SOF had a strict vetting process for recruits that included ‘buy in’ from the local village elders in addition to security checks conducted at the national level. Once the recruits were selected, they received training from U.S special operations teams – sometimes at the local level and other times at a regional location.
The ALP is a local defensive force of policemen with limited legal authority. While they can detain someone they do not have the full powers that a member of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) possesses. The ALP cannot conduct offensive operations unless insurgents are within their local area (district level).
The introduction of the ALP as a local defense force was not well-received by some observers in the international community. Concerns about ALP becoming just another militia controlled by warlords or powerbrokers independent from the Afghan government were expressed by many humanitarian organizations as well as some of the European nations. Some of those concerns were well-placed as reports of ‘unilateral ALP’ and militias calling themselves ALP emerged. [2]
The Afghan Local Police program was linked to the U.S. SOF Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. There were basically three parts of VSO that were implemented by U.S. SOF: security, development, and governance. U.S. SOF worked all three of these lines of effort to establish stability at the district level using a ‘bottom up’ approach. [3]
As time progressed and the ALP program matured – the management of the Afghan Local Police was turned over entirely to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Supervision of the ALP units is exercised through the Afghan District Chiefs of Police and Provincial Chiefs of Police. Funding is provided by the United States to field up to 30,000 ALP. Current strength (mid-2016) is at about 29,000. There are tentative plans to increase this number to 45,000; however the U.S. military is waiting for the implementation of some specific reforms by the MoI in the management of the ALP before requesting the manning increase. [4]
The Afghan Local Police program, for the most part, has been a success. A significant factor of the success of this local defense force was the integration of ALP with the ‘bottom up’ approach of the VSO program. [5] The ability of special operations forces to organize, train, equip, assist, and advise an indigenous local defense force in the middle of a counterinsurgency environment was aptly demonstrated with the ALP program.
Footnotes:
[1] SOF working with the ALP included U.S. Army Special Forces, Marine Corps MARSOC, and U.S. Navy SEALs. These SOF teams came under the control of regional Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) based regionally around the country and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) at Bagram Air Field.
[2] ‘Unilateral ALP’ were ALP set up by the Ministry of Interior without the assistance (and sometimes without the knowledge) of U.S. SOF. Some Afghan militias (stood up by warlords or powerbrokers) called themselves ALP in an effort to seek legitimacy and funding.
[3] The ‘bottom up’ approach is explained in a book by Seth Jones entitled In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, (2010). Jones worked at the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) for a year as an advisor and researcher.
[4] See pages 91-93 of Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, June 2016 for more on current strength and future funding.
[5] USAJFKSWCS, “Taking a Stand: Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police”, Special Warfare Magazine, July-September 2011.
Photos:
Top photo is an ALP candidate undergoing initial training in Kajran district, Daykundi province (Jan 2013). Photo by PO Matthew Leistikow, CJSOTF-A. Second photo is of a team meeting with ALP. From Special Warfare Magazine, July-September 2011.
As someone who’s seen what happens when the truth is distorted, I know how unfair it feels when those who’ve sacrificed the most lose their voice. At SOFREP, our veteran journalists, who once fought for freedom, now fight to bring you unfiltered, real-world intel. But without your support, we risk losing this vital source of truth. By subscribing, you’re not just leveling the playing field—you’re standing with those who’ve already given so much, ensuring they continue to serve by delivering stories that matter. Every subscription means we can hire more veterans and keep their hard-earned knowledge in the fight. Don’t let their voices be silenced. Please consider subscribing now.
One team, one fight,
Brandon Webb former Navy SEAL, Bestselling Author and Editor-in-Chief
Barrett is the world leader in long-range, large-caliber, precision rifle design and manufacturing. Barrett products are used by civilians, sport shooters, law enforcement agencies, the United States military, and more than 75 State Department-approved countries around the world.
PO Box 1077 MURFREESBORO, Tennessee 37133 United States
Scrubba Wash Bag
Our ultra-portable washing machine makes your journey easier. This convenient, pocket-sized travel companion allows you to travel lighter while helping you save money, time and water.
Our roots in shooting sports started off back in 1996 with our founder and CEO, Josh Ungier. His love of airguns took hold of our company from day one and we became the first e-commerce retailer dedicated to airguns, optics, ammo, and accessories. Over the next 25 years, customers turned to us for our unmatched product selection, great advice, education, and continued support of the sport and airgun industry.
COMMENTS
There are on this article.
You must become a subscriber or login to view or post comments on this article.