The following piece, written by Julian Nettlefold, first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.
The speed, range, precision, lethality, and networking capabilities of small drones are improving in an explosive fashion, and a technological race is adding new complexities and threat dynamics to United States and NATO forces.
Small Drones
Small drones are readily available to all via hobbyist suppliers. They are simple to weaponize by loading with an improvised explosive device (IED) or with grenades or mortars. Groups can now also easily buy specialized GPS systems, control electronics, high-powered batteries, and other components to build larger and more capable unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Those with state sponsorship may benefit from military-grade technology, delivering much more reliable UAS performance and impact.
Ranges have increased from 40 minutes to 7 hours, while speeds can reach 450 mph. UAS components are easy to smuggle into countries and assemble on-site, closer to their targets. As UAS become quicker and cheaper to build and their reliability continues to improve, the volume of attacks is increasing. Saturation attacks, where large numbers of UAS approach a target simultaneously, will add further to the difficulty for defenders.
There is also potential for true ‘swarming’, in which drones coordinate with each other.
Meanwhile, we expect to see hostile UAS becoming more effective through greater intelligence, independent navigation, jamming resistance, more sophisticated weaponry, larger size, and reusability.
We are in a continuous race to ensure that UAS countermeasures stay ahead of these developments. How feasible this is depends not only on the speed of technological advancement but on cost. The conventional strategy of using expensive missiles to shoot down much cheaper UAS certainly has economic limitations. Fundamentally, the threat should be countered by combining surveillance and intelligence platforms with electronic jamming and kinetic countermeasures. To achieve a rapid pace of technological evolution in such systems, developers should be free to respond with speed and agility to changing circumstances and needs.
The following piece, written by Julian Nettlefold, first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.
The speed, range, precision, lethality, and networking capabilities of small drones are improving in an explosive fashion, and a technological race is adding new complexities and threat dynamics to United States and NATO forces.
Small Drones
Small drones are readily available to all via hobbyist suppliers. They are simple to weaponize by loading with an improvised explosive device (IED) or with grenades or mortars. Groups can now also easily buy specialized GPS systems, control electronics, high-powered batteries, and other components to build larger and more capable unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Those with state sponsorship may benefit from military-grade technology, delivering much more reliable UAS performance and impact.
Ranges have increased from 40 minutes to 7 hours, while speeds can reach 450 mph. UAS components are easy to smuggle into countries and assemble on-site, closer to their targets. As UAS become quicker and cheaper to build and their reliability continues to improve, the volume of attacks is increasing. Saturation attacks, where large numbers of UAS approach a target simultaneously, will add further to the difficulty for defenders.
There is also potential for true ‘swarming’, in which drones coordinate with each other.
Meanwhile, we expect to see hostile UAS becoming more effective through greater intelligence, independent navigation, jamming resistance, more sophisticated weaponry, larger size, and reusability.
We are in a continuous race to ensure that UAS countermeasures stay ahead of these developments. How feasible this is depends not only on the speed of technological advancement but on cost. The conventional strategy of using expensive missiles to shoot down much cheaper UAS certainly has economic limitations. Fundamentally, the threat should be countered by combining surveillance and intelligence platforms with electronic jamming and kinetic countermeasures. To achieve a rapid pace of technological evolution in such systems, developers should be free to respond with speed and agility to changing circumstances and needs.
Traditionally, large defense companies have tended to be locked into lengthy development and procurement cycles, governed by national budgets and slow political processes. This makes it difficult to be responsive. Smaller businesses, with fewer constraints, can help the industry in this respect.
Another factor which may obstruct rapid progress is the bias of some large companies toward selling their own hardware.
Developers should have the flexibility to draw on a range of manufacturers and partners for whatever sensors, cameras, radar equipment and other products will currently best serve each system. This not only speeds up the development and deployment of systems but makes them futureproof. Specialisms in system integration, software and command and control technology are crucial to bringing all the elements together quickly and effectively.
When choosing a C-UAS system to meet the latest and upcoming UAS threats, buyers should question its stage of evolution. Not all systems on the market have actually been operationally deployed. Even fewer have been operationally proven. These are important differences. Every day brings the release of a new C-UAS system or the enhancement of an existing system; we discuss a variety of new kinetic-based systems in this feature.
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