Pacific Powder Keg: How The U.S. and Allies Can Counter China’s Taiwan Invasion Plans

The People’s Republic of China has made no secret of its attempts at unifying the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan. Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Communist Party of China, has made unification his top priority in his growingly authoritarian regime.

The U.S. government has prioritized the nation’s defense as both Beijing and Washington head towards a new Cold War. With a potential showdown in the Pacific increasingly veering towards inevitably, there are several contingency options America and its Asian Pacific allies can use against China.

Why a Chinese Invasion Would be Easy to Detect

A potential invasion of Taiwan would be the biggest war the Asian Pacific has seen since World War Two. Countries like the United States and Japan have pledged to defend Taiwan, while the Philippines and Vietnam are in a Cold War with China. The AUKUS coalition was also created to counter Chinese aggression and could also potentially intervene.

Before Russia declared a full-fledged war on Ukraine, it took the Kremlin eight months to muster Europe’s most significant invasion force since WWII. U.S. intelligence was able to spot Russian logistical and troop movements toward the Ukrainian border for months on end, up until the invasion on February 23, 2022.

China’s potential invasion of Taiwan would also be detected far ahead of its time frame. To invade Taipei, Beijing would have to amass the largest amphibious force in world history—a naval force that would have to eclipse the D-Day landings.

Beijing would have to amass anywhere between one million to two million troops to accommodate the most significant amphibious force the world has ever seen. The potential Chinese invasion would account for the military doctrine of one soldier per ten civilians needed to maintain an occupation.

Advising and Training Taiwan’s Self-Defense Forces

In late February, numerous sources reported that the United States would expand its advice and assist role to the Taiwanese Armed Forces. On April 18, the Pentagon sent 200 advisers from the U.S. Army to the isle to begin training.

Training by U.S. Forces is essential to enhance the capabilities of Taiwan’s military. Proficiency in air defense, radar, mountain warfare, and joint air traffic control are all fields that will play a role in the event of a Chinese invasion when you account for the geographic location of the ROC.

Intelligence Gathering is Key

Compared to the eight months Russia needed to build up close to 200,000 initial troops in Ukraine, China would need at least a year, if not more, to build up logistics and manpower and have their forces in a state of readiness on their coastal military bases. America and its Asian Pacific allies have a significant opportunity to exploit China’s invasion force timeframe.

The Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system gives the intelligence bureaus and Special Operations Capable Forces a substantial edge in early warning detection of a Chinese military buildup. Beijing has long condemned the THAAD system being in place in South Korea, as it gives the Asian Pacific signals intelligence on troop building. With the THAAD, China won’t have an element of surprise on Taiwan, and evidence of a military buildup would be undisputed by the international community.

Contingencies and the Role of Special Operations and Amphibious Reconnaissance

A Chinese-Taiwanese War would be a conventional conflict that could surpass the current Russian-Ukrainian War. Most of the war will be conducted with the Air Force and Navy of both nations—not accounting for the potential foreign intervention by the U.S. and Asian Pacific allies.

Both China and Taiwan have advantageous geographies between them. Intervening in the Korean War, China successfully kept the rogue Kim regime in power in fear that a pro-Western Seoul would be undisputed in the Peninsula. With a lack of an advantage, there is little room for mainland raids to strike critical targets or military leadership in China without first knowing Chinese military intelligence.

Likewise, Taiwan is an island fortress with minimal choke points for an amphibious assault. Much of China’s military bases are on the coast, opening the opportunity for Washington green light ATACMS transfers to Taipei to strike vital targets.

America, which should and is expected to uphold its defense pledge to Taiwan, should send joint air traffic controllers to fixate fires onto key Chinese warships and targets on their coastal mainland bases. Counterintelligence operations to make aware of potential sleeper cells will become a priority, especially learning from Ukraine as the country was littered with pro-Russian collaborators and traitors, and CCP sympathizers will be no exception in Taiwan.

If the war were to scale to a multi-axis war with various Asian Pacific nations, Special Operations Forces and Marine Reconnaissance Units would be instrumental in shaping the battlefield, particularly on the militarized isles China has built over the past several years. Akin to the liquidation of Russia’s high command in Ukraine, Special Forces and intelligence can play a role in analyzing critical military leadership and geolocating their presence to Taiwanese Forces or potentially take action themselves if America is drawn into the war.

Ultimately, the most significant way of defending Taiwan from a Chinese invasion is to constantly remind Beijing that the risks outweigh the rewards. Until Xi Jinping realizes he could suffer a military catastrophe akin to Saddam’s ill-fated invasion of Kuwait, a war in the Pacific will be more likely.