Note: This post is part of a multi-part series on the status of Russian security efforts for the Olympics. The purpose of this series is to keep SOFREP readers informed on the latest developments regarding the games as they draw closer.

Amidst Russia’s extensive security preparations for the Winter Games, it remains to be seen whether or not the Russian security measures are capable of preventing or at least temporarily disrupting the high terrorist threat originating from the North Caucasus.

As SOFREP previously reported, various nefarious actors undoubtedly possess the intent and capability to disrupt the games and will likely dedicate much time and effort to create a black eye for Putin by gaining a political victory for their grievances and followings.


When considering the historical data regarding terrorist trends and violence originating from the North Caucasus, the decision to host the games in such close proximity to an active insurgency and volatile region is highly relevant.  According to reporting from the Crisis Group, “armed conflict in the North Caucasus is the most violent in Europe today,” with over 1,200 people killed in 2012, and over 240 killed and 250 wounded from January to June of 2013. Analysis from The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) reports the majority of these attacks were perpetrated against law enforcement officials, followed by civilians, then military, and finally, government targets.

Caucasus violent events 2010-2013, courtesy of ISVG

In the North Caucasus, “violence is greatest in Dagestan, then in Chechnya and Ingushetia.” What complicates this violence is the diverse and complex variety of grievances inherent in the region. Among them are “disputes over territory, administrative boundaries, and land and living space…[coupled with] ethnic and religious tensions and the state’s incapacity to ensure fair political representation, rule of law, governance, and economic growth.” It is this list of grievances, along with the continued political and social alienation of North Caucasus residents that motivates such a large number of attacks against Russia.

While Westerners have not been previously targeted by the Caucasus Emirate, the State Department reports that they have previously targeted civilians as indirect or complicit supporters of the government. Previous targets include ski resorts, metro systems, high-speed rail, airports, a theater, and most recently a bus and trolley.


Based on the historical data associated with violence in the North Caucasus, along with statements by the Caucasus Emirate Emir Doku Umarov calling for “maximum disruption” of the games, the terror threat at Sochi and surrounding areas is at a high level. The item of highest relevance to the terror threat at Sochi is the inherent vulnerability of infrastructure and transportation networks. While key facilities at Olympic Park and throughout Sochi are relatively easy to secure and monitor, securing or monitoring the extensive transportation and infrastructure networks that feed into Sochi from the surrounding region is much more difficult.


Transportation lines and key infrastructure have already proved to be preferable targets for Caucasus-based terrorists and are a popular terrorist target choice due to the high number of people gathered in specific locations. This was evidenced in the recent Volgograd bombings and previous Caucasus Emirate activity reported above, to include numerous bombings of various trains, subways, and busses in the past several years. Securing these soft targets will most likely prove to be the most resource-intensive challenge the Russians face.