How Patton’s Third Army Defied Orders and Crossed the Rhine

In the early months of 1945, the war in Europe was coming to a conclusion. 

In mid-to-late February, the Russians, driving from the east, were pushing the German army backward and had arrived less than 100 miles from Berlin. Poland, where the war had begun in 1939, was almost completely in the hands of the Soviets. After the bloody Battle of the Bulge, the American, British, French, and Canadian troops pushed into Germany from the west and entered the Ruhr, where Germany’s industrial might was located. 

During this time, on March 2, 1945, General George Patton radioed one of the most brilliant and smart-assed messages to Allied Supreme Headquarters. 

Rising Tensions Between Allied Commanders

Despite how the war played out in the West, all was not well within the Allied ranks. There was a distinct rivalry between the Western Allies’ top two general officers, British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and Lieutenant General George Patton. Privately, the two detested each other and always tried to outdo each other.

With the war winding down, the Allied Supreme Commander in the West, General Dwight Eisenhower, again gave Montgomery’s 21st Army Group the main axis of attack. Eisenhower’s plan called for the destruction of German forces west of the Rhine River to be followed by the British and Canadian forces of the 21st Army Group attacking northern Germany, north of the Ruhr, and across the northern plain. His thrust included having the American Ninth Army under Lieutenant General William Simpson placed under his command. 

This chafed the Americans, Patton, and his superior, General Omar Bradley, the commander of the 12th Army Group. To make matters worse, the 95th Infantry Division and the 17th Airborne Division were taken from the 12th Army Group and assigned to Montgomery in the north. The 95th (the Iron Men of Metz) had taken part in the 3rd Army’s fiercest battles under Patton in the ancient fortress city of Metz and the German border town of Saarlautern and were some of his more experienced troops. 

Bradley and Patton, unfairly or not, pointed to Montgomery’s slow progress in taking Caen in Normandy and the failed Operation Market-Garden in Holland. 

The Canadians made Caen a D-Day objective because the town was a major hub of roads, railways, and communications. Yet, located nine miles inland, taking Caen on June 6 was overly ambitious. The Germans also reinforced the town with Panzer divisions. Caen wasn’t finally taken until two months later. 

Market-Garden was supposed to be a “dagger thrust” into Germany over the Rhine by having three airborne divisions seize a series of bridges. Bradley had derisively called it a “butter knife thrust.” Even if the area were lightly defended (as intelligence had said), it would have been a tough schedule to keep. But the Germans had shipped several SS Panzer units to Holland to rest and refit. Against lightly armed paratroopers, the SS units successfully cut the highway in several places, but the operation failed. 

In late February, Patton’s forces were relegated to an “aggressive defense.” Later, they were to engage with the First Army in a double-envelopment thrust of the Ruhr, but they most definitely had a complementary role in supporting the British. 

Patton’s Bold Moves and Montgomery’s Frustration

Patton was having none of this. The Third Army aggressively pushed the Germans into the Eifel region, a hilly, heavily forested area with three large rivers swollen with melting winter snow. 

He launched what he called “armed reconnaissance” of German defenses in front of his army following the “aggressive defense” approach. Third Army troops undertook that approach with parts of seven divisions. Its objectives were as listed Prüm, Bitburg, and the city of Trier on the Mosel River.

Trier was an ancient city. It was where the Celtic Treveri tribe (from which the city got its name) had resided. Julius Caesar and his legions took the city after a revolt in 58-50 BC. Some of Rome’s best and most famous cavalry troops came from the region. 

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHEAF), Eisenhower’s HQs, radioed Patton’s army to halt outside Trier because it “would take four divisions” to seize the city. Unbeknownst to SHEAF, Trier was already in American hands, as the 10th Armored Division had pushed through with the infantry. 

Patton then sent his now-famous message, “Have taken Trier with two divisions… what do you want me to do, give it back?” 

He further incensed Montgomery when — as the British commander was about to launch a great set-piece battle with airborne troops seizing bridgeheads across the Rhine and a huge amphibious operation — Patton, following Bradley’s orders to “take the Rhine on the run,” did exactly that. 

The Crossing of the Rhine: A Tale of Two Strategies

By the morning of March 23, Patton had pushed six battalions across the Rhine at Oppenheim with his engineers building pontoon bridges and attacking aggressively. That operation cost a total of just 28 troops killed and wounded. 

The day before Montgomery’s huge operation in the north, one of Patton’s staff officers announced in a meeting at higher headquarters that the Third Army had crossed the Rhine at 10 PM on March 22 “without the benefit of aerial bombing, ground smoke, artillery preparation, and airborne assistance.” This was a total dig at the British commander, and it did nothing to alleviate the hard feelings between the two men. 

This article has been reviewed and updated by the SOFREP News Team.

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