In Focus with Curtis Fox: Rethinking Coordination with Conventional Forces

Editor’s Note: Welcome back to our weekly column with former Green Beret Curtis Fox, where we explore the evolving role of Special Forces. This week, Curtis examines how Special Forces can better integrate with conventional forces in large-scale combat operations. Drawing lessons from the British SAS and SBS in the Falklands War, he highlights the value of deep reconnaissance, offensive action, and partner force development.

He also explores the potential benefits of co-deploying SFOD-As with light infantry units and coordinating with Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) to create a more sustainable and effective approach to irregular warfare.

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As the U.S. Army pivots towards strategic competition and away from the War on Terror, the Special Forces Regiment also needs to understand how best to coordinate with and support conventional forces.

The British Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) put on a clinic for how SOF can support conventional ground forces in the 1982 Falklands War. The SAS was first tasked with conducting reconnaissance missions on the Falkland Islands to detect Argentine troop locations and strength. The SBS was tasked with identifying beach landing sites and coastal defenses to provide the British Naval Task Force with an opportunity for a successful amphibious landing. In addition to these reconnaissance taskings, the SAS and SBS squadrons conducted numerous raids against Argentine garrisons, airfields, equipment, and supply points. These raids and “ranging” tasks frustrated and harassed Argentine forces, fixing them in place, and they provided Major General Sir John Jeremy Moore Land Forces Commander with the tactical intelligence necessary for the campaign.

SFOD-As can support American Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) through similar advanced force operations by not only providing valuable deep reconnaissance but by screening the movement of the line battalions. They can confirm intelligence on enemy troop locations and disposition, detect troop movements, and map pattern-of-life. SFOD-As can also mobilize local allies and harass the enemy rear.

Is there any reason SFOD-As shouldn’t co-deploy with a light infantry company for select missions? Many Special Forces deployments could benefit from the presence and participation of a company from the 82nd Airborne or 101st Air Assault. Consider the following: a company-level desert raid with indigenous partners in which a 82nd Airborne platoon serves as the backbone of the raiding force, flanked by two indigenous platoons led by Green Berets, a second 82nd Airborne platoon serves as a QRF, and a third 82nd Airborne platoon is on standdown-reserve. The Green Berets would benefit from the additional firepower, and U.S. airborne infantrymen would provide an example to follow for indigenous partners. Alternatively, conventional forces soldiers would benefit from the complexities of a SOF deployment, Foreign internal defense (FID) mission, and raiding experiences.

The Special Forces Regiment needs to appreciate the utility of the SFABs. No one in the Army sees the SFABs as a replacement for Special Forces. Quite the contrary, the SFAB’s 6-man cross-functional teams are not designed to operate behind enemy lines or to lead indigenous troops on offensive actions. SFAB teams are meant to build out the leadership, support staff, and supply mechanisms of indigenous battalions. They train officers on how to run a platoon or company or battalion.

This is an area where SFOD-As really struggle. SFOD-As tend to focus on tactical training with the goal of transitioning partner forces into kinetic operations. Special Forces NCOs are trained to perform their SFOD-A’s internal staff functions, but they are far less capable at building out staff functions for the partner force’s battalion HQ (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, or S6). SFOD-As have one Captain who is really capable of training an indigenous battalion command staff. Unfortunately, that Captain already has a full-time job running the SFOD-A.

This creates the paradox of temporary tactical excellence with weak long-term sustainment and staying power.

A better approach may be to coordinate SFAB deployments with SFOD-A deployments. The advisory tasks on supply, communications, personnel, and intelligence can all be supported by SFAB advisors that are provided by the Army and whom specialize in those fields and functions. While the SFAB is building a battalion command staff that will eventually be able to lead and sustain the unit in absence of American support, the SFOD-A can operationalize the Battalion, training the shooters in tactics and taking the platoons on patrol.

The SFOD-A will be able to prioritize S3 functions (command-and-control), training shoot-maneuver-communicate, intelligence collection, and going outside the wire for a fight.

Looking at the big picture, this divided approach with the SFABs also alleviates US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) of having to provide personnel for a plethora of low-impact persistent-presence SFA missions around the world. These missions, most of which are in permissive environments, do not require the expense and expertise of an SFOD-A. Instead, USASOC can focus on providing SFOD-As for the missions where the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) has the risk appetite for offensive action, where the SFOD-A has the support of the U.S. Embassy Country Team, and where there is already a partner force with functioning leadership and command staff (facilitated by the SFABs).

This divided approach also reinforces the assumption that the SFOD-A is deploying to theater to facilitate offensive action. This is important because U.S. Embassy Country Teams are often very skeptical of a SOF unit’s presence in-country. Afterall, hammers look for nails, and SOF units are certainly hammers. If an indigenous soldier gets injured in training, or a village child gets injured in a raid, or some SOF operator gets a local girlfriend pregnant, it is the U.S. Embassy that has to clean up the mess and preserve our country’s international relationships.

Country Teams are rightly skeptical of SOF operations in-country, and it is not uncommon for them to restrict offensive activity or even the number of SOF personnel allowed in-country, despite the host-nation’s government specifically requesting the presence of an SFOD-A and full deployment package.

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Stay tuned for next week’s continuation of “Practice of Unconventional Warfare,” where Fox explores the evolution, strengths, and limitations of the 12-man SFOD-A structure.

You can read the previous column here.