ISIS, or the Islamic State, has had a fair amount of success spreading their message and recruiting people through social media—a task that is far more challenging than many might consider. Think about the level of effort and expertise McDonald’s uses to engage millennials in the digital sphere, and despite a marketing budget that would put some nations to shame, only 20 percent of millennials in America have ever even tried a Big Mac. Using the very same tools and platforms, ISIS has managed to get young people to leave their homes and families to join in their fight, either in places like Iraq or as a “lone wolf” terrorist, often giving up their lives in the process.

This fact wasn’t lost on the U.S. government, which recognized that an important combat theater in the war against ISIS had to be online, where they were continuing to garner support and even recruits from nations all across the globe. Of course, if McDonald’s can put the best social media minds on the planet to work to try to boost Big Mac sales, the government surely must have their own crack team of Arabic-speaking social media experts to fight the good fight in the Twittersphere and elsewhere that ISIS is permitted to publicly engage in recruiting practices…right?

Unfortunately, a recent investigation conducted by the Associated Press found that, although the government does have a team working feverishly to prevent potential recruits from turning to the dark side, they seem to be downright bad at the job.

The responsibility of the WebOps program that falls under U.S. Central Command is to engage with people in social media that are being courted by ISIS and other extremist groups and to try to convince them not to aid in the terrorist organization’s efforts. Doing so requires a thorough understanding of the culture the people live in and the language they use to interact.  After all, it can be difficult to understand discussions on Twitter when they are conducted in English without having an appreciation for the digital shorthand of the day, so trying to jump into the middle of a Twitter conversation in Arabic presents a unique challenge that it appears the WebOps program has not been able to effectively manage.

“One of the things about jihadis: They are very good in Arabic,” said an Arabic specialist who previously worked on WebOps and requested anonymity. He went on to describe one instance in which the words for “authority” and “salad” got mixed up in translation, prompting the Twitter accounts being used by WebOps to be openly ridiculed by ISIS for discussing “Palestinian salad” in their efforts to stop recruitment.

You might suspect that such a mistaken Tweet couldn’t have too much of an effect on the program—until you come to find that WebOps has been doctoring its own numbers by reposting the same content from multiple user names repeatedly to demonstrate the high degree of “engagement” they have with the enemy.

“You send it like a blind copy. You program it to send a tweet every five minutes to the whole list individually from now until tomorrow,” the former employee said. “Then you see the reports and it says yesterday we sent 5,000 engagements. Often that means one Tweet on Twitter.” Those engagements are then added to a report management would provide to CENTCOM, indicating their high output without providing any insight into how they achieved that number.

In fact, the WebOps team, which is made up of a combination of military personnel and contractors, are responsible for their own appraisals. Each interaction is graded by the person conducting it, and perhaps unsurprisingly, very few of them indicated that they weren’t doing a great job.