Late in the evening of April 26th, 1986, a safety test simulated a power station failure shut safety systems down at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant near Pripyat, in Soviet-controlled Ukraine. A combination of design flaws in the reactor and station personnel failing to adhere to established safety precautions during the test soon led to an uncontrollable chain reaction that would culminate in one of the largest nuclear disasters in history, leaving the region surrounding the facility uninhabitable to this day.

In the years that followed, multiple investigations into the incident produced the same glaring conclusions: that the meltdown of the Chernobyl reactor could have been avoided, but the seclusion of Soviet engineers, experts and station personnel from the international nuclear community left them at a technological disadvantage. Because the Soviets opted to bar themselves from international cooperation in their nuclear endeavors, they lacked the expertise necessary to prevent the meltdown from occurring.

Now, more than 30 years later, that same recipe for disaster is brewing deep within North Korea’s secure borders.

In 2010, a group of experts hailing from Stanford and led by Dr. Siegfried Hecker were granted access to one of North Korea’s Experimental Light Water Reactors, which was still under construction at the time. Upon their return, they relayed a series of concerns that seemed eerily similar to the conclusions drawn in the years that followed the Chernobyl disaster; namely that the North Koreans were using poor construction methodologies and materials and that the team responsible for its construction and operation were too inexperienced and isolated from the expertise of the international community to safely operate the plant.