USMC Colonel (Ret.) Eric Buer: The Rejection of Peace in Our Time - Why the Latest Gaza Ceasefire Will Likely Fail

As President Donald Trump unveils yet another comprehensive peace proposal aimed at ending the war in Gaza and securing the release of Israeli hostages, history suggests we should temper our optimism. The latest October 2025 plan—which Hamas has conditionally accepted while maintaining ambiguity on key points—follows a tragically familiar pattern that has defined Israeli-Palestinian relations for nearly eight decades.

The Current Proposal and Its Prospects

Trump’s 20-point plan calls for Hamas to release all remaining Israeli hostages and transfer control of Gaza to a technocratic Palestinian administration. The group has indicated willingness to release captives “in accordance with the exchange formula,” but remains vague about disarmament and governance, two critical components of the proposal. Israel has responded cautiously, with Prime Minister Netanyahu accepting the framework while warning that Israel reserves the right to resume operations if Hamas violates the agreement.

The January 2025 ceasefire that preceded this latest proposal serves as a cautionary tale. That agreement collapsed within weeks, with both sides accusing each other of violating the terms. Israel cited Hamas’s delays in providing hostage names and suspended prisoner releases, while international observers condemned Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid as a breach of the ceasefire terms. By March, Israeli airstrikes had shattered the fragile peace.

Why should we expect different results this time? The answer lies not in the details of Trump’s current proposal, but in understanding the consistent rejection of peace offers by Palestinian leadership spanning generations.

The 1947 Partition: The First Rejection

The pattern began on November 29, 1947, when the United Nations proposed Resolution 181—a partition plan that would have created two states, one Jewish and one Arab, from British Mandate Palestine. The Jewish leadership, despite reservations about the territorial divisions, accepted the plan as a pathway to statehood. The Arab Higher Committee, representing Palestinian Arabs, rejected it entirely.

The Palestinian leadership’s refusal wasn’t based on the specifics of the borders or the percentage of land allocated. Instead, it represented a fundamental rejection of any Jewish state within any boundaries. This rejection led directly to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, resulting in Arab defeat and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians—the very catastrophe they sought to prevent.

Had Palestinian leaders accepted the UN plan, a Palestinian state would have been established alongside Israel in 1948, avoiding decades of conflict. Instead, their maximalist position—demanding all the territory with no Jewish state—cost them everything.

Camp David 2000: Arafat’s Historic Rejection

Fast forward to July 2000, when President Bill Clinton brought Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat to Camp David for what many believed would be the final peace summit. After seven years of the Oslo process, Barak came prepared to make unprecedented concessions.

According to Clinton’s own parameters presented in December 2000, Israel offered the Palestinians a state comprising approximately 94-96 percent of the West Bank, 100 percent of Gaza, a capital in Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, and Israeli recognition of Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount holy sites. The proposal included a $30 billion international fund to compensate refugees and addressed Palestinian concerns about territorial contiguity through land swaps.

Arafat’s response? He walked away without making a single counteroffer. President Clinton later stated bluntly: “I am not a great man. I am a failure, and you made me one.” Dennis Ross, the chief US negotiator, confirmed that Arafat never seriously intended to reach a peace settlement; instead, he used the negotiations to extract maximum concessions while avoiding any final agreement that would require him to end the conflict formally.

The collapse of Camp David triggered the Second Intifada, a wave of Palestinian terrorism that killed over 1,000 Israelis through suicide bombings and attacks. The very violence that Arafat unleashed destroyed the Israeli peace camp and led to a hardening of Israeli positions that persists today.

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The 2008 Olmert Offer: Abbas Walks Away If Camp David 2000 represented a missed opportunity, the 2008 negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas represented an even more generous offer—one that Abbas himself later admitted rejecting. In September 2008, Olmert presented Abbas with a comprehensive peace plan that would have given Palestinians a state on 93.7 percent of the West Bank (with Israeli land swaps compensating for the remaining 6.3 percent), all of Gaza, a capital in East Jerusalem, and international administration of the Old City and its holy sites. The proposal included a corridor connecting the West Bank and Gaza, creating territorial contiguity for the Palestinian state. Olmert asked Abbas to initial the map on the spot, making clear this was Israel’s final offer. Abbas declined, saying he needed time to study it with his advisors. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for the next day. Abbas never returned. He never proposed a counter-offer. The negotiations ended in silence. In a 2015 television interview, Abbas admitted he rejected the offer because he wanted to keep the map for further study—a transparently weak excuse for walking away from a state that met virtually every Palestinian demand. As Olmert later reflected, it would be another 50 years before Palestinians received such an offer. Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was briefed on the proposal, reportedly told Dennis Ross that if Arafat rejected Clinton’s offer, “it won’t be a mistake, it will be a crime.” The same assessment applies to Abbas’s 2008 rejection. Trump’s “Deal of the Century”: The 2020 Rejection When President Trump unveiled his comprehensive Middle East peace plan in January 2020, Palestinian leaders didn’t even pretend to consider it. Palestinian Authority President Abbas immediately declared, “Jerusalem is not for sale. All our rights are not for sale and are not for bargain.” The plan offered Palestinians a demilitarized state with economic investment of $50 billion over ten years, contingent on governance reforms, disarmament of terrorist groups, and recognition of Israel. It proposed a four-year timeline to statehood, with infrastructure development, job creation, and international recognition. Rather than negotiate over the details or propose modifications, the Palestinian leadership rejected it outright. Hamas called it an attempt to “liquidate the Palestinian national project.” The Arab League unanimously rejected the plan. Not a single Palestinian voice emerged in support of even considering the proposal. The pattern was by now familiar: immediate rejection, no counterproposal, and condemnation of anyone who suggested the offer merited serious consideration. The Cost of Perpetual Rejection Each rejection has come with a cost—not to the Palestinian leadership, who continue to receive international aid and diplomatic support, but to ordinary Palestinians whose lives remain trapped in a conflict their leaders refuse to resolve. The 1947 rejection cost Palestinians their state and led to the Nakba. The 2000 Camp David rejection brought the Second Intifada and a thousand Israeli deaths, which in turn destroyed Israel’s peace movement and brought hardliners to power. The 2008 rejection squandered the most generous territorial offer in history. The 2020 rejection of Trump’s plan foreclosed $50 billion in economic development and international recognition. And now, in October 2025, we witness another iteration of this cycle. Hamas conditionally accepts a ceasefire while maintaining ambiguity on disarmament and governance. They agree to release hostages while preserving their capacity to wage future wars. They speak of Palestinian consensus while refusing to cede control. The Legacy of Terror: Black September and October 7th Understanding why Hamas and Palestinian militant groups are unlikely to disarm requires examining their historical pattern of terrorism and their fundamental objectives. Two events particularly illustrate this reality: Black September in 1970 and the October 7, 2023 massacre. Black September: A State Within a State In September 1970, the PLO had effectively created a state within a state in Jordan, with tens of thousands of armed fighters openly calling for the overthrow of King Hussein’s monarchy. When Palestinian terrorists hijacked three civilian aircraft, forced them to land in Jordan, took foreign nationals’ hostage, and blew up the planes in front of international media, Hussein finally acted. The Jordanian military drove the PLO out of Jordan in what became known as Black September, with thousands of Palestinians killed or expelled. Rather than accept defeat and pursue peaceful means, the PLO relocated to Lebanon, where they repeated the pattern—creating a state within a state, undermining the central government, and ultimately contributing to Lebanon’s catastrophic civil war. The PLO’s response to their expulsion from Jordan was to form the Black September Organization, a terrorist group responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, where eleven Israeli athletes were murdered. They also assassinated Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in revenge. The message was clear: violence, not compromise, was the Palestinian movement’s answer to setbacks. This pattern reveals a fundamental truth about Palestinian militant organizations. When given territory and autonomy—whether in Jordan, Lebanon, or later Gaza—they invariably use it not to build functioning governance but as a launching pad for terrorism and attempted power grabs. They respect no agreements, no borders, and no sovereign rights of host nations. October 7th: The Deadliest Day Since the Holocaust Fast forward to October 7, 2023, when Hamas executed the most significant terrorist attack on Israeli soil in history. In a coordinated assault, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups breached the Gaza border, massacring 1,200 people—including at least 815 civilians. The attackers went house to house in kibbutzim like Be’eri, methodically slaughtering families, including children and the elderly. The depravity was stunning. Women and girls were subjected to sexual violence. Babies were murdered. Victims were burned alive. The terrorists filmed their atrocities and celebrated them on social media. They took 251 hostages, including babies, children, and elderly Holocaust survivors, dragging them back to Gaza. This was not resistance to occupation—Gaza had been entirely free of Israeli presence since 2005. This was not about settlements or checkpoints. This was genocidal intent enacted with medieval barbarity. Hamas’s own footage and the videos recovered from dead terrorists’ body cameras documented summary executions, torture, and celebrations of civilian murder. The October 7 attack was meticulously planned and executed. It required months of preparation, intelligence gathering, and coordination. Hamas knew precisely what they were doing: deliberately targeting civilians for maximum carnage. Human Rights Watch concluded the attacks constituted both war crimes and crimes against humanity—planned murder of civilians and hostage-taking as organizational policy. More than two years later, dozens of hostages remain captive in Gaza, if they are still alive. Hamas has refused to provide information about their condition or location. The organization treats these human beings—including American citizens—as bargaining chips while continuing to hold their families in perpetual anguish. The Pattern: From Munich to October 7th The through-line from Black September’s Munich massacre to October 7th is unmistakable. Palestinian militant organizations have consistently chosen terrorism over statehood, violence over compromise, and maximalist demands over practical solutions. They have used periods of calm not to build functioning societies but to rearm and plan the next attack. When Israel withdrew entirely from Gaza in 2005, removing every Israeli, dismantling every settlement, and handing over the territory to Palestinian control, the result wasn’t peace. Hamas seized power in 2007 and immediately transformed Gaza into a massive military installation. Instead of using international aid to build schools, hospitals, and infrastructure, Hamas constructed hundreds of miles of terror tunnels and stockpiled thousands of rockets. It diverted humanitarian resources to its military buildup. The October 7 massacre wasn’t an aberration—it was the inevitable result of an ideology that glorifies martyrdom and seeks not coexistence but Israel’s elimination. Hamas’s charter explicitly calls for the destruction of Israel. Hamas leaders have repeatedly stated they will never recognize Israel’s right to exist. They celebrate suicide bombers as heroes and name schools and streets after terrorists. Why Does Palestinian Leadership Always Say No? The consistent pattern of rejection raises a fundamental question: Does Palestinian leadership actually want a state alongside Israel, or do they seek Israel’s elimination? The evidence from Black September to October 7th suggests the latter. Every peace proposal has required Palestinians to do one thing that leadership consistently refuses: formally recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and permanently end all claims and hostilities. This is the actual sticking point—not borders, not settlements, not refugees. Palestinian political culture, shaped by decades of rejectionism and the glorification of violence, makes it politically impossible for any leader to accept a two-state solution. Leaders who seriously pursue peace—like Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979—are ostracized or assassinated. The Palestinian Authority’s own media and education system continue to deny Israel’s legitimacy and glorify “martyrs” who kill Israelis. Hamas’s October 7 massacre and their refusal to disarm demonstrate why any ceasefire agreement is unlikely to bring lasting peace. An organization that meticulously planned and executed such atrocities—and continues holding hostages while demanding concessions—has shown it views violence not as a last resort but as a preferred strategy. The International Community’s Complicity The international community has enabled this pattern by never imposing consequences for Palestinian rejection. When Arafat walked away from Camp David, the world blamed Israel. When Abbas rejected Olmert’s offer, it went largely unreported in the international media. When Palestinian leaders refuse to negotiate, they continue receiving billions in aid. This dynamic creates perverse incentives. Palestinian leaders face no pressure to compromise because rejection brings no penalty. Meanwhile, Israel—which has made increasingly generous offers over decades—is subjected to constant international criticism, boycotts, and condemnation. What Comes Next The latest Trump ceasefire proposal will almost certainly follow the same trajectory as its predecessors. Hamas will maintain its military capabilities while releasing some hostages. It will agree to the technocratic administration of Gaza while ensuring its own people control that administration. It will accept international guarantees that prove meaningless when violated. When the agreement inevitably collapses—whether in weeks or months—Hamas will blame Israeli violations. The international community will call for restraint on both sides. And the cycle will continue. The tragedy is that there is a viable path to peace: Palestinian leaders could accept any of the generous offers made over the decades, recognize Israel’s right to exist, dismantle terrorist infrastructure, and build a state. This would require Palestinian leadership to choose statehood over eternal struggle, prosperity over perpetual victimhood, peace over the dream of Israel’s elimination. But seven decades of history suggest they will continue to say no. The question is how many more generations of Palestinians and Israelis will pay the price for their leaders’ intransigence. Until Palestinian leadership demonstrates the courage to accept peace when offered—to say yes instead of constantly finding another reason to say no—proposals like Trump’s latest plan will remain diplomatic theater rather than genuine pathways to resolution. The pattern is clear, the outcome predictable, and the cost to ordinary people on both sides immeasurable. The international community can continue enabling this cycle, or it can finally demand that Palestinian leadership accept one of the many generous offers for statehood they’ve received. Until that fundamental change occurs, peace will remain as elusive as ever—not because Israel refuses to make offers, but because Palestinian leadership refuses to accept them.