The following piece first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.

 

A new Aegis Ashore System in Guam fired off a Standard Missile (SM)-3 IIA interceptor to track and destroy a ballistic missile target in the Pacific Ocean, a scenario indicating that theater-wide missile defense in the Pacific may be surging into a new area of protective capability.

The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency and Lockheed Martin conducted the first official live intercept of a missile target firing an Aegis Guam System from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

A Missile Defense Agency essay on the intercept explained that an interceptor missile networked with an AN/TPY-6 radar and Vertical Launch System to track and destroy the target.

While certainly, the successful intercept is important, the larger impact of this demonstration could perhaps be seen in terms of a collective multi-national Aegis-based networking umbrella forming a protective “shield” or “layer” of defense from Japan to the Philippines and Taiwan. A Guam base defensive system is, of course, quite relevant in terms of protecting the US territory of Guam and the many air and ground war assets placed upon the island, yet the strategic advantage of an Aegis “land” node in the Pacific seems to have significance well beyond the shores of Guam.

South Korea, Japan, and the US Navy all operate at-sea Aegis-capable mobile maritime missile defense, a technological synergy that enables an integrated web of multi-domain, multi-national ballistic missile defense. Adding Guam to this equation as

Guam to Taiwan

Guam is 2,745km from Taiwan, and the SM-3 interceptor operates with a range of roughly 1,500 miles. Therefore, land-based Aegis radar would be within range of defending the coast of Taiwan as well as large portions of the Philippine Sea. Of equal or greater significance, the larger, longer-range SM-3 Block IIA has shown itself capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) just beyond the boundary of the earth’s atmosphere. This is extremely significant because Aegis Ashore in Guam, fortified by Aegis-enabled warships strategically placed throughout the Pacific, could, in essence, be a defensive missile “wall” across large portions of the region. Ship or land-launched SM-3 IIAs could potentially be positioned to intercept an ICBM just as its completing its boost phase and moving beyond the earth’s atmosphere. This would intercept an ICBM attack much earlier than mid-course or terminal-phase intercept.