Ukraine Conflict Highlights Gaps in UK’s Radio Systems

The following piece, written by Julian Nettlefold, first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.

The British Army’s new architectural approach to combat radio networking, known as Evolve to Open (EvO), evolves the closed proprietary BOWMAN system capability into an open, modular system to allow the integration of new radios, applications, terminals, and other system components faster and with greater ease.

In April 2017, General Dynamics UK (GDUK) was awarded a £330 million (approximately $417 million in 2017) contract by the UK Ministry of Defence to design a ‘system of systems’ open architecture for the next generation of tactical communication and information systems as the initial phase of the MORPHEUS program.

At the outset, GDUK is believed to have estimated that EvO would cost £700 million (approximately $885 million in 2017); however, the contract was ultimately awarded for £330 million. The system plans to connect deployed tactical forces to their commanders, give improved access to powerful operational information technology (IT), and simplify the user experience.

The open system approach allows new technologies to be rapidly integrated to tackle emerging threats and enhance interoperability with allies. The EvO contract was the first to be awarded for the MORPHEUS program, which will give UK Armed Forces across all three services modernized command and control networks using the latest technology.

EvO aims to provide plug-and-play solution architecture for MORPHEUS to prevent stove-piped software and technology solutions that do not easily network together. Multi-domain warfare requires seamless connectivity from land, sea, and air platforms, from HQ down to the front line, using a multitude of bearers, be they radio, SATCOM (satellite communications), 5G, or IP (internet protocol).

To design a new architecture to accommodate all of these requirements is a very ambitious task given that it took over 20 years to develop the 3GPP mobile telephony standards where, by contrast, the commercial opportunity for network and handset providers was extremely compelling.

The other obstacle is that in the majority of major Ministry of Defense (MoD) procurements, the contractor is required to develop new versions of old things, platforms which will not necessarily have the required technology to talk to other platforms or indeed other armed forces equipment; thus it is typically difficult to make these platforms operate and communicate together as a coherent force, particularly with the MDI kill chain in mind. By early 2022, EvO seemed to be at a decision point to complete the architecture with additional funding or perhaps

Ukraine and Obsolescence Issues

In the midst of the EvO debate, the war in Ukraine broke out, and an analysis of the tactical radios deployed there provided some serious lessons about the operational sustainability of the technical capability of the current BOWMAN system.

Russia has always majored in Electronic Warfare (EW) systems and, in fact, had its own EW day last April. Thus, EW is deployed across the battlefield by Russia to great effect. This changed the manner by which Russia, in particular, communicated across the battlefield as its new SDR radios appeared to have issues.

There are news reports of them making use of Chinese commercial radios in clear, which are obviously easily jammed. In any jamming scenario, there is always a temptation to resort to mobile phones, but this often leads to the demise of personnel, many of whom are killed once their 4G presence and location are ‘announced’ by the system and they are targeted.

L3Harris has supplied thousands of Software Defined Radios (SDR) to Ukraine under the USAI (Ukraine Security Assurance Initiative) and has learned real-world lessons from their deployment since Moscow’s military operation against Ukraine began in 2014.

The rise of the near-peer threat in contrast to the technological asymmetries of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has enforced the need for resilient and robust EW features.

The tactical radios that replace BOWMAN will need to be SDRs that can support a portfolio of waveforms that trade throughput and robustness to counter the dynamic EW environment on the battlefield.

The current BOWMAN radios were designed around just one anti-jam (AJ) waveform, and although some parameters can be adjusted, the implementation of more robust waveforms is not viable.

Another problem looming for the MoD is the aging BOWMAN radios, of which some 50,000 are in service across Very High Frequency (VHF), High Frequency (HF), Automated Dialogue Replacement (ADR), and Hard Copy Data Recorder (HCDR), are subject to component obsolescence clearly, like any piece of technical equipment; they cannot be economically maintained indefinitely.

The BOWMAN Out of Service (OSD) is not fixed but is likely to be in 2030, with no replacement yet on the horizon due to waiting for the EvO architecture to be completed. ‘Solution A’ could be the formation of a system of gateways as the current BOWMAN BCIP upgrades provide.

The biggest problem with the original BOWMAN system was that the command systems software used by GDUK, as it did for the Canadian TCCS/IRIS project, did not have any gateways. IRIS was mainly voice with some data, whilst BOWMAN had a major data element with voice given priority. Thus, image downloads caused the BOWMAN system to hang.

Another change in doctrine since the BOWMAN definition era is that future wars will likely be fought with coalitions, and they are most likely led by the United States. So, interoperability with US forces is key.

In order to save time and money and get capability fielded as early as possible, it would seem sensible for the UK MoD to build on what the US has already done and not to try to define and procure bespoke radios for a ‘UK only’ requirement. This path would give the MoD the majority of any MORPHEUS-specific requirement at an affordable price and within a timescale, benefitting from available and proven tactical communication products.

The other issue facing the MoD is the need to implement a new waveform and enable both BOWMAN and any new radios to work coherently across the battlefield during fielding/conversion. It is possible to implement a BOWMAN-compatible waveform in the form of the JTRS Bowman interoperability Waveform (JBW). However, the upgrade of vehicles could be much faster than it was for BOWMAN conversion if the new range of radios slotted into the existing BOWMAN installations.

The integration costs encountered during BOWMAN were extremely high due to the differing design builds of the fleet, and a simplified installation approach could significantly mitigate these costs.

The big elephant in the room, however, is the pursuit of Multi-Domain-Integration, connecting sensors to decision-makers and tasking effectors, which requires a network that will support UK operations seamlessly across the globe in real-time linking SATCOM via Skynet 6, tactical communications by LE TacCIS and airborne assets such as the fast jet fleet, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Poseidon, transport, helicopters and the unnamed fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs).

Perhaps the only answer, given all the technology advancements and the emergence of near-peer threats, is to change course, use EvO as a departure point, and go out to industry to supply an overarching open architecture, plug-and-play secure network, built bottom up on a solid foundation of available but upgradable SDR equipment which can accommodate the needs of the British Army of the 21st century to meet the current and future threats.

Of course, it will take time and money, but if managed properly, it should be sustainable.