Fumble in the Jungle
While the 1954 edition of the Army Jungle Operations Field Manual is indeed dated, some truths are timeless, namely: “It is not uncommon to spend 2 hours of hard travel in traversing a distance of one-half mile through the jungle where roads, trails, or tracks are not available” (Department of the Army, 1954, p. 14). This is precisely the terrain a potential Venezuelan invasion force would immediately encounter upon entering the Essequibo region. Thus, the largely conscripted Venezuelan infantry would make negligible daily progress while being systematically worn down by the jungle.
Additionally, previous wars the U.S. has engaged in have demonstrated that jungle warfare is synonymous with disease (i.e., malaria, dengue fever, and typhus). For example, 65 percent of battlefield medical admissions in the Pacific Theater during World War II and the Vietnam War were attributed to “Disease and Non-Battle Injuries” (Grooms et al., 2023, p. 21). Venezuelan combat operations in Guyana will be no different as malaria alone is an ever-present danger, last year in 2023, there were approximately 23,000 recorded cases of malaria in Guyana (World Health Organization, 2023, p. 10).
Any Venezuelan attempt to conquer the Guyanese jungle region of Essequibo would be a painfully slow, demoralizing, disease-infested slog, not promising for an army that has, in recent years, suffered from desertion and low morale. The lack of quality transportation routes or effective air support (due to lack of maintenance and spare parts) would expose the long Venezuelan army patrol columns to well-placed ambush groups, taking full advantage of the terrain.
To highlight this danger, in 2021, the Venezuelan army was deployed to the border region with Colombia to dislodge remnants of the FARC (the now defunct Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group from Colombia). The operation went poorly for the ill-led Venezuelan soldiers; they suffered eight fatalities (presumably with many more injured) as they were outmaneuvered and attacked by the well-positioned and seasoned FARC guerillas. These were the blood-soaked results of an engagement with the holdovers of a stateless guerilla group; the results of an attack against soldiers fighting for their country would be much more costly.
Conclusion
There is a debate about whether Venezuela will actually invade Guyana. Some commentators have noted that President Maduro is whipping up support and creating a reason to “rally to the flag” prior to the presidential election scheduled for this July. He depends on the support of the military, particularly the army. Without such support, his election chances would be slim since, under his leadership, Venezuela has witnessed great suffering. While an invasion of Guyana may never be launched, Maduro is creating a dangerous situation where de-escalation may be difficult and ripe for miscalculation on both sides. This has the potential to lead to a military confrontation, with the added danger of drawing in other regional states.
References
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Bio, D. (2024, May 19). Guyana increases level of alert following Venezuela’s new troop deployment near its border. Latin Times. https://www.msn.com/en- us/news/world/guyana-increases-level-of-alert-following-venezuela-s-new-troop-deployment-near-its-border/ar-BB1mFOk6
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Department of the Army (1954). Jungle Operations (FM 72-20).
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Paraskova, T. (2020, January 27). Exxon strikes it big in Guyana, Ups resource estimate to 8 billion barrels. Oilprice.com. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Exxon-Strikes-It-Big-In-Guyana-Ups-Resource-Estimate-To-8-Billion-Barrels.html
STRATFOR. (2023, December 8). Venezuela’s reach for Guyana’s territory. STRATFOR. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/venezuelas-reach-guyanas-territory
United Nations Children’s Fund. (2021). Draft country and programme document: Guyana and Suriname. United Nations: United Nations Children’s Fund. https://www.unicef.org/executiveboard/media/8311/file/2022-PL9- Guyana_and_Suriname_draft_CPD-EN-2021.11.15.pdf
World Health Organization (2023). Regional data and trends briefing kit: World malaria report 2023. United Nations: World Health Organization. https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world- malaria-report-2023-regional-briefing-kit-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=299150e7_4&download=true
Author’s Bio

Christian P. Martin is a Michigan-based military researcher and writer. He earned his Master’s degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso. His professional interests are history, land, and naval warfare, both conventional and unconventional, with a focus on the developing world and an emergent China.








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