The PT-76 was an amphibious tank design developed by the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. Armed with a relatively small (for the era) 76 mm gun and intended to spearhead river crossings, it took up station with several units occupying the Warsaw Pact countries for a potential thrust into western Europe. Yet, against NATO and the Americans, thankfully, it would never be used.

Instead, it was deployed during the Vietnam War as one of a handful of tank models supplied to the North Vietnamese Army by their Soviet allies. In this environment, the mere fact that an enemy possessed a tank of any type was enough to startle many a soldier or base camp that often had to face them without any armor of their own. Additionally, if tanks could get close enough or be used at night, it was discovered that the most favored method of dealing with them, the airstrike, was rendered useless.

Such an event occurred in the battle of Lang Vei, a Special Forces camp in Quang Tri province that had the misfortune of enduring a full-on assault by several PT-76s and a mass of infantry. Here, a small group of Green Berets and the indigenous forces under their command found themselves facing a desperate last-stand scenario that culminated in a handful of them being reduced to a position a few yards in diameter, and the enemy, quite literally, on top of them while the rest of their units lay dead or taken prisoner. The following is, as accurate as possible, an account of a moment in time when, in a war by the day growing evermore unpopular, a small group of men faced death at arm’s length and through sheer will to survive, somehow overcame it.

Origins of the attack at Lang Vei began when several detachments of two divisions united after intense combat that began even before the famous Tet Offensive of January 31, 1968. These were the 24th Regiment of the 304th division, supported by the second Battalion of the 325th division, the second artillery Battalion, and most importantly the 198th Tank Battalion equipped with 22 PT 76s.

Beginning in on January 22, 1968, these units overran Khe Sanh village, and struck into Laos at the outpost of Ban Houei Sane, who radioed Lang Vei for evacuation by helicopter. Much to their dismay, however, helicopters were unavailable and the commander of the camp, with 350 of his men and their families, set off on foot through the jungle for Lang Vei, across the South Vietnamese border. This trek ended up end up converging them with thousands more refugees making their way from Khe Sanh to Lang Vei village and to within 1 kilometer of the camp to the point where the area resembled a makeshift refugee center. Even more disturbing was the news many from Khe Sanh brought. They had seen tanks being used during the attack.

Around them, throughout the entire country, the Tet Offensive exploded on January 31st, although within the camp itself nothing more than the usual nuisance shelling seemed to usher in the momentous event. Neither on the 31st, nor the days that followed it. Something wasn’t right, and the camp commander, Army Captain Frank Willoughby, had every reason to believe they were enjoying a prelude to something dire, based on a deserter who surrendered himself a few days before. If the story he told was true, thousands of NVA were already within hours of the camp, and their goal was to seize it. To counter this, all he could do was increase daytime patrols as well as nighttime ambushes to provide some sort of early warning. Any other decisions had to based on assumptions.

Taking stock of his command, he knew that unless he could maintain air support over the camp, they faced the real likelihood of being overrun. Defending forces consisted of detachment A – 101, Company C, 5th Special Forces Group personnel, along with a Montagnard CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group) company, 3 rifle companies and 3 combat reconnaissance platoons of the South Vietnamese Army. They also counted a recently-arrived Mobile Strike Force company with a complement of Montagnard tribesmen and Special Forces advisors. In total, the contingent numbered 24 Americans and approximately 500 indigenous personnel.

Prior to Tet, these forces had once been responsible for a 220-square kilometer operational area around the camp. Now, save for the Mobile Strike Force patrolling, they rushed to build up defenses within the barbed wire perimeter with what they had, which lacked heavy weaponry, such as anti-tank guns.