Building Resilience: US Army Special Forces’ Impact on Ukraine’s Military Strategy

Grim News

US Army Colonel Lucas VanAntwerp was in a meeting with Ukrainian commandos when he received grim updates: a helicopter crash had killed several of their comrades. This tragic news was not isolated; earlier, a tank attack had decimated a Special Forces unit, with enemy control over the area preventing any retrieval of the deceased.

“In those moments, they paused to grieve,” recounted VanAntwerp, former leader of 10th Special Forces Group. “But then it was, ‘Let’s get some food’.”

VanAntwerp admired their stoic reaction. He reflected that if he faced similar losses, it would profoundly affect him for months, involving heartfelt conversations with the families of the fallen.

“This is our daily reality,“ the Ukrainians explained to him. “There’s a stark contrast between your conflicts and ours. We’re sacrificing thousands.“ With little else to be done, they had to press on. By August 2023, Ukraine had lost tens of thousands of troops.

Ukrainian Resiliency

Since the onset of Russia’s intensified invasion over two years prior, VanAntwerp and his fellow special forces members have trained numerous Ukrainian commandos in Poland and other locations. The US forces also gained insights, learning about the Ukrainians’ unique resilience and tactical knowledge from European conflict zones that now inform the US Army’s special operations and modernization initiatives.

In July 2021, VanAntwerp assumed command of the 10th Special Forces Group, aiding Ukraine in transforming its operators to align with Western standards since Russia’s initial 2014 incursion.

His tenure began under challenging conditions as he destroyed sensitive communication gear while US troops evacuated Kyiv in January 2022, reminiscent of his last mission in Afghanistan.

“I’ve had to leave partners before. I hope to avoid it in the future,“ he remarked.

Training Ukrainian Operators in Poland

Relocated to Poland, his team initiated training programs for Ukrainian commandos. Initially, few trainees could attend during the chaotic early stages of the full-scale invasion. However, the numbers soon swelled. Ukraine wanted to double its 2,000-strong special operator forces. 

10th Group now trains hundreds of Ukrainians monthly, VanAntwerp noted. Some undergo specific training, like drone operations or target acquisition, while others engage in simulated attacks coordinated by Ukrainian forces.

“I’ve participated in midnight drills on boats, attacking mock targets along rivers abroad with 20 Ukrainians,“ VanAntwerp shared. “Three weeks later, they’re executing actual operations on those rivers.”

The experience levels among the Ukrainian trainees vary. After losing his predecessors, one battalion leader was appointed, leading a mostly inexperienced group.

“Training often reverted to the basics, catering to newcomers straight off the streets,“ he added.

The effectiveness of the training often depended on the commanding officers’ capabilities. Disciplined units excelled, whereas less experienced leaders struggled. Some groups proactively undertook morning physical exercises, which correlated with better performance, unlike hastily assembled units, which progressed less effectively.

“Leadership was crucial,“ he emphasized.

The training was mutually beneficial, with Ukrainian and US troops learning from each other. Ukrainian soldiers frequently pointed out which American tactics were unsuitable for their combat environments.

“It was an equal exchange of knowledge,“ he stated.

VanAntwerp mentioned that often, the most significant support for the Ukrainians was providing a secure environment for practicing specific operations, like trench assaults.

“You often found yourself observing as they instructed their own,“ he recounted.

Challenges Encountered and Overcome

With no US forces in Ukraine, 10th Group’s trainers sometimes struggled to assess the needs and numbers of incoming Ukrainian units. Units sometimes arrived with unexpected equipment, like excess mortars, causing logistical challenges.

“There was usually some confusion at the start of each course,“ he admitted.

Communication continued once the Ukrainians returned to combat; they could consult with 10th Group for advice on challenging objectives.

“They would inquire, ‘What would you do in our place?‘” he explained.

Having returned to the US in July, VanAntwerp now heads the Force Modernization Center of Army Special Operations Command. Established in 2019, the center oversees USASOC’s strategic development and technology integration.

Top on his agenda are drones and anti-drone systems, which are pivotal in the Ukrainian context. He also focuses on less conventional tactics, such as battlefield deception, to mislead the enemy.

“We need to master these techniques on a large scale and in coordination,“ he noted.

While acknowledging the unique aspects of the Ukrainian conflict, VanAntwerp advised caution in directly replicating these strategies. He pointed out that Russia had failed to stop the Western arms flow to Ukraine, a scenario that might differ significantly in other potential conflicts, such as with China over Taiwan.

A Need for Rapid Innovation

He underscored the necessity for rapid innovation in warfare, as adversaries quickly adapt. The initial impact of new weaponry is crucial, as countermeasures are typically swift.

“Holding a technological edge for an extended period is unrealistic,“ he observed.

From Ukraine’s steadfast endurance despite severe losses, VanAntwerp drew two critical insights: the American public must brace for significant casualties in any future major conflict, and military leaders must manage the profound emotional impact of such losses.

“These are the vital lessons: coping with daily losses as a leader is essential,“ he concluded.