After one too many coffees and having eaten the makeshift snack tent dry, we loaded up into the helicopters shortly after midnight and prepared for the long flight in. I was on the second CH-53E in a formation of four, with chalks one and two flying as a pair, and chalks three and four flying as another pair in trail. Based on the nature of the threat, our overwatch was an AC-130 Spectre gunship, which was ordered to come on station an hour before our intended wheels-down timing. This was deliberately planned in order to minimize the chance of a noise compromise. Insurgents were very cognizant of our training, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and a circling aircraft was one the clearest indications that a follow-on force was likely to be arriving in the vicinity at some point in the immediate future.
After approximately an hour’s flight time, we received a 10-minute courtesy call; we were to be wheels down on our designated HLZ shortly. I was about the fourth man in from the tail ramp, and I began my routine of getting ready to disembark—checking equipment, tightening straps, moving my legs, checking my night vision, etc. I was going over the actions-on in my head when we received the 30-second call. I knew just how bad Kajaki Sofla was, as we had been to this exact area only two years prior, except this time there was one critical difference: We were landing in the green zone rather than 10 km off target.
The CH-53E Super Stallions were unable to land us in the dasht due to the threat of helicopter brownout. This ultimately meant that, rather than taking the bazaar by stealth and surprise like we did in 2009, we were landing four of the biggest and not-so-agile helicopters right in the middle of a hornet nest.
Another grouping and task of this operation involved a USMC recon element, which was to stage about eight km (five miles) outside of Kajaki Sofla. They were to provide a blocking element to the south, as well as to serve as a quick-reaction force in extremis. The recon element departed about half a day prior in order to reach their designated staging location, which they did without incident. What we ended up finding out later, however, was that their movement triggered reporting up through the valley as part of the insurgent network’s early warning.
Even though the recon element stopped short of our intended target area, it put the entire valley on notice due to the coalition movement. Some of the communications intercept that I was privy to in the days after the operation indicated that the insurgents in our target area were standing by and actually waiting for coalition soldiers to arrive. They were running pickets, complete with scheduled change-outs—essentially standing by for our impending arrival. They may not have known how we were going to get there or where exactly we were going to be, but they were obviously—and rightly—convinced that we were going to be in the general vicinity at some point in the immediate future.
Around 10 seconds had passed since the 30-second call was given, and by this stage, we were all on a knee facing the CH-53E’s tail ramp. It was dark, cramped, hot, and the helicopter had a bad habit of spitting hydraulic fluid over a handful of lucky guys throughout the entire flight in. We were looking out the rear of the bird and focused on getting off and getting on with our job when the horizon erupted with two very bright and very distinctive vertical blasts of gunfire.
Under NVGs, the two parallel trails of gunfire went well above the opening that we could see out of, and for those of us lucky enough to see the fireworks, we immediately knew that it was an anti-aircraft weapon—most probably a ZU-23-2. The AA gun first took aim at us, then the trailing birds, and then—believe it or not—at the AC-130 Spectre. Later, during the AAR, we were made aware that the Spectre had reported “baseball-size explosions” a thousand or so feet higher than what they were flying as overwatch. The gunship was subsequently pushed off station at our most critical point—the landing—which almost ended in absolute disaster.
We were nine feet off the ground when things really took an interesting turn. Without warning, the left, right, and rear sides of the helo erupted with incoming gunfire. All three door and tail gunners opened up simultaneously, returning fire while the CH-53E pilots took immediate evasive action. We were thrown from our knees into the side of the helo as it banked hard left in a way that I didn’t think possible from ‘ye ol’ crash pony’.
Both helicopters in the first packet found themselves on the receiving end of a well-orchestrated U-shaped ambush, with the insurgents’ only fault being their premature initiation. Had they applied some tactical patience and waited another 30 seconds for us to be on the ground, disembarking, then the proverbial shit would have really hit the fan. Our alternate HLZ was also compromised, which made landing impossible, and the pilot in command eventually gave the order to abort the mission. We flew back to Bastion where we regrouped, modified our mission, got some rest, and redeployed the following night.
What these examples serve to highlight is how the utilization of air assets opened up an entirely new spectrum of operational possibilities and environments for us to exploit. These particular operations and countless others would not have happened without the availability of airframes for us to utilize. Our limitations as a FE were undoubtedly linked to the inability of our own government to have provided us with the aircraft that we so desperately needed.
William McRaven’s theory of special operations (SO) discusses how relative superiority is achieved through the application of six interdependent principles: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. Surprise is achieved by catching the enemy off guard through deception, timing, and exploitation of his vulnerabilities. Speed enables a force element to reach its target area or objective as quickly as possible so as to limit vulnerability and enhance the opportunity to achieve relative superiority.
Beyond a shadow of a doubt, our utilization of air assets is inextricably linked to the realization of these principles. In Afghanistan, it allowed us to operate in the way that we as a special operations force are trained to operate. It enabled us to plan for and achieve a far greater effect than relying solely on ground-based options. As our rotations progressed, the ground-based and helicopter-based operations continuum started to lean in favor of the latter, which fully enabled the Special Operations Task Group’s Force Element Bravo (SOTG FE – B, or the 2nd Commando Regiment) to realize its full potential. We still had to compete for the U.S. aircraft to use on our operations, however, our competitors were far fewer and any conflicts could generally be worked around fairly easily.
(All images courtesy of the Australian Defence Force unless otherwise stated)
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