Jeds would put all of the pieces in place needed to conduct an unconventional campaign if the US government required it at some future date, and also would prepare the environment for Special Operations Forces if that need arose as well. This way, the infrastructure for both Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare is already in place years, if not decades, prior to it being needed. This level of long-term forward thinking will result in intelligence information which is more accurate, timely, and consistent, allowing policy makers a much greater range of options in addressing international security crisis and allowing military force to be used in much more surgical manners which limit damage and casualties on both sides of the conflict.
One friction involved in standing up a program like Jed-21 is the feasibility of projecting influence of this nature across the entire world. As mentioned previously, other OPE initiatives are limited in scope and do not maintain long-term pervasive presences overseas.
Some countries have cultures and national styles that appear to lend themselves better to unconventional warfare more so than the United States. Iran uses Quds Force and Hezbollah to project influence and maintain networks. China works through the Third Department of the People’s Liberation Army to maintain influence throughout the pacific rim and beyond. However, these countries seem to maintain mostly regional influence rather than global influence, as the Jed-21 program would. Allied nations like Britain and France maintain overseas intelligence networks, but these are also somewhat regional in scope and usually based in former colonies where they have the home field advantage. France may provide a helpful example for Jed-21 as it has been alleged that the French use former members of the French Foreign Legion as long-term overseas intelligence assets throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe.
Jed-21 will have significant hurdles to overcome in the early years. Inserting over 180 operatives into somewhere around 180 countries is a large-scale project. However, the intent from the beginning is to maintain a light footprint in each country, with minimal overhead in regards to logistics and funding that the operatives require from their handlers in the United States. The Jed-21 concept is that the operatives work in a decentralized manner and are self-reliant. The program will probably have to provide some seed funding for the operatives to help get established in their target countries, but within a few years the operative should be self-sufficient. Self sufficiency should be one of the metrics used to judge an operative’s level of success, and if they do not achieve this within a few years, they should be replaced with someone more creative and resourceful.
Once the growing pains in Jed-21 are over, the program will become institutionalized and become an entrenched part of the US government’s intelligence gathering apparatus. Jed-21 will be multi-generational in scope. As operatives pass away and have to come back to the US, they will be replaced with younger Special Forces veterans. If the operative has married and had children in their target country, then their kids would be looked at as viable replacements. Jed-21 will require very little funding and maintenance over the long-term and will provide a significant return on investment for the Special Operations community.
Perhaps more so than feasibility, the real challenge to Jed-21 will be bureaucratic and legal in nature. For instance, there are already two venues under which agents are run under Non-Official Cover: one at the CIA and another at the DOD. Other programs exist for running intelligence assets. The fear of a duplication of capabilities within the intelligence and defense establishment may prevent Jed-21 from getting off the ground as many will see it as encroaching on their territory. To this end, it must be made clear that Jed-21 is a new capability and does not take away missions or tasks from other agencies.
Legally, the debate of Title 10 versus Title 50 is going to haunt the Jed-21 program. The military normally works under Title 10 authorities to conduct operations, while the CIA uses their Title 50 authorities to conduct covert operations. The military gets around these restrictions which preclude them from many intelligence related activities by classifying their activities as OPE. Units like ISA conduct OPE, which is considered to be directly related to combat operations, as they are simply doing intelligence gathering to support the military under Title 10. However, OPE and the covert activities of the CIA often look identical to each other.
Furthermore, both the military and the CIA have been exploiting a loophole in the law which allows Special Operations to conduct missions under Title 50 authorities. The way this is done is that JSOC will notionally hand operational control of their units over to the CIA, and while placed under the auspices of Central Intelligence (Wall, 2), JSOC operators can now conduct covert operations which would otherwise be illegal.
The very real concern exists that JSOC operators can be “sheep dipped” and used as CIA assassins. In this manner, the CIA gets to act as gate keeper to coveted Title 50 authorities, blessing off on JSOC operations that they want to green light. On the other hand, JSOC gets their operators out on missions which capture or kill high value targets, the type of missions from which JSOC derives credibility and legitimacy. These types of operations may be technically legal, but they exploit a loophole which Congress has turned a blind eye to so as not to upset operations during a time of war.
Due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq winding down, elected leaders becoming more aware of the Title 10/50 loophole, and because the media is likely to expose further indiscretions on the part of JSOC, it is highly likely that this legal loophole will be closed in the coming years. Jed-21 will be directly impacted by this issue and it will have to be decided under what authorities the program operates under. Is it Title 10 or Title 50?
The controversial nature of the legal loophole makes it unlikely that it will be able to masquerade as both. However, having a clearly defined tasking and authority is a good thing for Jed-21. The military and intelligence communities have relied on novel interpretations of the law, legal loop holes, and willfully skirting around the intent of the law for far too long. “The Title 10-Title 50 debate is the epitome of an ill-defined policy debate with imprecise terms and mystifying pronouncements,” (Wall, 86) and this gray area will not be allowed to continue as is much longer. Jed-21 and the rest of SOF should operate under clear authorities given to them by lawmakers.
Preferably, Jed-21 would in fact operate as an open source intelligence mechanism that does not fall under Title 10 or Title 50. The program could be privatized and run in a quasi-official manner if need be. Jeds would live off their pensions along with a stipend as needed in the early years and would be traveling on their civilian passports. They would not have a cover; their backstop is their real life. In the 21st century, old methods of espionage are becoming obsolete. The new covert is overt.
The process of standing up Jed-21 faces profound challenges, particularly in the early years as the program would struggle to identify operatives, insert them, fund them, and as the program works to attain legitimacy within the US defense establishment. However, the great dividends which it can provide would be unprecedented. The intelligence value Jed-21 would provide to SOF, intelligence agencies, and defense planners should not be underestimated. Compared to other defense programs, Jed-21 would also require relatively low funding in the early years, and perhaps no funding over a longer time horizon. This may be important in a time when the Pentagon is facing increasing austerity measures.
Whether Jed-21 is accepted or rejected as a program is a matter for experts in the field of Special Operations and Intelligence gathering. What should not happen is for Jed-21 to be swept aside and shelved rather than discussed. The reasons for this are enshrined in the “SOF truths” (Special Operations Command) which state that quality SOF cannot be mass-produced or created in response to an emergency. As Charlie Beckwith wrote, it takes years to insert an asset and get them to a point where they are producing valuable intelligence. By the time a war breaks out in the South China Sea, or an Oil Refinery in Algeria is taken over by terrorists, it is already too late to start from scratch. The Jedburgh concept should be dusted off today because long-term sustainable relationships are just that, not a knee jerk response to an emergency.
American Special Operations Forces should be forward thinking and deliberate in their actions as opposed to letting the enemy dictate the terms of the battle. Modern-day Jedburghs will help America move beyond counter-terrorism and begin the process of getting inside and disrupting the enemy’s decision-making process by utilizing intimate local knowledge and capitalizing on long-term rapport built in the host nations in which they will live.
Bibliography
Beckwith, Charlie. Delta Force. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983.
“Eagle Claw veteran, Special Ops Aviator receives 2013 Bull Simons Award.” Bottoms, Mike. May, 22 2013. Web.
Irwin, Will. The Jedburghs. Public Affairs, 2005.
Smith, Michael. Killer Elite. St. Martin’s Press, 2006.
“SOF Truths.” www.soc.mil. n.d. Web
Wall, Andru E. “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities, and Covert Action.” Havard Law School National Security Journal, 2011.
(Featured Image Courtesy: Wikimedia)
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