The problem, Crane explains, began with a force structure decision. “One of the unintended consequences of the creation of Special Operations Command in 1987 was an unhealthy intellectual bifurcation in the Army. Special operations forces had no incentive to think about concepts of counterinsurgency beyond the small-scale operations they had run in El Salvador, while conventional forces could ignore COIN altogether, assuming such missions belonged to SOF.
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The problem, Crane explains, began with a force structure decision. “One of the unintended consequences of the creation of Special Operations Command in 1987 was an unhealthy intellectual bifurcation in the Army. Special operations forces had no incentive to think about concepts of counterinsurgency beyond the small-scale operations they had run in El Salvador, while conventional forces could ignore COIN altogether, assuming such missions belonged to SOF.
Read the rest on Foreign Policy.
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