China and the War in Ukraine: A Shift in Global Power

China may emerge from the war in Ukraine in a stronger strategic position than any of the belligerents, despite never entering the conflict militarily. This outcome does not stem from orchestration or covert control. The relationship between China and the war in Ukraine is one of structural alignment. Beijing did not need to design the conflict to profit from it. The war’s dynamics have advanced long-standing Chinese interests by straining Western political will, absorbing U.S. and European industrial capacity, and increasing Russia’s economic and strategic dependence. However, the fighting ends, China’s relative position improves unless a genuinely disruptive event intervenes.

The War’s Opening Signal

When the war began, that logic was not yet obvious. What was obvious was the symbolism. The Beijing Winter Olympics closed with a carefully staged meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, a public affirmation of alignment delivered days before Russian forces crossed into Ukraine. For many observers, it read as diplomatic theater. For others, it felt like a signal that a line had been crossed.

Within weeks, thousands of foreign volunteers moved toward Ukraine. Veterans, idealists, drifters, and men who could not reconcile themselves to watching a European capital threatened from afar. I was among them. At the time, the war still appeared legible in familiar terms: invasion and resistance, democracy under assault, a smaller state fighting for survival.

What was less visible then was that the conflict would not only reorder Ukraine’s future, but quietly reshape the global balance far beyond the battlefield.

China and Russia Are Not Equals

The relationship between Beijing and Moscow is often mischaracterized as a partnership grounded in trust or ideological affinity. History argues otherwise. China retains a long memory of territorial losses to Imperial Russia formalized in the Treaty of Aigun and the Convention of Peking. It remembers the Sino-Soviet split, the armed clashes along the Ussuri River in 1969, and the proxy competition in Cambodia during the Cold War. From Beijing’s perspective, Russia is not a natural ally but an insecure neighbor whose weaknesses can be managed.

China’s strategic culture favors patience over confrontation. It does not require Russia to win in Ukraine. It requires Russia to remain dependent.

Multipolarity as a Transition

Western debates often frame China’s ambitions as a choice between global hegemony and a multipolar order. This misreads the strategy. Multipolarity is not an end state; it is a transitional condition. Fragmenting the Anglo-American system weakens the institutional constraints that limit Chinese influence. Disorder creates opportunity.

Ukraine has accelerated that fragmentation. While the United States and Europe expend political capital, industrial capacity, and fiscal resources sustaining Kyiv, China has positioned itself as Russia’s indispensable economic counterweight without assuming the liabilities of formal alliance.