China’s 770-ship naval force & a potential war in the Pacific

This article was written by Alex Hollings and originally published on Sandboxx.com.

If war were to break out in the Pacific between China and the United States, the U.S. Navy would find itself in an extremely difficult predicament. While America does maintain the largest and most powerful navy in the world, its security obligations are similarly far-reaching. The U.S. Navy serves as more than a defensive force for the nation; it is a means of force projection to back American foreign policy. The United States Navy also serves as a stabilizing presence in shipping lanes the world over, ensuring the free trade of goods over heavily trafficked waterways that could otherwise be susceptible to the whims of bad state actors or even smaller pirate or terrorist regimes.

As a result of these obligations, the United States Navy cannot actually leverage the entirety of its sea-power in any one region without that leaving security and stability operations elsewhere in the world compromised. And therein lies the source of a great deal of confusion when it comes to comparing military strengths on a global scale. Many Americans are quick to point out that the U.S. has the most powerful military force, and therefore, should be able to exact quick and definitive victory over less technologically advanced forces like the People’s Liberation Army-Navy China. While a comparison of aircraft carriers suggests a rapid American victory, a comparison of forces that could actually be leveraged in such a conflict does not paint quite as rosy a picture for American analysts.

The truth is, despite America’s naval power, China could actually devote far more combatant resources to a fight in the Pacific than America likely could. This is in part because of the aforementioned limitations on America’s defense apparatus, and also because China’s Navy is not the only force Americans would find themselves squaring off against. China would almost certainly also leverage their Coast Guard and even Maritime Militia in such a conflict, in addition to the nation’s massive stockpile of ballistic missiles, including hypersonic anti-ship missiles that America currently lacks any means of reliable defense against.

China’s Maritime Militia

China’s rarely discussed Maritime Militia is often discounted by Chinese-based analysts for good reason. The intent behind utilizing such a force is to conduct military operations that fall within the “Grey Zone,” which is a term used to characterize aggressive actions that do not quite meet the criteria to be considered an overt act of war. Grey Zone operations have become an area of increasing focus for nations like China and Russia, which use forces like China’s Maritime Militia or Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group to conduct what are effectively military operations outside the formal control of their parent state. In other words, China uses its fleet of large fishing boats and Russia uses its private mercenaries to conduct offensive operations. Each respective government can then deny responsibility, as we have seen in places like Libya, Syria, and the South China Sea in recent years.

However, despite Chinese officials and media personalities discounting the presence of China’s Maritime Militia, satellite imagery and eyewitness reports continually show these large fishing ships conducting aggressive operations against foreign vessels. Additionally, China’s Military Service law outlines in clear language what role these vessels play in China’s military apparatus. The law, which was first written in 1984 and then revised in 1998, orders the Maritime Militia, “to undertake the duties related to preparations against war, defend the frontiers and maintain public order; and be always ready to join the armed forces to take part in war, resist aggression and defend the motherland.”

It is important to note that China considers the entirety of the South China Sea to be China’s frontier in need of defending, despite the international consensus that China’s claims over the waterways are illegal.

China’s massive Maritime Militia fleet of fishing vessels is numbered in the hundreds. It is important to note that this militia is made up of large vessels, some reaching as large as 500 tons in size. These are not recreational fishing boats — they are deep sea-capable vessels that routinely turn off their legally mandated Automatic Identification System (AIS) transceivers to make it nearly impossible for nations other than China to accurately track the size or location. Satellite imagery shows that these vessels very rarely deploy actual fishing equipment and instead spend a great deal of their time anchored — which while entirely unprofitable, is perfectly in keeping with the understanding that these ships are not actually intended for commercial use.

According to an article in Foreign Policy by the director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Gregory Poling,

“On a day-to-day basis it serves as a logistics and surveillance arm of the PLA, ferrying supplies to Chinese outposts, monitoring and reporting on the activities of other claimants, and engaging in joint training exercises with the military and law enforcement. But they also move into more direct harassment of other nations’ vessels when called up—maneuvering dangerously close to foreign naval, law enforcement, and civilian vessels, sometimes shouldering and ramming them, and in general making it unsafe for other parties to operate in areas contested by Beijing, all while the PLA and China Coast Guard are kept in reserve as an implicit threat with a level of deniability.”

Recent estimates place the total number of vessels in China’s Maritime Militia operating in the South China Sea at approximately 300 ships.

China’s military Coast Guard

Likewise, China’s Coast Guard is widely seen as the most powerful force of its kind in the world. It was originally established as the maritime security arm of the Public Security Border Troops, a paramilitary organization under China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Today, the Coast Guard falls under the command of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC). This transition was a complex one. I recommend reading Lyle Morris’ “China Welcomes its newest armed force: The Coast Guard” on War on the Rocks if you would like to learn more about how it happened.

Although the Chinese Coast Guard is formally tasked with law enforcement and rescue operations, it is often leveraged in territorial disputes just as the Maritime Militia is. For example, coast guard vessels were used to blockade the Scarborough Shoal during a dispute that began in 2012 with the Philippine government over the shoal’s sovereignty. The blockade remained active until 2016 when China seized control of the landmass.

According to Bonnie Glaser, a regional security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),

“The evidence is clear that there is a pattern of behavior from China that is contrary to what law enforcement usually involves. We’re seeing bullying, harassment and ramming of vessels from countries whose coast guard and fishing vessels are much smaller, often to assert sovereignty throughout the South China Sea.”

Much like China’s military modernization efforts, the Chinese Coast Guard has undergone a similar revamp in recent years. Over 100 new Coast Guard vessels have been launched in just the past seven years, making China’s Coast Guard a rival to that of some national navies in the region. Among these new vessels are at least two 12,000-ton cutters that are significantly larger than the U.S. Navy’s 9,800-ton Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers. These vessels are equipped with 76mm rapid-fire guns as well as close-in auxiliary and anti-aircraft machine guns, along with a helicopter deck and hangar facilities for rotary-wing assets and UAVs.

Other Chinese Coast Guard vessels of note include at least six 3,500 ton Type 818 patrol ships. These vessels share a hull with China’s Type 054A Jiangkai II-class frigates and also carry a 76mm PJ-26 naval gun as each vessel’s primary weapon alongside other smaller weapon systems. Unlike China’s frigates, however, these large vessels do not carry anti-ship or surface-to-air missiles. Other Coast Guard vessels based on Chinese Navy designs include China’s newest cutters, which are based on their Navy’s 1500-ton Type 056 Jiangdao-class corvettes.

All told, China’s Coast Guard now boasts 135 vessels, all of which fall under the direct control of China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy, making them effectively an addition to China’s continuously growing Navy numbers.

According to CSIS, China’s Coast Guard is actually the most common element in China’s territorial disputes with other nations. Out of 45 clashes recorded since 2010 in the region, China’s Coast Guard was present in no fewer than 30 incidents. Only four of those clashes involved Chinese naval vessels without a Coast Guard presence.

The People’s Liberation Army-Navy

China’s rapidly expanding Navy is no stranger to the spotlight. For years now, China has grabbed headlines with the launch of new and technologically advanced vessels like their Type 052D guided-missile destroyers that are widely believed to be comparable to America’s own Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. A great deal of attention has also been paid to China’s home-grown aircraft carriers like the Type 002 that is currently undergoing final assembly. Once completed, China will have three operational aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

This new carrier is expected to be a technological leap over China’s two Type 001 carriers, one of which was built on a former Soviet hull and the other was built using many design cues from the first. However, none of these carriers, including the new Type 002, possess the same nuclear power America’s supercarriers boast. As we have discussed before, China also lacks any appreciable combat experience among its strike group commanders and the nation currently lacks a reliable carrier-based fighter. Efforts are already underway to mitigate these three serious weaknesses. Yet, what China may lack in these regards, it more than compensates for in sheer volume.

Between 2005 and 2019, China’s navy grew by an astonishing 55 percent, increasing its total number of vessels to a staggering 335 ships, according to a Congressional Research Service report entitled, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress.”

To give you another sense of just how rapidly China’s Navy has grown, Nick Childs, a senior fellow for naval forces and maritime security at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, told National Defense earlier this year that, “during a recent four-year period the naval vessels that Chinese shipyards produced were roughly equivalent in tonnage to the entire U.K. Royal Navy or the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.”

It is important to note that China is showing no signs of stopping, despite occasional setbacks making their way to the media. Retired U.S. Navy Captain James Fanell, who previously served as head of intelligence for the Pacific Fleet, estimates that the Chinese navy will continue to grow rapidly in the coming years and by 2030, will have a whopping 450 surface vessels and another 110 submarines at its disposal. This will be in addition to the supplemental forces provided by the Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. Captain Fanell said,

“Given the past 20-year trajectory of PRC naval ship construction, the PRC’s expressed desire and ability to continue to increase its spending on naval shipbuilding, the cost advantages its shipbuilding industry enjoy compared to foreign naval shipyards and Chinese shipbuilders’ continued trend of indigenous technical mastery of complex designs and systems integration, I expect the PLA navy will continue to surpass the U.S. Navy in the number of warships built for the foreseeable future.”

How does the U.S. Navy stack up?

In total, when considering the 2019 strength estimates of the Chinese Navy, estimates of China’s Maritime Militia strength, and total figures attributed to China’s Coast Guard, the People’s Liberation Army has roughly 770 vessels operating in the Pacific. It is important to note that these vessels range widely in terms of military capability and purpose: Some more modern ships are designed for a wide variety of mission sets and many less capable vessels are intended for only very specific operations. Nonetheless, this figure represents an astonishing amount of naval power consolidated into a far smaller area than America’s navy is.

The U.S. Navy currently operates around 293 total vessels; this is only two ships more than a decade and a half ago. President Trump campaigned on and has continued to push for a larger Naval force of 355 ships, but current estimates suggest that this will be impossible unless the Navy sees a significant increase in its shipbuilding budget.

Included in that total are 69 nuclear submarines. Although orders are in place for new Virginia-class and Columbia-class subs, most of these will replace older vessels like the Navy’s aging Ohio-class. China is expected to be operating as many as 70 submarines by the close of this year, though most of these subs are diesel-electric, rather than nuclear powered like America’s.

Lest you dismiss these non-nuclear platforms, however, it should be noted that a Swedish Navy Gotland-class diesel-electric sub managed to successfully “sink” the Nimitz-class USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in a series of war-games in 2004.

The United States Navy would not be able to dedicate the entirety of its fleet to combat operations in the Pacific, nor could it leverage the full brunt of America’s Coast Guard. This would place U.S. forces at a significant disadvantage in terms of numbers alone in a Pacific conflict. Of course, technology is a considerable force multiplier, and America’s more advanced platforms, coupled with America’s far more experienced troops and commanders, might be enough to offset China’s numerical advantage.

The use of stealth aircraft like the carrier and amphibious assault ship-based F-35s (with added range granted by the forthcoming MQ-25 Stingray refueler drones), along with U.S. Air Force long-range bombers like the B-2 Spirit and forthcoming B-21 Raider may even be enough to steal victory away from China’s clutches. According to Ronald O’Rourke, a naval specialist at the Congressional Research Service,

“U.S. and other observers generally assess that while the United States today has more naval capability overall, China’s naval modernization effort has substantially reduced the U.S. advantage, and that if current U.S. and Chinese naval capability trend lines do not change, China might eventually draw even with or surpass the United States. In the South China Sea, some observers are concerned that China has already drawn even with or even surpassed the United States.”

Of course, the best way to win such a war would be to avoid it in the first place, without losing grip of America’s lead in the realms of diplomacy and international commerce. But even with the understanding of that aim, doing so will require a U.S. military that is capable of standing up to China’s massive Pacific presence. Deterrence, at the end of the day, is all about avoiding war through the threat of a fight that would be too costly to stomach.