The Plan:
Skorzeny’s men (the 150th Panzer-Brigade) were split into teams with a demolition group responsible for blowing bridges, ammo, and fuel dumps, a reconnaissance element reporting enemy troop movements, and a lead commando group who would be in charge of cutting telephone wires, disrupting enemy communications, and reversing road signs. The concept of the plan was for Skorzeny’s men to wear American Army uniforms employ captured U.S. jeeps to go behind U.S. lines and sow chaos and confusion. Skorzeny’s men knew that under the rules of war if they were captured by the Americans in these uniforms they would be summarily executed. There was also the very real risk that they would be shot at by their own side as well if they came back into contact with SS troops who mistook them for actual American soldiers in the fog of battle.
Getting the necessary uniforms, weapons, and equipment was a huge issue. So was the procurement of American tanks and other vehicles. The Germans disguised Panther tanks to resemble American M-10 tank destroyers since only one Sherman tank was available.
His men were assigned to the 1st SS Panzer Corps under the command of Joachim Peiper. His men were to follow the Panzers into battle and then break off and surge ahead to their different targets. Peiper would later face war crimes charges for the massacre of eighty-four American prisoners at Malmedy.
The Operation:
The Battle of the Bulge began in the early morning hours of December 16. Following a massive artillery bombardment, the heavy German units easily cut through the thinly defended American lines. Confusion on the American side lay supreme as they were caught completely unprepared. The road net soon became a tangle of combat units rushing to meet the Germans being met by rear-echelon support units caught in the offensive trying to get back to the rear of the fighting where they could support the counterattack. These units were generally artillery, quartermasters, field hospitals, and the like. The narrow, two-lane roads were jammed.
Skorzeny’s men were easily able to infiltrate the American lines in the confusion of the early hours of the battle. One of his units was able to drive right into an American-held town and scout out all defenses. On the way out of town, he redirected an American convoy of armor and supplies to a different road. Two of his other units misdirected Allied convoys of supplies and reinforcements. They added to the general chaos among the Americans in the early hours of the battle.
But the Allies soon learned that German soldiers were operating in American uniforms and sent out a warning to check out the identification and behavior of any suspicious troops. It was here that Skorzeny’s men accomplished far more than they did on the ground. Near panic ensued as GI checkpoints were posted everywhere.
Troops initiated questions about American sports, celebrities, and slang as a means to ferret out Nazi infiltrators. General Bruce Clarke of the 7th Armored Division was held after telling MPs that the Chicago Cubs were in the American League. British Field Marshall Montgomery was briefly held when he said he “had no idea” who won the World Series.
Rather than impede Skorzeny’s actions, this overreaction only caused to slow down the Allied response behind their lines and caused far more confusion than the threat itself. One of his men was captured by the Americans and under interrogation made up a story that Skorzeny was en route to Paris to kidnap General Eisenhower. Thus the Allied HQs became a fortress with tanks, machine guns, and troops posted everywhere. According to Eisenhower’s naval aide, Captain Harry Butcher, “He is a prisoner of our security police and is thoroughly but helplessly irritated by the restriction of his moves.” Several actual U.S. soldiers were killed at check points by jittery guards who suspected they were Skorzeny’s men. One sharp-eyed sentry figured out that the forged identity cards the Germans were using had corrected the misspelled word “Indentification” used on the actual U.S.-issued ID cards. Anyone caught with an ID with the corrected spelling of “Identification” was arrested.
With the stiffening American resistance, soon the Germans knew that the offensive would fail in its ultimate goals, and the 150th Panzer-Brigade was withdrawn by the end of December. Out of the forty-four men Skorzeny sent behind U.S. lines in disguise, just eight were lost. As the initiative in the battle shifted back over to the Americans, the Germans still behind U.S. lines changed back into their German uniforms and slipped across American lines again. The Allies were particularly fierce in the treatment of German soldiers caught in American uniforms. Many were caught, imprisoned, and then executed.
But the search for Skorzeny in Paris continued until February.
As the war ended, Skorzeny was tried for war crimes but was exonerated on all charges. One charge that nearly stuck was one of improperly wearing US uniforms. But a witness for the defense, F. F. E. Yeo-Thomas, a former British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agent, testified that the Allies had done the exact same thing. He was acquitted. Although he was still held in a POW camp awaiting a de-Nazification hearing, Skorzeny escaped. He later worked as an adviser to Egyptian President Nasser and even the Mossad, helping track down German rocket scientists working for the Egyptians. Skorzeny died of cancer in 1975.
Although Operation Greif never accomplished its stated goals at the outset of the operation, the confusion and panic it caused among the Allies was a success. It ultimately proved to be a successful special operation by the Germans in their failed offensive.
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