By Steve Gottlieb
When a government becomes divided, its political institutions often fracture first. But when the chaos reaches the ranks of those responsible for national defense — the military and the intelligence community (IC) — the consequences can quickly become catastrophic.
In a recent viral video, several current members of Congress who previously held military or intelligence roles appeared on camera urging service members to refuse “illegal orders.” Although they framed the message as a defense of constitutional duty, the video unmistakably suggested that orders issued by the Trump administration — including those given by the President or the Secretary of Defense — should be viewed by default as illegitimate. These statements were not made in a vacuum. They were disseminated publicly, intentionally, and with a clear political subtext.
Retired Army Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis offered an articulate rebuttal on Fox News, correctly noting that the U.S. military — and, by extension, the U.S. intelligence community — is bound to uphold loyalty to the Constitution, not a political party or personality. Both communities operate under a strict chain of command, rigorous legal frameworks, and a culture of disciplined apolitical service. Undermining that culture for partisan purposes is not merely irresponsible; it may also be dangerous.
The danger is not just domestic. It is strategic.
A Lesson from Israel: Division as a Strategic Opening
Following the judicial reform debate in Israel last year, thousands of reservists — including pilots, cyber specialists, and intelligence officers — announced they would refuse to report for duty. Political infighting spilled into the IDF and the intelligence services. Public statements of disobedience circulated widely. Enemies watched.
After the October 7 attacks, multiple open-source Israeli government reviews, public statements by IDF leadership, and independent Israeli media analyses pointed to a troubling consensus: Hamas and its Iranian backers perceived Israel as distracted, divided, and weakened. The refusal movement was not the cause of the attack, but it contributed to a perception that Israel’s internal divisions were eroding its deterrence. Hamas leadership misread political fragmentation as military fragmentation.
Deterrence is not only about capability. It is about perception.
America’s adversaries — including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea — have long studied internal cohesion as a key indicator of national strength. They look for distraction, division, uncertainty, and internal political turbulence. When they see these indicators emerging inside the military or IC of a targeted nation, they interpret them as opportunity.
And they act.
The U.S. Military and IC Cannot Become Political Battlegrounds
The U.S. military and the intelligence community operate under separate but complementary pillars:
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Unified mission: defend the Constitution and protect the nation.
Apolitical ethos: loyalty to lawful authority, not political preference.
Chain of command and legal frameworks: established in statute, doctrine, and longstanding tradition.
Deterrence credibility: based on the expectation of clear, decisive, unified response.
When political leaders imply — openly — that future presidential orders are inherently suspect depending on who occupies the Oval Office, that unity is threatened.
When current members of Congress publicly urge military or IC personnel to pre-judge hypothetical orders as unlawful based on political identity, they encourage erosion of the very structure that protects the republic.
Once doubt about legitimacy seeps into the ranks, it takes root fast.
And adversaries notice.
Why This Matters for Deterrence
China’s PLA doctrine, through its “Comprehensive National Power” framework, explicitly tracks levels of internal disunity and civil–military tension inside rival nations.
Russia’s “reflexive control” doctrine is designed to exploit perceived confusion or division in opponents.
Iran monitors U.S. political turmoil to time proxy escalations.
North Korea habitually tests missile launches during U.S. periods of political tension or transition.
These states do not view political chaos as “just politics.”
They view it as an indicator of readiness and resolve.
If the U.S. military or intelligence community were ever to follow the path Israel briefly took — where internal political disputes visibly spilled into the armed forces and IC — the resulting perception of fragmentation could invite strategic miscalculation.
A divided military or intelligence community does not project hesitation only; it projects opportunity.
The Stakes Are Higher Than One Election
This is not about whether Americans like or dislike a particular administration. It is not about Donald Trump, Joe Biden, or any other political figure. It is about national cohesion — the glue that binds the military and IC to the mission the Constitution defines.
To be clear: service members and intelligence officers must refuse illegal orders. That obligation is rooted in law and ethics. But refusing orders is a legal process, not a political slogan, and it should never be encouraged as a blanket preemptive stance against a future lawful commander.
When current members of Congress with military or intelligence backgrounds imply that personnel should treat political disagreement as grounds for insubordination, they blur the line between legitimate concern and political manipulation.
That line must remain bright.
America Cannot Repeat Israel’s Mistake
America has the most capable military and intelligence community in the world — but even powerful institutions can be undermined from within if political actors succeed in turning national defenders into political pawns.
Israel’s experience shows how fast perception can shift.
When unity fractures, deterrence erodes.
When deterrence erodes, enemies test boundaries.
And when testing begins, miscalculation becomes almost inevitable.
The United States cannot afford to send a signal of division, hesitation, or internal politicization within the very institutions responsible for preventing strategic surprise.
This is a moment for clarity, not chaos.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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About the Author
Steve Gottlieb is a retired U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps officer, former CIA analyst, and prior firefighter/paramedic.
** Editor’s Note: Check out Steve’s Substack: https://substack.com/@stevegottlieb
PRIMARY-SOURCE LIST (OPEN-SOURCE ONLY)
Below is the exact list for PCRB, all publicly accessible:
U.S. Framework / Law / Doctrine
U.S. Constitution, Articles II & VI.
10 U.S.C. § 892–893 (Uniform Code of Military Justice) — lawful/ unlawful orders.
DoD Directive 5124.02, “Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness” (civil–military relations).
Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities” (IC missions & oversight).
Defense Intelligence Agency, “Overview and Mission,” public website.
Israel – October 7 Context (Open-Source Only)
Israeli State Comptroller, public briefings (2024) on pre-attack cohesion issues.
IDF Chief of Staff Public Statement, Nov 2023 — acknowledging impact of reservist refusals on perception.
Haaretz, “How Reservist Refusals Affected Israel’s Deterrence,” July–Oct 2023 coverage.
Times of Israel, public reports on reservist protests and intelligence community warnings.
Adversary Doctrine (Open-Source English Translations)
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) — “Comprehensive National Power” doctrine, open-source summaries from China’s Academy of Military Sciences.
Russian General Staff Academy, published open-source writings on “Reflexive Control” (Leier, 2020 review).
Iranian IRGC publications, English-language public statements on exploiting U.S. political discord (IRGC-affiliated Fars News).
North Korean KCNA, publicly released statements tied to missile tests during U.S. political cycles.
Media / Commentary
Fox News interview, Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis (ret.), aired publicly and archived online.
Publicly available viral video of sitting members of Congress urging refusal of “illegal orders.”
All above sources are: OPEN SOURCE / PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE / UNCLASSIFIED.
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