Taiwan’s Han Kuang Exercise 2025: Assessing Joint Operations and Whole-of-Society Deterrence

Editor’s Note: SOFREP thanks Yenting Lin of George Mason University for sharing this informative piece with all of us. – GDM

Abstract

This paper assesses whether Taiwan’s 2025 Han Kuang Exercise demonstrates real gains in joint warfighting and national resilience or whether it reveals structural weaknesses that still limit deterrence. The analysis reviews the exercise across five areas: command integration, sensor to shooter links, reserve mobilization, civilian preparedness, and coordination between military and civil authorities. The results show clear service level improvement and broader civilian participation, but also persistent separation of intelligence systems, incomplete kill chains, slow reserve activation, uneven equipment, and short-duration civilian drills that cannot support sustained conflict. These findings indicate that Taiwan’s progress remains operational rather than institutional. The paper argues that Taiwan must establish unified territorial command, functional reserve units, long-term sustainment, legal authority for civil defense, and a coordinated cyber and information defense network. Han Kuang 2025 marks advancement, but Taiwan has not yet built the integrated readiness required to deter or endure a modern multi-domain assault.

Introduction: On the Edge of War: Is Taiwan Ready?

Taiwan faces the most serious military threat in its history. China’s 2027 military modernization goal aims to give the People’s Liberation Army the ability to seize Taiwan through combined air, sea, land, and information operations (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024). China now has the world’s largest navy by hull count, an air force with several hundred modern fighters, and a Rocket Force capable of striking targets across Taiwan within minutes (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023). Its missile forces include large numbers of short-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles designed for a first strike against the island (Jamestown Foundation, 2025). Taiwan cannot match this scale or firepower. Its only viable strategy is deterrence by design: raising the cost of invasion through readiness, resilience, and joint operations (McKinney & Harris, 2024). The question is whether Taiwan is prepared for a war that might be decided before the fighting begins.

Han Kuang is Taiwan’s largest annual military exercise and the main test of its defense preparedness. Since 1984, it has been the one time each year when the armed forces rehearse their response to a full attack. The 2025 exercise was the most ambitious in decades. It expanded to ten days, incorporated new American systems such as the M1A2T Abrams, HIMARS, Patriot interceptors, and F-16V fighters, and added cyber defense and urban resilience drills (Global Taiwan Institute, 2025). For the first time, it attempted to combine land, sea, air, and information operations instead of keeping each service in its own lane. The government also merged long-standing civil defense drills into a new Urban Resilience Exercise that connected ministries, local governments, and civil groups into one mobilization system built around training, stockpiles, infrastructure protection, medical readiness, and secure communications (Brookings Institution, 2025).

These changes lead to a clear research question. Does Han Kuang 2025 show that Taiwan is building the joint force and societal resilience needed to deter or withstand a Chinese attack, or does it show that Taiwan remains unprepared for a modern multi-domain war? This paper evaluates the exercise as a test of joint operations, reserve readiness, and civilian preparedness to assess whether Taiwan is moving from performance to real capability or whether it remains vulnerable despite recent progress.

Joint Operations: How Taiwan Moves Beyond Land, Sea, and Air

Joint operations are essential for Taiwan because any Chinese attack would compress time and space. A joint operation means land forces, naval forces, air forces, and information forces working under a single command structure while sharing sensors and targeting data in real time. The core of joint warfare is the sensor-to-shooter kill chain, which links detection, classification, data transfer, and engagement within a short time window (U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Military Studies, 2021). China’s missile and air power can strike Taiwan in minutes, which means no service can operate alone. Taiwan can delay or defeat a landing only by acting as one integrated system rather than three independent branches (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024).

The Falklands War offers a clear example of why unified command and rapid information flow matter. British forces succeeded because naval, air, and ground units shared a common operational picture and responded under one command authority. British losses early in the conflict also showed the danger that comes when radar data and fire control information move too slowly across units (Australian Army Centre of Excellence, 2023). Taiwan faces the same challenge and must learn both sides of the lesson.

The army is responsible for defending Taiwan’s beaches, cities, and key terrain. In the Han Kuang 2025 exercise, the army tested the M1A2T Abrams main battle tank, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and infantry brigades in landing and urban defense scenarios. These systems improved firepower and range, but they operated mostly inside army channels. Army missile batteries did not receive real-time data from naval radars or the Air Force’s early warning systems. As a result, the army could fight well on its own but could not form a complete kill chain in cooperation with the other services (Global Taiwan Institute, 2025).

The navy is responsible for controlling the waters around Taiwan and stopping Chinese forces before they reach the beaches. During Han Kuang 2025, naval units practiced patrols, missile strikes, and defensive mining. These missions matched Taiwan’s denial strategy. The weakness was the same as on land. Naval sensors detected threats, but the information did not flow automatically to the air force or army. No unified kill chain linked detection at sea to immediate strikes from air or land forces (The Diplomat, 2025).

The air force is responsible for surviving the first missile strike and sustaining air operations. The Han Kuang 2025 exercise emphasized dispersal, rapid turnarounds, and hardened shelters for fighter aircraft. Patriot air defense batteries protected major bases. These actions improved survivability, but the air force still worked as a separate service. Radar tracks did not automatically cue naval or army fires, and the air force did not operate as part of a synchronized multi-domain system (Global Taiwan Institute, 2025).

Command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance should be the system that links the three services. Taiwan operates parts of the Po Sheng command network and is developing the Taiwan Dome air defense system. These programs aim to integrate sensors and fire control into one architecture. Yet Han Kuang 2025 revealed gaps that slowed decision-making. Intelligence remained separated by service, command authority moved vertically inside each branch, and cyber-attacks disrupted communications. Commanders lacked the authority to execute joint fires without higher approval, which slowed responses during the exercise (Taiwan News, 2025).

Two ways to continue to read this article.

China’s Joint Sword exercises show what Taiwan must be prepared to counter. China conducts missile strikes, naval operations, air sorties, and cyber activity under unified theater commands. These commands merge sensors and shooters into a fast kill chain that can detect, pass data, and strike within minutes (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024). Compared to this standard, Han Kuang 2025 demonstrated stronger service level performance but limited progress toward a single integrated joint force. Whole-of-Society Defense: Building National Resilience Whole-of-society defense matters for Taiwan because a military alone cannot survive a Chinese attack. Modern war collapses the line between front and rear, and Taiwan can only endure if government, civil society, and the private sector function together. Whole-of-society defense refers to a national system where state agencies, local governments, private companies, and individual citizens sustain essential functions during conflict, including shelters, stockpiles, transport networks, energy grids, hospitals, and emergency communications (Brookings Institution, 2025). President Lai Ching te formalized this approach through the Whole of Society Defense Resilience Committee and directed that national defense planning integrate civilian roles across training, stockpiles, infrastructure, energy security, and medical readiness (Executive Yuan, 2025). Han Kuang 2025 offered the clearest test of whether Taiwan can turn this concept into real capability. The reserve system showed how wide Taiwan’s readiness gap remains. Han Kuang mobilized 22 thousand reservists, the largest number in the exercise’s history, and activated the 260 Infantry Brigade as a full unit (Taiwan News, 2025). Yet the exercise also exposed the limits of the reserve force. Most reservists trained under short conscription cycles that did not produce reliable combat skills, and many receive only occasional refresher training (Global Taiwan Institute, 2023). Equipment shortages persist, including basic rifles and anti-armor systems needed for live training, and significant portions of the reserve force lack the gear needed for sustained operations (Defense News, 2025). Mobilization still relies on manual notification and local coordination, which cannot scale to support the 1.66 million registered reservists in a conflict that would unfold within days (Global Taiwan Institute, 2024). These gaps show that reserves cannot yet support whole-of-society defense in a real crisis. Civilian integration during Han Kuang showed progress and limits. The Urban Resilience Exercise linked all counties and cities in coordinated evacuation and communication drills between 7/15 and 7/18 (Focus Taiwan, 2025). Local governments tested shelter procedures, hospitals ran emergency protocols, power plants practiced damage control, and major retailers assisted with public guidance and first aid. These actions demonstrated that Taiwan can organize nationwide drills under controlled conditions. However, the exercise provided only short duration simulations. Real conflict would require sustained resilience under conditions of disrupted communications, damaged infrastructure, and unpredictable attack cycles. Han Kuang proved that Taiwan can coordinate a civilian response. It did not prove that society can sustain continuous operations during prolonged conflict. Government agencies and civil society groups are trying to fill the capability gaps that Han Kuang exposed. The All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency manages reserves, civil defense, and resilience planning, but its authority depends on cooperation from other ministries and private actors rather than formal command power (Armed Forces Reserve Command, 2025). Civil society groups such as Kuma Academy have trained tens of thousands of citizens in first aid, evacuation, and disinformation awareness, reflecting growing public interest in national defense (Business Insider, 2025). These programs improve awareness but cannot replace an integrated national system. Participation remains uneven, training standards vary, and instruction is not fully synchronized with government procedures. The national resilience fund has the potential to strengthen whole-of-society defense if applied consistently. The 150 billion New Taiwan dollar program aims to expand shelters, reinforce critical infrastructure, and improve logistical networks for emergency response (Taipei Times, 2025). These investments can raise societal resilience if implemented across multiple years and integrated into long-term defense planning. If funding weakens or becomes a one-year effort, stockpiles will expire, shelters will degrade, and communication networks will not keep pace with modern threats. Recommendations: Move Beyond Han Kuang Han Kuang 2025 is only a snapshot. The real question is what Taiwan must fix to turn rehearsal into real readiness. The exercise showed progress, but war will test the institutions behind it. Taiwan’s next steps require stronger command structures, usable reserves, steady sustainment, clear legal authority, and a coordinated defense of the information space. First, Taiwan needs a unified territorial command that brings the Ministry of National Defense, the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency, and local governments under one structure. At present, these actors operate separately, and civil groups lack legal authority. A territorial command with regional posts would allow military and civilian forces to mobilize together and respond within hours. Ukraine offers a clear example. Its Territorial Defense Forces operate through regional headquarters that coordinate brigades with civilian authorities, improving speed and clarity in crisis response (International Centre for Defence and Security, 2022). Finland demonstrates similar benefits. Its government issued a national decree establishing regional cooperation groups for civil defense, appointing coordinators to integrate rescue services, defense forces, municipalities, and health agencies into one system (Government of Finland, 2024). Taiwan needs an equivalent structure to ensure unified action. Second, Taiwan’s reserve force must shift from paper numbers to functional territorial units. Mobilization today is slow, and equipment shortages limit capability. Reservists should be assigned to fixed units in their home counties and linked directly to regional commands. Estonia provides a clear benchmark. Estonia organizes its reservists on a territorial principle, assigns them to defined wartime positions, and maintains a mobilization registry of more than 230,000 individuals with clear assembly locations (Ministry of Defence Estonia, 2025). Estonia’s broader security posture emphasizes routine training and local accountability, strengthening readiness at the community level (International Centre for Defence and Security, 2025). Taiwan’s 2025 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledges equivalent gaps and calls for improved equipment and longer recall training (Taiwan Ministry of National Defense, 2025). Third, Taiwan must rebalance its defense spending toward sustainment. Personnel costs and high-end platforms dominate the budget, while ammunition, fuel, and maintenance remain underfunded. Taiwan’s current stockpiles cannot support prolonged operations. Redirecting procurement toward sustainment would deepen ammunition reserves, expand distributed fuel storage, and pre-position repair and medical supplies. Sweden offers a strong model. Sweden’s Total Defence Bill allocates long-term funding for military and civilian sustainment and directs government agencies to build grain reserves, adopt rotating stock systems, and partner with private industry for storage (Government of Sweden, 2025). The Han Kuang 41 Exercise Report reached similar conclusions, emphasizing the need to integrate civilian logistics and disperse stockpiles more effectively (Taiwan Ministry of National Defense, 2025). Fourth, Taiwan needs a legal structure that gives the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency clear authority to coordinate resources and integrate civil groups. Civil defense organizations today operate without legal protection or defined roles. A national Readiness Act should formalize cooperation among ministries, local governments, the military, and civic organizations. Taiwan has already begun this work. The Office of the President established the Whole of Society Defense Resilience Committee to coordinate continuity of government, strategic stockpiles, civilian training, and infrastructure preparedness (Taiwan Office of the President, 2024). Ukraine illustrates the importance of law. Its Territorial Defense Forces were transformed into a distinct branch through legislation that established clear regional command chains (Jamestown Foundation, 2025). Taiwan needs comparable legal authority. Fifth, Taiwan must integrate civilian cyber capacity and disinformation defense into its national security plan. China has increased digital attacks and information manipulation, and Taiwan’s response remains fragmented. Taiwan needs a unified cyber and information defense network linking the Ministry of Digital Affairs, regional commands, telecommunications providers, and civil fact-checking organizations. Redundant communication systems such as low-orbit satellites, cross-network roaming, cloud backups, and public alert systems are essential. The Whole of Society Defense Resilience Committee has already initiated this effort by developing emergency communication infrastructure and digital resilience programs (Taiwan Office of the President, 2024). These measures must be institutionalized and incorporated into reserve training. Conclusion: Exercises Alone Do Not Win Wars Han Kuang 2025 showed that Taiwan can simulate war but has yet to institutionalize readiness for it. The drills are no longer mere theater, yet their gains will fade unless command, reserves, and civilians are bound by real structures of trust and responsibility. 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