“There is no such thing as the Free Syrian Army. People still use the term in Syria to make it seem like the rebels have some sort of structure. But there really isn’t.” — Rami Jarrah, prominent Syrian activist and co-founder of ANA Press, a Syrian news outlet

So who are we giving weapons to? Who are we funding to fight Bashar al Assad?

Short answer? No one.

Well, a handful are being trained. But no one to fight Assad. As of early July, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced a grand total of sixty Syrians have passed the Pentagon’s vetting process and have actually been retained for training. We don’t want them to fight Assad, though, that’s expressly forbidden. We’re training them to fight the Islamic State, and ONLY the Islamic State. In fact, that’s been a significant difficulty in recruitment. The Pentagon said in June that a major problem was finding recruits with no connections to the Islamic State and who would be willing to fight the IS and not Assad.

And yet, in September 2014 State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said the Islamic State cannot be defeated as long as Syrian President Bashar Assad remains in power.

Confused yet? How does Obama’s long-held position that Assad must go reconcile with DoD training Syrian rebels to only fight ISIS, while the State Department says Assad has to be defeated before the Islamic State can be defeated? If US-trained Syrian rebels fight the Islamic State, which is also fighting Assad, doesn’t that take pressure of the Assad regime?

US support of Syrian rebels has been confused and complicated from the beginning. Originally, it was a CIA-sponsored program begun in 2013, two years after President Obama first declared that Bashar al Assad had to be removed. Weapons, including small arms, ammunition and some anti-tank systems like the TOW, were bought by Saudi Arabia and other Arab backers, flown to Turkey and then trucked into northern Syria for rebel groups there. But the CIA’s program was fundamentally hampered by the need to scrupulously vet Syrian commanders. The ties among the various anti-Assad groups are murky, and no one in the White House wanted US weapons to end up in the hands of Al Qaeda.

The necessary close scrutiny and rigid accountability requirements led to predictable results. Weapons and ammunition shipments, when approved, were often too small or too late to do any good. According to the Wall Street Journal, “One of the US’ favorite trusted commanders got the equivalent of 16 bullets a month per fighter. Rebel leaders were told they had to hand over old anti-tank missile launchers to get new ones—and couldn’t get shells for captured tanks.”