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Home » Special Operations » Soldiers in Afghanistan Finally Allowed to Put Magazines in Weapons

Soldiers in Afghanistan Finally Allowed to Put Magazines in Weapons

by Mark Miller · August 20, 2012 · Posted In: Special Operations
Marines on patrol in southwest Afghanistan
According to CNN, in reaction to recent attacks by Afghan security forces, the Nato Commander, U.S. Marine General John R. Allen has ordered all 90,000 troops at NATO headquarters and all bases across Afghanistan to carry “loaded” weapons.  Nothing in the chamber, but they can carry a magazine in their gun now.

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General Allen recently testified before the  House Armed Services  Committee.

General Allen said, “There is no part of our strategy that  intends to stay in Afghanistan  forever…I wish I could tell you that  this war was simple and that progress could  easily be measured, but  that’s not the way of counterinsurgencies.  They are fraught  with success and  setbacks, which can exist in the same space and time,  but each must be seen in  the larger context of the overall campaign. And  I believe that the campaign in  on track.”

The current plan seems timed around the U.S.  Presidential elections.  First, a drawdown of 23,000 American troops by the  end of September (before elections in November) followed by a  complete withdrawal by December 2014, when Afghan forces step up.  The Afghan government forces have shown little real progress over the last five years.  It is doubtful anything will change by 2014.

It is claimed that Afghan security forces have expanded from 276,000 to  330,000 in the last year.  Some of these men only exist on paper so their wages can be pocketed by commanders.  The men actually there are poorly paid and lead.  They will not fight and cannot possibly defeat the forces of regional war lords.  The only option is to persuade the war lords not to disrupt the government

General Allen  also said 60 coalition troops  from six countries have been  killed since January.  Thirteen of these soldiers were killed by “what appears to have been  Afghan security forces.”

If you haven’t been deployed, it may surprised you to know that, on base, guns were empty with no magazines.   There was an elaborate system of clearing barrels.  Troops were required to carry weapons all the time but they are not allowed to put a magazine in.  We were more afraid of accidents than the enemy.

I don’t have details about the shootings, but it seems most of them have happened on bases.  I believe this policy has generated a vulnerability the enemy has exploited.  Now, soldiers can put a magazine in, but they are still not allowed to chamber a round.

The good news: troops can now shoot an attacker within a few seconds by putting a round in the chamber.  The bad news: every thirteen year old boy in rural Afghanistan carries an AK with a round in the chamber.

Every police officer in America is authorized, if not required, to carry a loaded gun all the time.  There are very few problems with this and occasionally, they save a life with their preparedness.  Our Soldiers should get the same vote of confidence.

In the initial seizure of Afghanistan about 300 Green Berets and paramilitary branch guys from another government agency swept the Taliban from power.  They all had loaded guns and didn’t trust any one they met.  They trained, equipped and led Afghan irregular forces.  The Army response was to send a three star headquarters bring a military sense of order to the war.  They stopped paying the irregular forces and lost influence over them.

The US Army has something no other army in the world does.  Army Special Forces Command is a division sized force specifically designed to train and employ indigenous forces in combat.  Led by a two star Green Beret, they are the perfect tool for counter insurgency.  In El Salvador in the 80′s, they won a war without a single infantry unit, 55 guys at a time.

Afghanistan is a primitive and complicated place.  It is a fractured and isolated area which lacks any national identity.  Ninety percent of the population can’t read or do simple math.   The current NATO theory is that we can make Afghanistan a modern nation-state with functional national security institutions in one generation.

The experts would tell you that the only thing that works in Afghanistan is the ethnic clan organization.  The national government is not recognized in much of the country and recruits to the army and police have a higher loyalty to their clan.  These clan leaders control the fate of the national government.

The Department of Defense would never send a sailor to run a ground campaign.  They would never send a pilot to run a naval blockade.  For over a decade, they sent a series of infantry generals to run a counter insurgency.  As in Vietnam, the results speak for them selves.  What we need is a strategy of training locals to fight their own battles.

Corporate Army has two core competencies.  When they don’t know what else to do, they built bases and increase conventional force structure.  The need for bases and supplies created vast movements of building supplies, equipment, food and water.  All this stuff comes to a sea port in Pakistan and is trucked across Afghanistan.  The Taliban “taxes” the movement of these goods and that is now the largest source of their income.  Bigger than Opium.

If you ask an Army general how to solve a problem, the answer is always a number of infantry brigades.  This is the product of their training and culture.  If the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.  When things weren’t working in Afghanistan, they didn’t re-evaluate strategy, they sent more troops.  If your house is on fire, and there are two police cars there, it won’t help to send more police cars.  Send the specialists.

I support the President’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.  I wish it was moving at a more rapid pace.  Almost immediately after initial victory, there was a deliberate decision to stop Green Berets from working with indigenous forces in Afghanistan and replace them with conventional soldiers.  The results are readily visible in the casualty figures.

Conventional troops don’t have the training, language skills or mindset to work in this environment.  There have been a series of seemingly minor cultural incidents which have been brilliantly exploited by our enemies.   Combine this with leadership which doesn’t trust soldiers with loaded guns and you have big problems.

At the beginning of the war, most of our generals had no combat experience.  Some had been to the former Yugoslavia where they learned to patrol in light vehicles and wear body armor with unloaded weapons.  In worked there, but not in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We need to put the right guys in the right jobs and pull conventional troops out of Afghanistan.  They can do little good, but they make great targets.

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shagstar
shagstar 5pts

this bullshit P.C. crap has got to friggin stop! the goddamn libtard political mandates are getting our troops wasted on a daily basis needlessly.

The Midnight Philosopher
The Midnight Philosopher 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

When I was on my last Uncle Sam vacation, I was fortunate to be allowed to carry a loaded weapon at all times. I did not trust any of the locals, sorry I just didn't. I am happy that the brothers and sisters are now allowed to be somewhat ready if one of our "partners" has a bad day. I wish the president would give Karzi a 30 day notice, and pull our forces out of Afghanistan.

lecoug
lecoug 5pts

Great article.  The author touches on the strategy during Vietnam and how it contrasted to early days of the Afghan conflict - another good case study to compare/contrast is the Brits in Borneo during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation in the early 60's.  It was tiny compared to Vietnam but it was also approached completely differently.  

 

Originally the plan was to flood area with regular army and face off against the Indonesians to stop them crossing the border into Malaysia/Borneo.  This changed and what they actually did was deploy the SAS who operated in 2-20 man patrols living in the jungle for up to 3 months at a time who operated a hearts and minds philosophy for the local indigenous population to get them on board and a 'shoot and scoot' philosophy for the Indos they were fighting.  During the 4 year conflict they suffered less than 150 KIA and won.  It was hush-hush and effective.  Looks very much like SF wanted to the do same but in Afghan... but... 

 

then again, you could say four years is a long time and if they had flooded the area with troops it wouldnt have lasted so long (but it also would have been all over the press).  Swings and roundabouts.

SEAN SPOONTS
SEAN SPOONTS 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 8 Like

I glad the policy has changed but the existing policy didn't exist because the Generals and politicians are stupid. Since 2003 something like 90 service members have been killed by negligent discharges of their weapons. Quite a bit of those fatalities were the result of servicemembers handling their weapons like toys in a careless or reckless manner. A Marine pilot blew his brains out in the ready room twirling his pistol on his finger like a cowboy during OIF II. Another Marine clowning around killed his unit corpsman with the corpsman's own pistol trying to prank him. Part of the problem is that many of our troops only get to handle weapons during their annual qual and then it's a by the numbers and range controlled; "Load, shoot, unload" kind of exercise. Many of these troops are young, immature and never handled a real weapon until they joined the military and have weapons handling instincts that are from Call of Duty....BANG! Yeah it's loaded. Having the troops in Condition 3 is great but Big Army and little Marine Corps really needs to inculcate the full gun culture to our troops. There seems to be this calculus that the more the troops handle live weapons the more NG deaths will occur. I think its the opposite. I think the more they handle live weapons in a safe manner the more ingrained and reflexive it becomes, even when handling unloaded weapons. There are comparisons to this. When the military cuts flight hours crashes go up as do the number of air craft downed for maintenance issues. It's because flying and fixing airplanes is a perishable skill, I think safe gun handling is too.

JRMayII
JRMayII 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

 @SEAN SPOONTS I agree completely. I have been around firearms for most of my life that I recall. I once swept my uncle with my muzzle and my Dad (a Marine) took it away for a year. I took it much more seriously ever since. A firearm is ALWAYS loaded. PERIOD.

Conventional Forces
Conventional Forces 5pts

 @SEAN SPOONTS i'm calling BS on your negligent discharge statistics...and your example of issues.  A pilot is going to twirl a loaded weapon around his finger?  Yeah I'm calling BS.  Show something or retract that.  Same with the Marine killing his unit Corpsman while pranking him.

 

Give me somethign where I can read it or else you need to retract that.

SEAN SPOONTS
SEAN SPOONTS 5pts

@Conventional Forces You think I just made it up?

SEAN SPOONTS
SEAN SPOONTS 5pts

CF, I'm waiting on your answer.

engelbrad
engelbrad 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

Thanks for the post SEAN. Very thoughtful.

It makes sense to me that if we trust someone to protect the United States of America in combat we should completely trust them with their weapons. They should be trained completely and never seperated from the force they carry.

 

Connor31
Connor31 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

 @SEAN SPOONTS IMO, firearm safety is more common sense than a skill. Don't point your muzzle at something you don't want too shoot. Simple. If anything, the military needs more common sense driven people and common sense is not so common.

This comment has been deleted

majrod
majrod 5pts

 @markmiller

 I would love if Ameicans didn't have to run patrols but unfortunately the Afghans aren't there yet and if the Taliban are the only one's exercising presence the nation is lost.  It's also the process of presence that builds confidence in the populace to provide intel so the bad guys can't hide.  The intel doesn't always come from SIGINT or UAVs.

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

@markmiller

Let’s talk El Salvador.  How many tribes are there in El Salvador in comparison to Afghanistan?   Compare the national consciousness of El Salvador and Afghanistan?  Did El Salvadorans identify with their tribe before their national identity?  The two ideologies that clashed in El Salvador where Communism and Democracy.  Afghanistan has a conflict of radical Islam vs. a less virulent form of Islam.  The difference could be considered shades of gray vs the differences between Communism and Democracy.  Compare the standing armies of El Salvador and Afghanistan?   I could go on but those are some of the differences.

 

Finally we may have only had 55 Americans in El Salvador most were conventional!  Conventional field grade Infantry, Artillery, Military Intelligence and Logisitics officers helped El Salvador stand up their BN, BDE and Division headquarters.    They taught them the staff operations necessary to function as a modern army.  http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume2/april_2004/4_04_4.html .  We also trained tens of thousands  of El Salvadoran NCOs and Officers stateside at beautiful Ft. Benning (School of the Americas) and even entire El Salvadoran Infantry BN’s.  More than 50% of the trainers were conventional soldiers.

 

Kind of shows when you drill down it’s not a special forces only show.  We work best when we work together even when the conventional guys don’t get any credit for it

 

markmiller
markmiller 5pts

 @majrod

Thanks for your comments.  The link you have is pretty accurate.  I am not advocating a specific unit or an MOS.  I am saying that the strategy of training others to fight their own battles is sound.

 

The most important advisors were at the Brigade level.  There were no Divisions.  The Brigade advisors were all SF except two Marines.  The SF guys were mostly infantry branch, this was before SF branch.  The Intel guys did a great job as did the Air Force advisors.  When I was there, there were more logisticians in country than SF.  I don't think that was such a great idea, but the Sals always had chow and ammo.

 

The differences between El Salvador and Afghanistan are huge.  The human factors of insurgency are universal.  People fight for their families and kids.  Culture shapes this.  I have been in Afghanistan and seen the same techniques work.

 

I do not believe that any type unit can control people or territory with bases or patrols.  If we had ten times as many troops, things would be no less secure. 

 

Please describe our success in Afghanistan and the conditions which would permit us to leave victorious.

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

@markmiller“I am not advocating a specific unit or an MOS.”  Well actually Mark you did…   

 

“The US Army has something no other army in the world does.  Army Special Forces Command is a division sized force specifically designed to train and employ indigenous forces in combat.  Led by a two star Green Beret, they are the perfect tool for counter insurgency.”

 

Also you stated, “Almost immediately after initial victory, there was a deliberate decision to stop Green Berets from working with indigenous forces in Afghanistan and replace them with conventional soldiers.”  You may be surprised to find that decision was made by SOCOM.

 

 “On 1 March 2005, nearly three and one-half years after 9/11, President George W. Bush signed the 2004 UCP, directing the USSOCOM commander to serve  “as the LEAD COMBATANT COMMANDER for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.”(emphasis added)  USSOCOM History 1987-2007 p16

 

Furthermore you will find in the section covering the history of Special Forces in Afghanistan before 2005 there were 25 ODAs in country (only 50 less men than the original 300 you mentioned) in country and that the JFSOCC dictated roles and responsibilities of spec ops units in country.  One cannot lay the debacle that followed at the Army’s feet. USSOCOM History 1987-2007 p101 - 112

 

You may not believe, “any type unit can control people or territory with bases or patrols.”  But history is full of examples (Tibet, the USSR, our frontier period etc.).  Now I’m not promoting that strategy, far from it!  I’m just saying to state out of hand it doesn’t work is clearly full of them.

 

Afghanistan’s solution is not to be found in a purely military bag of tricks and the Afghans, whoever they may be have the biggest and most important role in finding them.  To be brutally honest I don’t think it’s our job to find a solution to the Afghan people’s problem but it is our problem to keep another attack from coming out of that “nation”.

 

I threw out some strategies a little farther down.  

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

I disagree with the character assasination of the Army, conventional troops and their utility in low intensity ops.  Granted, no one does FID better than Army Special Forces but the wholesale contempt for conventional capabilities and supposed mindset is inaccurate and symptomatic of the hubris some operators are guilty of.

 

The Army has some historical successes in low intensity ops e.g. Mexico, the Philippines and all of the Indian Wars.  Also conveniently forgotten by many is that conventional officers and NCOs commonly served in advisory roles with ARVN units.  The current manual for counterinsurgency?  Yep, written by conventional guys.

 

The conventional guys are no more mired in conventional approaches as special forces is incapable of conducting ops against conventional forces.  They obviously can though it’s not their forte and a potential waste of capability.  Some seem to forget that it was conventional Army units that developed modern airmobile/air assault TTP.  Conventional Army units were first to integrate women in combat patrols later identified as a positive development by the Marines and the special ops community.

 

No doubt Special Forces did yoemen’s work early in Afghanistan but they weren’t alone.  QRF conventional troops were part of the operation at Mazar-i-Sharif.  The lack of conventional troops and their assets allowed Bin Laden to escape at Tora Bora along with the failure of indigineous troops to do what they were supposed to even when ably supported by SF.  We didn’t make the same mistake at Anaconda where Special and Conventional forces complemented each other.

 

Bottom line is Special and Conventional forces are different tools in the same tool box. Some seem to have forgotten.  They both bring things to low intensity ops.  El Salvador has as many similarities to Afghanistan as the Soviet experience does.  It’s not helpful when we work against each other nor can one factually support the Conventional Army “bogarted” OEF.  SOCOM could have done whatever they wanted in theatre.  They actually had the lead in GWOT.  I guess they got distracted also?   There's PLENTY of blame to go around to include why the Army has been pressed into conducting FID when Special Forces was more concerned with growing and doing direct action.  In the end the Army did what was asked of it without all the fancy equipment, training, title or glory.  There's a lesson there.  Trying to kick it in the teeth whike it was doing someone else's job that is actually better resourced to do it seems a bit ungrateful.

 

For a very long time conventional forces were suspicious and treated special forces poorly.  The pendulum has swung and it seems that some want to get payback.  Personally, they both bring something to the fight as I’m sure operations like Anaconda and Red Dawn showed.

Recon6
Recon6 moderator 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

 @majrod   The Only thing holding America's forces from getting this situation under control are the individuals in Command.  In SE Asia small elements worked with both the ARVN, a waste of time IMO, and the Indigs, mainly Montagnards, the Best.  By living and working with these locals throughout the Highlands we were able to pretty much stabilize our AO's.  At the same time, SF via A Dets. were accomplishing the same thing as our PRU's.  My point being, to operate at this level does Not require Mother Army, rather groups of dedicated individuals with a specific goal and almost Zero oversight by "Higher" which will fuck it up!!  As I traveled in country I saw/heard such ridiculous rules as unload your weapon, I will also say in 3 years I ignored such b.s.  As long as one avoided ignorant XO's, who remained in the Rear, and chickenshit CSM's, there was little issue.  I only saw a Base Camp when entering country and exiting same.

 

The sand box in A-Stan would be the same type of conflict, IF the Command Officers got out of the way and let the small units do what is required.  Any soldier etc. that would carry a weapon without a round in the chamber is asking to be shot, period.  I would gladly send a package of "goodies" to anyone that wanted to avoid the Mess Hall and some moronic First Sgt. checking for loaded weapons.  Go hungry before you go Empty.

 

Sorry to Rant, but this very subject was discussed between myself and M2 and AW, several days ago when I discovered that such an asinine rule was in place, just showing nothing has changed in 45 years of war fighting!    R6

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

 @Recon6 My company was ordered to carry "cold" in sight of the Iraqis we had been shooting only a couple of days earlier (DS).  Understandable, there was concern the Iraqis might try and cause an incident to embarrass us. 

 

I passed the order, looked at my NCOs, told them I'd probably be relieved if they violated the order but we always had the right to defend ourselves.  Then I didn't check.

 

Your comments above bear some value but small units still require direction to be where they are needed.  I also believe the presence of advisors in ARVN units had some positive benefits.  There are many cases where the presence of Americans caused ARVN units to hold and those advisors provided important skills (calling arty/CAS) and advice our allies needed.

Recon6
Recon6 moderator 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

 @majrod   Lol, the Leadership I was referencing was the simple fact you knew it was a silly order that could have dire consequences.  Additionally, any Grunt receiving the order to 'clear' his weapon would know it was stupid.  Thus, your men knew you had their best interest at heart = Leader!!

Fortunately as a LRRP we didn't deal with many officers, of any ilk.  If we encountered some dumbass we were usually gone back out of the firebase before any remedial action could be taken :)  We were pretty much autonomous and operated outside the b.s. others encountered with few exceptions.    6

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

 @Recon6  LOL!  I would never call "not checking" leadership but I learned long ago that troops do what the boss checks. ;)

 

It was a silly order but officers don't have the option of selective obedience.  I was struggling to find a way to do the right thing. 

 

I'm a firm believer that subordinates can influence superiors.  The easiest way to influence a "ticket puncher" is to ask questions that point him in the right AND self serving direction.  When asked to do things that weren't right I'd simply ask for clarification and phrase the question in a manner that made it clear what I was being ordered to do.  Crappy way to run an Army but effective.

 

We're stuck until someone cleans house.

Recon6
Recon6 moderator 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

 @majrod  My comment on the ARVN was from a 'personal' point of view and experience.  The attachment of Americans to certain units definitely were an Asset for the reasons you mentioned.

My time was primarily spent in the Central Highlands working with Yards, and I use that term with endearment! whom I came to love as brothers.

Further, it is my opinion that officers from your pay grade Down understand how to fight COIN, those above, with few exceptions, are/were ticket punchers.

Point - you passed the order but did Not check your men, That is Leadership!  6

markmiller
markmiller 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

 @majrod

The Marine efforts in Haiti and Nicaragua are better examples of the techniques I am talking about.  The Marine Small Wars Manual is a classic.

 

We didn't catch Pancho Villa in Mexico, did you mean the Mexican American War?

 

The campaigns against the American  indians were a success of genocide and attrittion more than effective counter insurgency. They did use indian scouts to some good effect.

 

In the Philipines, some of the old indian fighters used the same tactics.  We didn't really stop the insurgency, it is still going.  We did establish one of the key tenants of guerilla warfare. "You can never win an insurgency on an island if there is a hostile navy patrolling surrounding waters."

 

There were some terrible things done.  I don't think the attrocities shortened the war. 

 

Check out Max Boot's "The Savage Wars Of Peace: Small Wars And The Rise Of American Power"

 

This is pretty good too:

 http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey_24.pdf

StormR
StormR 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

 @markmiller  @majrod With respect, more Indians were killed by small pox, measles and mumps than by bullets and cannons.  Our estimates are 3 million lost to disease.  Add in starvation because the primary food source of the Plains tribes were destroyed and 'civilian miltias' and another million lost.  There was also the factor that not all tribes were 'war-like'.  The Woodlands and Coastal tribes were not nomadic and did not develop the war tactics of the Plains Tribes as there was no need.  The Coastal tribes were trading with the British and French long before the Americans reached our coast, and naively assumed they would have the same kind of relationship.  Scouts often worked with an Army unit in an effort to score off an enemy tribe and it was considered honorable. Yes, genocide was the ultimate plan - and it failed.  We continue to exist.  But as Chief Joseph said:  We will fight no more forever.

JRMayII
JRMayII 5pts

 @majrod  @StormR  @markmiller Outstanding! I like the way you think!

majrod
majrod 5pts

@markmiller

Thanks Mark.  I hope you keep up your reading also and I don’t think you understand some of the complexities of the region or my commentary either. :) 

 

Agree, none of my courses are viable for the various reasons I clearly stated when I described them but they are as viable as a step back and train the Afghans to do it approach like you suggest e.g. El Salvador or even an approach sans conventional forces which as I pointed out have been involved in the fight from the earliest days.  That SOCOM publication is an excellent reference.

 

BTW, we did have an unconventional warfare trained theatre commander.  Heard of Gen McCrystal?  Best... :)

 

markmiller
markmiller 5pts

 @majrod  @StormR

I hope you keep up your reading.  I don't think you understand the complexity of the region or the article.  None of your courses of action are viable.  The good news is that there are many great guys in DoD and other agencies with the training and vision to come up with better ideas.  Counter insurgency as you understand it is a failed conventional concept.

 

There is no "solution" in Pakistan.  We cannot change their internal politics. We could do some clever unconventional indirect things to influence them.  I am not advocating a Green Beret occupation. That would be even more foolish than our current occupation.   I believe that an indirect approach is the only answer.  A Theater Commander trained in unconventional warfare is needed.  We have never tried that.

 

Indirect approach, unconventional warfare, integrated US government response.

Recon6
Recon6 moderator 5pts

 @majrod   Thanks for the 'rec's', I most certainly will read those.  I spend a lot of time in the attempt to understand what today's Warriors must endure, thus my joining SOFREP from the get go.  Always open to learning new things, sadly America's warfighting skills haven't kept pace with the awesome troops we place in harm's way.    6

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

 @Recon6

 BTW, "Outlaw Platoon" is a classic up there with McDonough's "Platoon" and MacDonald's "Company Commander".  I highly recommend it to anyone that wants to know what the very much maligned Army grunt's fight looks like.

 

As for the incident it is totally believable.  Just read up on that airstrike that killed 24 Pakistani border troops who were shooting up a special forces patrol almost a year ago.

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

 @Recon6  That was a very kind comment.  Thank you.

 

My goals/measures of success were different than the Army's.  I also have a "bad habit" of speaking my mind when asked (and sometimes when not)  ;)

Recon6
Recon6 moderator 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

 @majrod  Interesting that I am currently reading 'Outlaw Platoon' at the point when the platoon comes under fire from across the Pak. border.  The shooters were spaced among the M.G. bunkers of the Paks!  When gunships rolled in they responded they could not fire because the targets were across the border in Pak.!!

I don't know how much credence to allow this book, but this situation sounds plausible to me knowing what I do about ROE's.

 

That being said, I definitely agree with your 3 Points above.  Too bad you stopped at being 0-4, lol.    6

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

 @StormR  @markmiller

Read the Marine manual in my college days along with Galula, Mao and a bunch of other classics and case studies.  Didn't bring them up because of space and I was trying to stay with Army examples since the Army was being characterized as incompetent when it comes to insurgency.

 

My point about the Indian Wars was the Army is not a "Johnny come lately" to counter insurgency. 

 

Pancho Villa conducted an insurgency into the US.  The Army put an end to it.  There are some parallels to Afghanistan.

 

Some may not consider the Philippine insurrection over.  We could use the same logic about our revolution and civil war if you consider the militias an extension of them.

 

I don't want to go down rabbit holes but the article took some rather definitive .positions that I contest.  I do agree that "If the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a  nail."  It just happens to apply to special forces as much as the conventional Army.  We don't have a homegrown insurgency in Afghanistan.  The Taliban are a Pakistani creation designed to control a tribal region (not a nation) to their north in some weird counter India strategy.  The solution to Afghanistan is not military alone and definitely not the half assed approach we've followed since '03.  Our greatest weakness is our lack of political will. No one believes anymore that we'll do what it takes (even ouirselves).  Next to that, is our supply lines and severe aversion to casualties.

 

Victory in Afghanistan (to me) is keeping it from ever becoming a terror haven from which an attack against us can be planned/launched.  The only lasting solution is to fix Pakistan.  Standing up a western style Afghan democracy/nation state is futile let alone not our responsibility.  We forgot the way we got Pakistan to play ball after 911 when they were the ONLY allies of the Taliban was threatening their regime's existence. 

 

If we ever grew a spine here are three potential strategies...

1. Take out the sanctuaries. Prep our people with the facts of Pakistan's treachery. Do the UN thing. Any nation that doesn't exercise sovereignty over its territory and is allowing attacks from that territory on a neighbor conducting a war of aggression against a neighbor. Do it through NATO but make a very public show that we're going after the sanctuaries. Limited action and then we are LEAVING. Pakistan has to decide what side of the fence they want to be on. If Pakistan closes the supply lines, blockade them. They send troops, fine, sign a treaty with India beforehand so they have to worry about a two front war and supply through Kashmir. High risk but it solves the problem. The greatest shortcoming of this strategy is the world doesn't believe us anymore. If we had done this after 911 we'd have been out of Afghanistan by '03.

2. Make Pakistan responsible for Afghanistan. Make a very clear doctrine announcement. "Pakistan has elements in it that want to rule Afghanistan and will not take action against them. If those elements gain power in Afghanistan PAKISTAN will be held responsible for any action or inaction of those elements. We will also consider a terror strike as a 1st use of a WMD by PAKISTAN." Sign a mutual defense pact with India. Heck, I'd like to drop a nuke in the Indian Ocean to show we're serious but that would hurt India (and the fish).

3. Turnabout is fair play. Pakistan makes trouble for us, return the favor. Pakistan has a xenophobic fear of India. EVERYTHING they do is done with an eye to India. Let's give them a reason to be so focused and let them know beforehand what we are willing to do. Those domestic terrorists might not be such a good idea anymore. Think KASHMIR. India. Internal unrest. Just get their nukes or have them targeted just in case.

 

What isn't going to work is SF as a panacea in Afghanistan creating a counterinsurgency against the Taliban or just one that hangs on.  The record for successfully defeating an enemy with sanctuaries is pretty poor.  Best case it becomes a low intensity "Forever War", worst case another debacle with helos lifting the last Americans out of the Embassy.

majrod
majrod 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

Don't be fooled folks.  This is smoke and mirrors, an effort to make it look like "we understand the problem and are in charge".

 

Troops around Afghans laregly carried locked and loaded and had someone watching the Afghans.  It's just common sense.  That is why the overwhelming majority of these cases result in a dead Taliban after shooting a couple of ours on rock and roll.  There have been some cases in "rear areas" but this is the minority.  Most units suffering green on blue were combat units conducting joint ops or units advising/training Afghans.

 

Good decision but this is CYA more than being proactive.  A proactive solution would be to develop a highly trained afghan Cadre and then let THEM train and spot check them with US troops.

 

 

ggammell
ggammell 5pts

Non military here with a question. What kind of trouble would a soldier face for carrying a round chambered? With so many green-on-blue incidents, Might it be worth the risk?

Recon6
Recon6 moderator 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

 @ggammell   To answer your question from an old school guy, you would receive a form of Non Judicial Punishment, for example an Article 15, which is a reprimand that goes into your personnel file.  May or may not mean much, depending on whether or not you are career Army.  IMO, it would definitely be worth it since there is so much green-on-blue, not being loaded could mean being dead!  6

Ed
Ed 5pts

@BrandonTWebb Chief, can sniper overwatches work? Green on Blue pigs would know they can't kill/escape to Taliban, as that Police CDR did

Breach
Breach 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

That's a pretty big step! Maybe they'll be able to defend themselves soon!

g8trlawyer
g8trlawyer 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

This is not anything new.  Just ask the families and friends of the soldiers, Marines, and French forces that died in Beirut in 1983.  The sentries were also prohibited from having a magazine in their weapons.  He who doesn't learn from history is doomed to repeat it.  Unfortunately, good men and women pay the price for the myopic views of those that "lead" them.

 

I remember in the early 90s being sent to Panama and being completely stunned when I saw Army MPs and sentries without magazines in their weapons.  Heck, as an Air Force SP we were required to be armed just to protect our weapons from theft let alone attack.  I knew MPs who requested us as ride alongs because that meant there was going to be at least one armed person in the vehicle.

 

 

Conventional Forces
Conventional Forces 5pts like.author.displayName 1 Like

Wow.  I'm not getting the surprise here.  You go to one of the big bases especially the airbase and its like you're in a poor Dubai.  Fast food spots, social functions, people playing grab ass and sneaking off to  uh well you know.  That's where the saying that in Afghanistan your experience may vary.  Earlier before the surge and infrastructure came in you had to put flea collars on boots to try and keep them off ya.  Now even some of the FOBs are getting cushy (or so I've been told).  I guess the real issue is that the Big Army brings in Big Stuff.

 

I have to disagree with the author on a couple of things.  The Conventional Forces have been fighting hard and are doing more than making good targets.  We were following orders and patrolled, built schools etc because thoose were the orders.  Conventionals get blow up and shot at just like Special Ops.

 

But we'll get another chance to see SOCOM at war.  Before the surge Afghanistan was called a Special Forces Olympics because all that was in country was Special Ops units from the NATO countries.  After the drawdown it'll be a SOCOM party again...not just a Green Beret but SOCOM party.  And with SOCOM being composed of mostly raider type units we'll see how that works out.

Recon6
Recon6 moderator 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

 @Conventional Forces Reminds me of a time in Danang, RVN, when I learned the Air Force had movie theaters, Swimming Pools, air conditioners, ice machines, you get the idea, lol !!

We got WWll  c-rats,  creek water with Kool Aid, sent from home, and twice a month we received whatever left over soda (Never Coke!) the POG's didn't want.  I can only imagine the FOB's of today resemble the Base Camps of then?  Forward of that were FireBases, and forward of that were US.

It never changes I guess.   R6

markmiller
markmiller 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 3 Like

 @Conventional Forces

 The whole point is, we need our Afghanis shooting their Afghanis.  We don't need NATO "presence patrols" driving around until they hit an IED.   We can't wear them down by throwing bodies at them.  We need to change tactics and be more effective.  Rangers and MARSOC have had their share of problems in Afghanistan too.  We need to train and advise, not provide maneuver units.

JackMurphyRGR
JackMurphyRGR moderator 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 5 Like

 @Conventional Forces CF has absolutely been doing their job, even though it isn't the job they asked for or were trained for...and that is kind of a problem.  CF units spend a lot of time patrolling but don't always know the terrain or how to work effectively in a semi-permissive environment.  I hate to make the comparison, but this reminds me of what I've read about the difference between CF and LRRPS and Special Forces in Vietnam.  You also have situations where for instance, a Field Artillery Officer is in charge of battle space during a Counter-Insurgency.  This leads to huge problems.  When I was in SF I had some great experiences doing joint operations with CF, however I had some very bad experiences dealing with CF on the FOB.  Their leaders just don't understand UW.  It's kind of an Army wide thing, UW and safety do no always go hand in hand.  I also dislike the elitist mentality, but I also have to be honest here.  In many ways this war has been fought by SOF units...then there is everyone else.  Everyone else isn't doing so hot.  While SOF has further professionalized, I don't think that trend had yet trickled down to the conventional infantry and that is something that needs to change over the course of the next decade.  We need a lighter, more agile infantry that can be scaled down to the squad level to conduct decentralized patrols and actions.  These guys need, and deserve, better training.  My two cents...

Conventional Forces
Conventional Forces 5pts

 @JackMurphyRGR I get you but let me boil it down a bit more.  Outside of Special Forces who else in SOCOM is able to get down and lead a counter insurgency in the purest sense?  I count SF and maybe some CIA bubbas (that were once SF)...maybe some NSA jokers I've never heard of but outside of those guys everyone else is shooters.  Rangers, SEALs, MARSOC, AFSOC and all the rest are gonna have some of the same issues as CF's in this battle space.  They're shooters...Raiders...but not counter insurgency specialist.  So that means a Green Beret party.  Not even our allies have units that are similar to SF so you're talking about one helluva tasking.  If this is done properly then you're about to commit at least half the SF Battalions to Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

JackMurphyRGR
JackMurphyRGR moderator 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

 @Conventional Forces Well, I include DA as a part of a robust Counter-Insurgency strategy.  Everything from removing High Value Targets to raiding training camps has to be on the table.  In some cases a local force trained and led by SF teams can do this, in other cases it might be more prudent to send in a platoon of Rangers to do the heavy lifting.  I do agree that SF is the only force task organized of UW and COIN and I would also hold SF to task for not fully developing these capabilities.  On the other hand, mother Army holds SF down as does centralized control coming from an SF Battalion or Group level command.  SF has to be decentralized to work correctly, they need the freedom to address the terrain that they are seeing to their front and flanks or an ODA is nothing more than a high speed Infantry Squad.

Tacdriver
Tacdriver 5pts

As others have stated, I'm upset about this but not surprised in the least. I remember when my Father was a Deputy that he used to carry his 1911 cocked and locked. The S.O. rewrote policy strictly forbidding this method (condition) of carry. Seems a city councilman had seen either my Pop or one of 2 other deputies and complained. Their mindset was that it looked "Scary."

striped1
striped1 5pts

@BrandonTWebb finally, how have we not learned from Beirut Marine Barracks, Embassy, khobar towers, USS Cole, etc.? Guns should be hot.

jyates01
jyates01 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 5 Like

<object width="420" height="315"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/bTalnzcO0xk?version=3&hl=en_US"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always">

Tacdriver
Tacdriver 5pts like.author.displayName like.author.displayName 2 Like

 @jyates01 If I could "Like" this clip more, I would.

 

ufridman
ufridman 5pts

@BrandonTWebb you won't believe how bad it is after 11 years of war...

ufridman
ufridman 5pts

@BrandonTWebb "The Army hated the beards and the mixed uniforms." So true… the thing is, unless you experience it 1st hand,,,,

BrandonTWebb
BrandonTWebb 5pts

@ufridman yep

rrisc
rrisc 5pts

@ufridman @BrandonTWebb Great article and a must read.

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