What Happened to US “Global Zero” Nuclear Disarmament

The following piece, written by Peter Huessy, first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.

Nuclear Modernization, The Global Disarmament Racket, and America’s Security

A History Introduction: Arms Control & Disarmament

A push in 2007 from the “Four Horsemen”—former Senator Sam Nunn, former Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, and former  Secretary of Defense William Perry—to set a goal of zero nuclear weapons galvanized the disarmament community to seek the abolition of nuclear forces. Although, by their own admission, they had no idea how disarmament could be accomplished.

At the time, American strategic nuclear forces under START I (1991) and the Moscow Treaty (2002) had been reduced by nearly ninety percent. On the other hand, while Russia agreed to both treaties, its strategic nuclear forces probably, while significantly reduced, remained somewhere around 2500-3000, with the ability to grow significantly.

Disarmament advocates assumed US and Russian nuclear forces would continue to reduce. Once New START was ratified in 2010, US strategic nuclear forces would continue their descent to an official 1550 warheads. In the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the time, it was widely predicted that further START-type arms agreements would be on the horizon, lowering US nuclear forces toward worldwide nuclear disarmament, joined by a reformed or reset Russia, and move all in due course to what has become known as “Global Zero.”

Progress in reducing nuclear warheads was impressive. Since the height of the Cold War, for example, there has been roughly a 90% reduction in the deployed US strategic nuclear forces, with the reductions occurring primarily from 1986-2024.

In 1991, under what was known as the PNI or Presidential Nuclear Initiative, the President unilaterally eliminated most of the US force of theater or regional nuclear weapons, leaving a few hundred gravity bombs in Europe as a backup to NATO’s deterrent capability.

Unfortunately, Russia didn’t follow suit and now has at least 1900 such weapons and probably at least 4000 under realistic assumptions. But what is little understood is that the reductions were not easily accomplished. The Soviets had repeatedly rejected American proposals to reduce nuclear weapons.

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its massive distress brought about by America’s economic war against Moscow, the Russians could no longer afford to deploy the ten thousand or more strategic nuclear weapons allowed under the original SALT agreements. START’s time had come.

Ironically, the US-based disarmament community enthusiastically embraced the SALT process that actually saw a five-fold increase in Soviet strategic nuclear power. They were angered and critical when the Reagan administration published Soviet Military Power in 1986 detailing the very high allowed SALT II nuclear force levels.

The disarmament folks did support the 1972 SALT I and 1979 SALT II  treaties, which, as noted together, allowed a huge Soviet buildup. But in 1979-80, when SALT II was rejected by the US Senate and then subsequently withdrawn from consideration by the Carter administration, the disarmament community pivoted to the Soviet-supported nuclear freeze. They aggressively fought the Reagan administration’s INF and START initiatives as both unrealistic and deceptive ruse. Decades later, they even complained that the 2002 Moscow treaty that reduced strategic nuclear weapons to 1700-2100 wasn’t “real arms control.”

Reversing positions, these groups did embrace the 2010 New START treaty that brought allowable US nuclear warheads to the 1550 level from the 1700-2100 Moscow treaty (2002) warhead numbers, and considerably less than START II (3500) and START I (6000).

However, the 2010 New START agreement allowed the US to deploy 60 strategic bombers and count their gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles as only “one” strategic nuclear delivery vehicle, no matter how many weapons each strategic bomber actually carried. These gave the US considerable flexibility in deploying our nuclear and conventional strategic bombers, a key advantage in that the US is the only country in the free world with such weapons.

The New START allowed force was thus closer to 2000 than 1550 and was a rough continuation of the Moscow Treaty numbers. And did not necessarily significantly restrain the then-existing Russian strategic nuclear modernization plans. Moscow says that plans have now been implemented by 92%. This clearly indicates Russia is no fan of going to zero nuclear weapons, let alone arms control deals such as START I.

On top of this, for years now, Moscow has suspended the required reporting and inspections of the Treaty.

Unilateral Cuts in US Forces?

Now, having failed to secure disarmament or continue down a path of serial reductions, and with Russia and China markedly increasing their nuclear forces, disarmament enthusiasts in the absence of “arms control” and progress toward disarmament have long sought to have the United States unilaterally kill its own deterrent. And for years, ICBMs have been at the top of the list. With the unilateral elimination of the Sentinel ICBM program, the US would kill sixty percent of the strategic nuclear forces or SNDVs (strategic nuclear delivery vehicles) allowed under the 2010 New START agreement.

This history needs to be understood to be able to appreciate the current disarmament campaign to kill the ICBM leg of the nuclear TRIAD, or the Sentinel system of land-based missiles, of which 400 are to be deployed in five Midwestern and Western states—Colorado, Nebraska, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana.

And how such efforts would seriously undermine US deterrent capability just when Russia and China are both poised to markedly increase their deployed strategic nuclear forces which Dr. Chris Yeaw of the University of Nebraska and a top nuclear expert believes will reach within the next decade a combined 8000-10,000 warhead level, hardly only a few steps away from the goal of abolition.

In fact, America’s enemies are moving exactly in the opposite direction of the seeming disarmament path urged on the United States by the “four horsemen.” And gone is the cooperative spirit envisioned by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Arms control is decidedly not on the table, and new options have been continually rejected by Russia and China.

In the face of such threats, it would make sense for the United States to continue its nuclear modernization effort to replace its legacy forces with advanced nuclear capabilities rather than risk going out of the nuclear business or, as one expert commented, “rusting to obsolescence.” As the former Commander of US Strategic Command Admiral Charles Richard warned us, we have only two choices: modernize and stay in the nuclear deterrent business or disarm.

Certainly, at this time, the disarmament community has no hope for further joint nuclear reductions by the United States and Russia or China. So, the disarmament community has chosen instead to campaign for unilateral US nuclear reductions, primarily through the deployment delay or even elimination of the entire US Sentinel ICBM force.

Why ICBMs?

So, naturally, the question arises: Why should the United States keep and fully modernize our ICBM force?

The ICBMs are ready to deter. As US Air Force (USAF) Maj Gen Stacy Jo Huser, the Commander of all our ICBM bases, explained at a forum earlier this year, some 398 of these 400 missiles are on alert at any one time, making the force a formidable deterrent that is fully available for the United States President to deter our enemies and assure our friends.

The disarmament groups have called for nuclear reductions but by primarily calling for the US to stop nuclear modernization, much as they tried to do with the proposed 1980 nuclear freeze. They simply want to eliminate the platforms that carry warheads. That, for these groups, is the real goal. Kill something. And ICBMs have been one of their favorite targets.

Now the disarmers make three points about ICBMs. They complain that first, the ICBM force has grown sharply in costs, now estimated to cost $141 billion to be spent over 30 years. Too costly, they say. Second, the US nuclear modernization of its ICBM force will trigger an “arms race,” a point I will deal with later.  And third, they complain that being in fixed silos the missiles are on a “hair trigger” and could accidentally lead to a nuclear war.

Let us address these points, starting with the question of strategic stability.

The Window of Vulnerability and Strategic Stability

In theory, the missiles are vulnerable to a Russian first strike should Moscow decide to take the missiles out before they can be launched. This supposed strategic instability forms the basis for Annie Jacobson’s new book. Her thesis is that any US retaliatory strike using nuclear weapons would automatically result in all out nuclear war and nuclear winter, with the resultant death of billions of people worldwide. Thus, she dismissed the nuclear deterrence strategy as “mad.”

And because ICBMs are vulnerable to attack, it is assumed an American President might be pressured to “Use ’em or lose ’em” and thus even by mistake initiate a nuclear war, if for example responding to what turns out to be a false warning of attack.

Thus, it is American ICBMs—not Chinese or Russian missiles—that are the target of opponents of nuclear weapons and those seeking global zero.

The advocacy to get rid of ICBMs is not new. The “global zero” folks never liked US land-based ICBMs. During the Clinton administration, during the nuclear posture review, a proposal was put forward to kill all ICBMs, an effort that was stymied by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Later that decade, a global zero founder declared a USAF launch officer could, on his own, initiate the launch of ICBMs. Missiles that were obviously very dangerous, and on a hair trigger, and thus had to be eliminated.

In reality, the ICBM missiles during the 1970’s were fitted with technology that enables them to be fired only by Presidential authority and also required at least two launch officers working together in at least two launch control centers to carry out such an order. Despite the hysteria about American ICBMs being just moments away from being launched, in the 38 million minutes since October 1962, during which US ICBMs have been on alert, no Presidential order to “launch” has ever been given. Some hair trigger!

During the Reagan era, when the ICBM known as Peacekeeper was deployed, there were dozens of floor votes in the House of Representatives seeking to terminate all ICBM missile deployment. One was partially successful–in December 1982, the House cut funding for the basing mode but not the missile That was reversed in early March 1983 when the new defense budget was approved after receiving a unanimous report from the Scowcroft Commission supporting the Reagan nuclear modernization plan.

As for Soviet land based ICBMs, the same disarmers have long dismissed the idea that Moscow’s most powerful ICBMs were especially dangerous. In fact, the disarmers dismissed Ronald Reagan’s concern that the 300+ SS-18 Soviet missiles, a behemoth with ten, 500 kiloton warheads on each missile or more than 3000 very large and accurate warheads, did, in fact, threaten the US nuclear deterrent. And was not a defensive weapon but a weapon to be used to fight and win a nuclear conflict.

The original SALT I and SALT II agreements actually allowed the Soviet Union to grow its strategic long-range nuclear arsenal from 2100 to over 13,000,  of which Mark Schneider thinks Moscow probably deployed after its buildup of roughly 10,000 warheads, including the 300 SS-18 missiles.

At the height of the Cold War the USSR according to the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, may have deployed upwards of 45,000 nuclear weapons, the predominant number being theater or regional and shorter range, but vastly exceeding the US stockpile.

The SALT process was actually an agreement to build up, thus Reagan’s strong opposition to the Nixon-Ford-Carter administration’s pursuit of such a fake arms “control” deal, especially when coupled with an equally unserious and dangerous policy of détente and peaceful coexistence.

As early as 1976, according to one of the creators of the 1976 Committee on the Present Danger, then-candidate Reagan called for major reductions in nuclear weapons. The concern was that the USSR could hit our 1054 Minuteman and Titan ICBM missiles (with the highest accuracy in the US arsenal at the time) with an estimated 2000 of their SS-18 warheads. This would leave the Soviets with a remaining reserve of 8000 other strategic nuclear warheads with which to blackmail or coerce the US into standing down in a crisis or even during a conventional conflict in central Europe.

The issue was that our submarine leg of the TRIAD did not have the necessary accuracy (which Peacekeeper would provide) to hold at risk key hardened Soviet leadership and military targets; without such a capability, US deterrent strength would be weakened.

Thus, Reagan campaigned to close what he termed the “window of vulnerability.” Reagan proposed to both modernize America’s nuclear forces while also cutting US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces by roughly fifty percent (START I) and then again by another forty percent (START II), coupled with a ban on multiple-warhead land-based missiles (START II).

Reagan also proposed a zero-zero INF option for both US and Soviet medium-range nuclear warhead armed missiles deployed in Europe. At the time the Soviets were deploying one SS-20 missile each week in Europe.

Though previous administrations had proposed a counter-deployment of our own such missiles in Europe, both ground-launched cruise missiles and the fast-flying Pershing’s, none had actually put any funding in their proposed military budgets until President Reagan did so in early 1981.

But when the President officially proposed such a zero-zero INF missile deal in November 1981, the disarmament community went apoplectic. It was a trick they declared as the United States knew the Soviets would reject any such deal, and then the United States would be free to pursue an arms race and deploy its medium-range missiles in Europe. The critics had little to say about the thousand or more SS-20 warheads already deployed by Moscow.

The administration overcame the nuclear freeze and widespread opposition to the deployment of the two US medium-range missiles in Europe. Reagan forced the Soviets to agree to what became known as the INF or Intermediate Forces Treaty of 1986 which got rid of all such missiles, including the Soviet SS-20s. Gorbachev’s attempt to split NATO and coerce Europe into concessions spectacularly failed, and an entire category of nuclear-capable missiles was banned.

Now, if the United States had adopted the nuclear freeze when proposed by Moscow in the 1979-81period and then embraced by such groups as SaneFreeze, the Soviets would have had 441 SS-20s deployed with over 1300 warheads to the US zero GLCMs and Pershing’s.

And also, a Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal was largely modernized, while the US had not yet built or deployed the Ohio class submarine and D-5 missiles, the B-1 and B2 strategic bombers, or the Peacekeeper ICBM.

The nuclear freeze would have eliminated the backbone of a US modernized nuclear deterrent, which was thankfully deployed under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. And on which we still rely, even today, along with the other legacy MMIII and B52s that have been given serial life extensions.

The disarmament community not only embraced the nuclear freeze but rejected any idea that the heavy, large, multiwarhead Soviet SS-18 land-based missiles were really any threat to the United States. While today a US ICBM force with only one warhead each is somehow such a strategic threat to Russia that during a crisis Moscow would risk nuclear Armageddon and pre-emptively strike the US Minuteman missiles.

The Reagan administration, like its predecessors, did try and make the new ICBMs mobile and thus more survivable. However, even so, the disarmament community continued its opposition. (The US could add missile defenses and enhance US missile survivability as part of a nationwide defense against nuclear blackmail and coercion.)

But with the signing of START II in January 1993 by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, the Treaty’s ban on multiple-warhead land-based missiles obviated the need for the new Peacekeeper, and thus, the deployment was stopped at half its original plan.

However, the Russian Duma at the end of the decade failed to agree to START II as they insisted the United States would have to also jettison all missile defense work except for what could be done in the laboratory, a replay of what General Secretary Gorbachev sought at various summits with President Reagan.

But as Gorbachev wrote in the New York Times in 1996, the action of the Russian Duma to reject START II was not due to missile defense. The ban on multiple-warhead land-based ICBMs would rip the core out of the Russian coercive nuclear strategy, with the result that Moscow would have to have only single-warhead land-based missiles. Given the cost of putting the bulk of their forces on land-based missiles with only one warhead, the Soviets would be forced to sea, where alert rates were usually lower, and such weapons were not usually thought of as first-strike systems. Adopting START II while the Soviet empire also collapsed would have slammed shut the window of vulnerability. Russian opposition implicitly proved President Reagan’s right.

The US, however, did stop deployment of its new land-based missile, the Peacekeeper, under the assumption START II would be adopted, as it was by the US Senate. But given the Russian later rejection of START II, the US opted for its only available option, to keep our 400 Minuteman III missiles with one warhead each, numbers that would fit within the restrictions of the Moscow and New START agreements.

Now, to keep the Minuteman missiles viable, having first been deployed in 1970, the United States successfully gave two life extensions for the guidance and propulsion of the Minuteman III force, with the initial phase costing some $8 billion from 1997-2007.

But without the ability to extend the life of the MMIII once again, a new missile was needed. The new Sentinel (originally the ground-based strategic deterrent or GBSD) was approved by each of the past four administrations and will continue under President Trump.

There has been considerable cost growth in the program since its first cost estimates. But it is not the missile that has seen cost growth. It is the silos in which the missile rests. They cover thousands of acres and varying terrain. And the silos are also in need of repair and even replacement, and early assessments of the status of the silos proved to be considerably optimistic, especially the status of the silos at Malmstrom, USAF and Minot, USAF in Montana and North Dakota, respectively.

The disarmament community has repeatedly called for killing all ICBMs. Stopping the Sentinel program would leave a US nuclear deterrent of only a dozen or fewer targets that, if destroyed, would put the United States out of the nuclear business. As opposed to the 500+ targets in the current US nuclear arsenal of submarines, bombers, and ICBMs.

Without 400-450 ICBM silos and 50 additional launch control centers, the United States, at least through 2042, would only have 12 submarines and 60 bombers based at two submarine bases at Kings Bay, Georgia, and Kitsap or Bangor in Washington, and three USAF bomber bases at Minot, Barksdale, and Whiteman.

The submarines are highly survivable and carry two-thirds of the US nuclear warheads; they are a formidable deterrent. But they need a complimentary ICBM insurance leg of the Triad to sustain deterrence, especially to avoid being caught by a technical surprise breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare.
Bombers are also a formidable deterrent, but the US does not now deploy them on alert, and thus, the bomber bases are currently vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. However, although lacking the prompt capability of ICBMs, they can, during a crisis, be placed on alert. This allows the bomber component of the Triad to take part in a retaliatory strike with multiple hundreds of gravity bombers or air-launched cruise missiles. Such flexibility gives the bombers their unique capability as a diplomatic and military tool to signal resolve.

But a force of submarines and bombers only is a force that markedly simplifies any targeting strategy by our enemies. Combined, the number of US nuclear targets would be as low as twelve—the five bases on the CONUS and an estimated 6-8 submarines at sea.

And here the ironies mount. At the center of the disarmament communities opposition to Sentinel is that they believe that in a crisis, Moscow will suddenly attack all 400-450 US missile silos.
But for some reason not attack our five highly vulnerable submarine (2) and bomber bases (3) where some roughly 1200 warheads are deployed, which could be destroyed using only a handful of either conventional or nuclear weapons. And which contain three-fold the warheads in our entire ICBM force.

As a retired USAF General officer told me when the 2010 nuclear posture review was reported discussing whether to kill the US land based ICBMS or not, “What is the point of making it easy for our enemies to disarm us?”

What ICBM opponents are claiming is that the Russians would actually choose the most reckless of possible options. And attack only our ICBMs. But to do so would require the Russians to use two warheads for each US ICBM silos, and thus launch upwards of 900-1000  highly accurate warheads, primarily using their land based missile warheads of which the official START reported number is 1,032.

The Russians would obviously be inviting a massive retaliatory attack where the US could respond with some multiple hundreds of seas based warheads. Plus, hundreds of additional bomber weapons to the extent in a crisis or conventional conflict the United States would have put its bombers on alert. And whatever number of ICBM managed to survive.

Eliminating the ICBM force doesn’t change the retaliatory capability of the United States but only under some highly unrealistic assumptions. That is if you assume no ICBM warheads of any kind would be available for retaliation—you have recklessly, as argued earlier, however, made it far easier to attack the nuclear forces of the United States in a potentially disarming attack.

In addition, any attack by our adversaries other than an all-out attack against our ICBM force, world leave the ICBM force available for use. And configured with one warhead on some Sentinel missiles, such an available force gives the President an entire range of flexible options not available with a nuclear deterrent with only multiple warhead platforms such as submarines and bombers.

Given the assumption of the ICBM opponents is that under either an ICBM included force or one without such ICBMs, the Russians would still be risking a retaliatory strike made up of bombers and submarines, why then would the United States be more secure by eliminating the ICBMs?

Apparently, the disarmament community thinks the Russians are so reckless that even when facing a retaliatory strike of over 1000 nuclear weapons, Moscow would attack the heartland of the United States with nearly 1000 warheads of its own.

As for the fairy tale that the US ICBM force could be launched if the President mistakenly believed the US was under attack, the US system of missile launch warning is highly redundant and requires confirmation of any missile launch. Plus, contrary to popular narratives, to ensure deterrence there is no requirement for the US to launch prior to confirming an enemy nuclear warhead has detonated on US soil. A technical glitch in 1979 and 1980 did put out false warnings of a missile attack, and one was during a training exercise. According to a 1980 report of the Senate Armed Services Committee these two false alert problems were corrected, and no such glitches have occurred since.

The Cost of Nuclear Deterrence

Now there is the matter of cost. The current nuclear platforms—-submarines, ICBMs and bombers—along with the air launched missile for the bombers and the D-5 missile for the submarines, comes to around $17 billion annually, according to Senate Defense Subcommittee and full Appropriations Committee member Senator John Hoeven (R-ND). The Senator noted the Sentinel annual cost is this year under $4 billion, and for the life of the missile through 2080 would average around $3.1 billion annually.

One way to look at the cost of the US nuclear deterrent is to estimate how much it requires to keep on alert ICBM or SLBM warhead on alert with a force of uploaded warheads given the buildup projected in China and Russia. The cost for the land based and sea-based missile systems is $4.3 and $4.4 million a year per each alert warhead over the lifetime of both systems. It is of course on-alert warheads that provides the day-to-day deterrent for the United States and its allies. Such costs are a bargain compared to any comparable costs of a nuclear conflict.

You can add $3 billion more for the warheads being refurbished by the National Nuclear Security Administration, a task that would have to continue even without ICBMs. Warheads not for the Sentinel would still need to be deployed, but on the sea-launched D-5 ballistic missiles should the United States add more SLBM warheads to at least maintain currently allowed New START warhead levels.

The wild fuzzy math cost estimates used by abolitionists for the cost of all modernization needs to be reworked. Only 20 of the 100 B-21 bombers will be nuclear capable. That reduces the nuclear bomber, ALCM and warheads costs by upwards of $100 billion over three decades. In addition, the entire strategic bomber O&M and personnel cost estimates cannot all be placed into the nuclear bucket.

Second, a significant percent of the annual cost of the nuclear deterrent of $52 billon is the NNSA or the National Nuclear Security Administration. The warhead refurbishment and laboratory upgrading are required whether the United States keeps Sentinel or does not, modernizes or not. The warheads need a service life extension especially given the US ability to produce new warheads, while improving, is limited.

Third, the current cost of operating the legacy nuclear deterrent is included in most estimated “modernization” costs. But these operating costs are not for the modernized force and would not be eliminated if modernization were stopped. In addition, the aging and legacy force costs are also growing. Age has its cost. The modernized forces will actually save on annua operational costs–no reactor work for the submarines and no silo door removal necessary for maintenance work on the ICBM force, for example.

Fourth, the TRIAD platform modernization costs should peak around 2031-2 under the current program of record and largely under current plans be completed by 2042. And over the next 20 years average around $22-25 billion annually.

Arms Racing & The Hedge

The US strategic modernization effort is entirely consistent with the New START treaty. The deterrent force was designed to reflect the terms of the Treaty. And at 1550 warheads the US as some 85% lower than at the Cold War peak.

But it should be pointed out that the strategic nuclear balance is not set in stone. The 2010 New START treaty ends in February 2026. And even though the US is abiding by the terms of the agreement, Russia is not. And China was never a party to the agreement in the first place.

The real challenge the US faces is whether to add deterrent forces or not given international security conditions. By killing Sentinel, the United States would be putting all its nuclear fast flying missile eggs in one submarine technology basket. Taking 400 Minuteman/Sentinel warheads out of the deterrent business and placing such a number of warheads on the submarine launched missiles would require each of the 16 D-5 missiles on each of the 12 Columbia class submarines to all have 8 warheads. Which is the maximum they can carry.

That would total only 1535 warheads or a whopping 45 more ICBM and SLBM warheads than New START allows. This would essentially eliminate any serious hedge to build up that the United States would want to maintain. And it would significantly reduce the day to day alert warheads the US has, as the country would be trading ICBM warheads on alert 98% of the time for sea-based warheads alert roughly 50% of the time.

As for the idea that the United States modernization program is spurring an arms face, nothing is farther from the truth. The entire program of record for nuclear modernization is completely consistent with the 2010 New START arms control agreement. Our planned modernized force is limited to the 1550 strategic warheads allowed by New START, which is precisely what we are building to, (although the actual number is higher given the special bomber counting rules.) Unless the disarmament community is convinced the New START agreement actually spurred an arms race, here is no basis for describing the current US nuclear modernization program as such.

However, with New START expiring in 2026, and China according to Chris Yeaw  building toward a force of 3600 strategic and theater warheads by mid-next decade, and with the US only with shipyards capable off building one additional submarine per year after 2042, there will be no hedge beyond New START warhead levels available for at least two more decades if ICBMs are eliminated. With ICBMs available, the currently available hedge reaches just short of 1000 fast flying missile delivered warheads, assuming the US keeps the current nuclear deterrent platforms.
What happens if the United States decides not to build the 800 warheads that could be made available with Sentinel, of which 98% would be on alert? If the United States built an equivalent force at sea on submarines, the United States would have to build an additional nine submarines and associated missiles, at a cost of nearly $100 billion for the submarines, missiles and warheads. And would not be achieved until 2050, hardly a timely hedge implementation. That is true even assuming the entire planned force of an initial 12 Columbia class submarines is deployed with a maximum capable force of eight warheads per each of 16 missiles.

In short, given the breathtaking buildup of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, the United States may wish to add warheads to its current deterrent arsenal. Not going forward with the Sentinel makes that impossible for at least the next two to three decades, during which the bad guys get to vote and challenge the US militarily. (The US could temporarily deploy—if such warheads were available–840 additional warheads on the Ohio class submarines and their 20 missiles prior to the submarines going out of service [2031-42] when replaced by the Columbia class submarine fleet.)

Now, what about the cost of Sentinel?

The current $52 billion for nuclear deterrence (not including the conventional bomber costs of the B-21 as the entire fleet of airplane will not all be nuclear capable), comes to 1.8% of the $28 trillion in United States GDP. For our nuclear platforms, the $17 billion Senator John Hoeven (R-ND) explained the US will spend this year on the nuclear platforms undergoing modernization also comes to 1.8% of the defense budget, hardly excessive. Hoeven’s number was actually $20.4 billion but this included all the B-21 bomber costs, plus the B52 upgrades and the new cruise missiles. When calculating just the new modernized forces that are not yet deployed, he number is between $16-17 billion.

The Sentinel cost growth has been centered on refurbishing the silos, which sit on tens of thousands of acres of widely varying terrain.

For comparison purposes the US spent 23% of the defense budget of $293 billion and 8% the US GDP of $4.399 trillion during the height of the Cold War (1985) on all nuclear deterrent requirements.

According to most estimates, $308 billion or more than half of the nuclear costs for the next decade will largely be for the operations and maintenance of US legacy forces, (2023-2032), not modernization.

Another $108 billion will be for maintaining the current nuclear arsenal through the work of our nuclear laboratories and NNSA assets which has to be spent even if we maintain legacy forces only.
For the next decade of nuclear modernization including the RDT&E and Procurement, the cost is projected at $250 billion for platform modernization, and NC3.

All annual nuclear spending of an estimated $52 billion in FY2025 is roughly 5.8% of the defense budget which will probably come in at just short of $900 billion if recent House action is sustained, which comes in lower than the budget that has been proposed by Senator Wicker (R-MS) the new incoming Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Conclusion and Summary

In proposing that the US get out of the ICBM business, advocates are making it certain that the US would suffer the following:

1. Dramatically lessen our deterrent capability;
2. Undermine the cohesion of our alliances and allies;
3. End any full hedge option to build up the US strategic nuclear arsenal for at least another 25 years;
4. Make it easier for an adversary to disarm the United States;
5. Save relatively little funding as the loss of ICBM deterrence and rebuilding elsewhere within the Triad would cancel out at about 75% of the assumed budget savings; and
6. Lessen US diplomatic and negotiating leverage in any future crises or arms control negotiations.

The Minuteman missiles were initially deployed in Montana on the very October day in 1962 when US intelligence determined Soviet missiles were in Cuba aimed at the United States. Days later, President John Kennedy, successfully faced down the Soviets, forced Moscow to remove the missiles from Cuba and saved the world from Armageddon. He gave credit to the US nuclear deterrent explaining, “Minuteman was my ace in the hole.”