Op-Ed

The Fentanyl War We Pretended Wasn’t a War

Mexico did not flinch because it cared about Maduro, but because his capture proved the United States had stopped negotiating with old assumptions and started enforcing new ones.

Fentanyl, force, and the moment Mexico realized the rules had changed

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2025 started with me drifting south. Argentina. Colombia. Mexico. The kind of travel where you’re half working, half disappearing, watching the hemisphere from ground level instead of through policy briefs and Sunday shows.

Had you asked me before that trip what the odds were of the United States putting boots on the ground in Venezuela, I would have laughed. Scoffed, really. Most of us would have. Had you told me the future involved American special operators abducting Nicolás Maduro, I would have suggested less caffeine or stronger medication.

Yet here we are.

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If there’s one consistent feature of the presidency of Donald Trump, it’s that complacency is punished. Assumptions age poorly. And the idea that Washington would never cross certain lines in its own hemisphere has quietly expired.

So now we look south again, not at Caracas in isolation, but at the ripple effects. Especially in Mexico.

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Let’s get one thing straight, and let’s do it without slogans or performative outrage: fentanyl is not coming from Venezuela. It’s not moving through South America the way cocaine does, hopping coastlines and speedboats like a relic of the 1980s. Anyone pretending otherwise is either lying or hasn’t bothered to learn the supply chain.

And we should also be adults about this: cocaine and fentanyl are not the same threat. Cocaine ruins lives over time. Fentanyl ends them in minutes.

During the 2010s, fentanyl flowed directly from China into North America. Finished product. Analogues. Mail parcels. Chemical logistics dressed up as global commerce. Washington noticed, and eventually leaned hard on Beijing. China responded, at least formally, by banning fentanyl production and export.

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But the factories didn’t disappear. They adapted.

Instead of producing fentanyl itself, Chinese chemical manufacturers pivoted to producing precursor chemicals. Legal substances. Dual-use compounds with legitimate industrial and medical applications, including lawful pharmaceutical fentanyl production. They don’t trigger the same controls. They don’t raise the same red flags. On paper, nothing illegal is happening.

Those precursors get shipped to Mexico. That’s where the real transformation happens. Mexican criminal organizations synthesize the final product in clandestine labs, press it into pills, and move it north using the same infrastructure they’ve perfected for decades. Trucks. Cars. Commercial cargo. Human couriers. The border isn’t being overrun by chemistry students; it’s being exploited by logistics professionals. Fentanyl’s lethality is what makes it strategically different. Trace amounts kill. Dosing margins are microscopic. Production costs are low. Profit margins are obscene. It doesn’t need farmland, weather, or time. It thrives in garages and warehouses. Once, fentanyl was used to cut heroin. Now it has its own market. A domestic appetite. That appetite didn’t appear out of nowhere, and it didn’t appear because Mexico willed it into existence. It’s rooted in American despair, untreated trauma, hollowed-out communities, and a healthcare system that treats addiction as either a crime or a moral failure. That reckoning matters, but it’s a different argument. What matters here is perception. For years, the United States justified aggressive interdiction far from its shores: chasing cocaine shipments in the Caribbean, raiding jungles, pressuring governments that had little direct control over consumer demand in Chicago or Baltimore. That logic escalated slowly, then suddenly. Now it has culminated in the capture of Nicolás Maduro, an act that shattered every remaining assumption about what Washington will and won’t do. Mexico noticed. Not because it sympathizes with Maduro. It doesn’t. But because precedent matters more than rhetoric. If the United States is willing to seize a foreign head of state under a narco-terrorism framework, then geography stops being a shield and proximity becomes a liability. Mexican leadership understands the implication immediately: this is no longer just about drugs. It’s about sovereignty under conditional terms. Publicly, Mexico is careful. Statements are calibrated. Words are weighed like live ammunition. Privately, the anxiety is obvious. The same legal architecture used to justify action in Venezuela can be rhetorically extended north. Cartels designated as terrorist organizations. Fentanyl framed as a weapon. Criminal enterprise recast as national-security threat. That framing collapses distance. It binds Mexico into the narrative whether it wants to be there or not. So Mexico responds the only way it realistically can. Not with speeches, but with gestures. Arrests. Extraditions. Seizures. Intelligence sharing. Visible cooperation meant to signal alignment without surrender. Actions over words, because words now carry risk. This is the real fallout of the fentanyl war. Not just overdose numbers or seizure statistics, but a hemisphere quietly recalibrating its assumptions about American power. The old belief was that Washington moralized while hesitating. The new reality is blunter. Less dressed up. Less patient. Hunter Thompson once wrote that when the going gets weird, the weird turn pro. In 2026, the weird is institutional. Legal. Strategic. And very real. Mexico understands that now. The rest of us are just catching up.
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