The Bolduc Brief: Interoperability Failures Among Senior Military Leaders in Special Operations and the Conventional Military

Introduction

As a result of the announcement to downsize special forces, I am writing this essay to add insight into why this decision is being considered. Nothing occurs in a vacuum, and there are always causes and effects and actions and reactions that lead to conclusions that do not make sense and seem unreasonable. https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/military/army-considers-big-cuts-to-special-ops-forces/

There is no doubt that the United States Army Special Forces is the world’s leader in unconventional warfare operations. Special Operations Forces have many capabilities and capacities across all the services. Each has its focus, but this is the only special operations force that has the numerous mission profiles of Special Forces. Our nation needs these mission profiles to possess a military capability suitable to conduct operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels across the operational continuum of peace through war. No other force in the military can go from combat to humanitarian operations as quickly as Special Forces.

The tactical level of SOF is the most effective. It is the strategic and operational level where senior leaders make decisions that is usually the weak point. At no time do I point my fingers at others without including my own mistakes. Although I disagreed with what I was seeing and experiencing, I could not influence those decisions. My lack of political savvy and inability to influence my senior leaders contributed to failed strategy and operational plans.

In Special Operations since 1987, the counterterrorism forces have dominated special operations. Since 2001, the counterterrorism forces have marginalized the US Army Special Forces. This takeover has, unfortunately, been at the cooperation of special forces senior leaders at the general officer level. The geniuses that created this problem, most of them now retired, replaced by their sycophant protégés to carry on, have concluded this was not a good idea and want to broaden the SOF horizons. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/02/12/after-decades-focused-on-terrorism-special-operations-is-broadening-its-horizons/

During my time as a special forces officer, commanding at all levels up to the general officer level, I saw firsthand how my leadership subordinated itself to the counterterrorism force leadership to ensure their continued promotion inside the special operations community. This has had a detrimental effect on US Army Special Forces. It negatively affected combat development, funding, force structure, reductions in direct action force structure in special forces, command and control, and assignments and promotions. The co-opting and control of US Army Special Forces began in earnest in 2005 when Special Forces Colonels and Generals began working as senior staff members and deputy commanders in Joint Special Operations Command. The assignment there, over time, became a stamp of approval for continued advancement at the senior level. Those that were not chosen or decented in any way were shown the door. The dominance of counterterrorism senior officers and civilians at USSCOM created a counterterrorism-focused command with large staffs that subordinated to US Army Special Forces. This resulted in counterterrorism becoming synonymous with all special operation force missions. In COMBATANT Commands, JSOC took over the responsibility and focus of special operations by using their national force, three-star, and funding power to co-opt special forces primacy from the Theater Special Operations Command. In addition, JSOC established liaison organizations in Washington, DC, to increase their leverage within the interagency.

Another problem is the need for more civilian oversight of the United States Special Operations Command. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict has been subordinated, in practice, to the United States Special Operations Command. This subordination of civilian oversight is detrimental to the civilian oversight role of our military. Also, the Assistant Secretary position should be an Under Secretary position. The name and function should be changed to Under Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. This would ensure civilian oversight and put special operations on the same level as the conventional military.

A Strategic and Operational Recap:

The advent of modern warfare has necessitated the seamless collaboration between special operations and conventional military units. However, despite recognizing the need for interoperability, senior military leaders in both domains have failed to address this crucial challenge effectively.

It is important to note that at the tactical level, the men and women operating in Afghanistan did their jobs with honor, dedication, and competence. This included all Special Operations Forces, Conventional Forces, and Counterterrorism Forces. Despite the lack of interoperability at the senior levels, the tactical level did a better job at figuring out how to work together. The success of our tactical units was not matched at the senior level with a sound strategy and operational plan. The senior leaders took care of themselves. Blamed the problems on their subordinates and failed to give our service members the awards they deserved.

The failure of our senior leaders in Afghanistan to work together and develop a successful strategic and operational plan resulted in higher casualties, corruption in the Afghan government, and the prolonging of the war in Afghanistan. There was no accountability at the senior levels for failure. The senior leaders in special operations and the conventional military were unable to work together, figure out a functional command structure, and develop a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan that resulted in neutralizing and defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

In my experience, there were two opportunities in which we could have declared military objectives were met in Afghanistan. The first came in March of 2002 after the first rotation in Afghanistan, where we had successfully established an interim government. That interim government established provincial and district Afghan leaders to govern Afghanistan. This was the international community’s opportunity to allow Afghans to govern Afghans in their traditional way. The Afghans would have successfully figured out how to work together and integrate the Taliban successfully into their governing process. The international community could have supported with money and other resources. Instead, the United States and Coalition Forces expanded their operations, including establishing a democratic government in Afghanistan, a national military army and police, and a justice system that mirrored a Western-style system. This type of nation-building was doomed to failure. It resulted in a resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda by 2005. This was encountered in Operation Medusa in Afghanistan and validates the resurgence of the Taliban. https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n4_op_medusa_page_1.html

The second opportunity would have been in 2015-2016 had the Obama Administration not decided to change strategy in 2013. As a result of the comprehensive counterinsurgency plan that General Stanley McChrystal put in place in 2010 and General David Petraeus expanded from 2010 through 2013, we see an opportunity to transition operations in Afghanistan to the Afghan government. There were other Generals and Admirals that supported this approach as well. They were Admiral McRaven, Admiral Olson, General Rodriguez, and Lieutenant General Kearney.

Unfortunately, when General Petraeus transitioned out of Afghanistan, the incoming commander did not fully appreciate the success of the counterinsurgency strategy. In addition, there was significant political pressure by the Obama Administration to end US military involvement in Afghanistan. The political and senior military leaders decided to change the strategy and the operational plan from a bottom-up comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to a top-down counterterrorism and conventional military operations.

Under the McChrystal and Petraeus counterinsurgency plan, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were neutralized, US casualties were at their lowest, and 90% of the rural areas were under the control of the Afghan government. General Petraeus made a decision that was unique to any commanders before him, and that was to put conventional forces subordinate to special operations. General Petraeus recognized we were operating in an unconventional warfare environment and placed special operations in the primary role.

As a result of the success of the bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy, it was assessed that by 2015-2016, the Afghan government would be able to govern their country without the presence of US military forces. By changing the strategy to a top-down counterterrorism and conventional military operations strategy in the later part of 2013, by 2016, the Taliban had resurged, Al Qaeda had resurged, ISIS had joined the fight, and the security situation in the rural areas was predominantly under the control of the Taliban. By 2019, US casualties were the highest they had been since 2013. thehill.com/policy/defense/476461-us-combat-deaths-in-Afghanistan-highest-in-years/

The Trump administration inherited an enormous strategic and operational mess in Afghanistan. The Trump administration attempted to figure out the best way to end military operations in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense’s senior leaders continued with a failed strategy. The incoming Biden Administration failed in its plan to withdraw from Afghanistan.

It is important to note that not one senior leader was held responsible for the strategic and operational failures in Afghanistan. The consequences of the failure of special operations senior leaders and conventional senior leaders in Afghanistan have been far-reaching. The prolonged conflict has resulted in the loss of countless lives, both military and civilian, as well as the squandering of significant financial resources. Moreover, the failure to achieve a stable and secure Afghanistan has allowed extremist groups to regroup and pose a continued threat to regional and global security.

Inadequate Leadership at Senior Levels:

The failure in Afghanistan can be attributed to the shortcomings of senior leaders responsible for overseeing military operations. These leaders, entrusted with formulating and executing a comprehensive strategy, often needed to catch up in their decision-making processes. Their lack of understanding of the socio-cultural complexities in Afghanistan, insufficient knowledge of counterinsurgency tactics, and an over-reliance on conventional warfare methods undermined the effectiveness of their plans. Moreover, the frequent rotation of senior leaders disrupted continuity and prevented the formulation of a coherent long-term strategy. Multiple studies by many think tanks gave the senior leaders the correct answers, but they chose to ignore them.

Inadequate Leadership and Communication:

The failure to address the interoperability problem can also be attributed to inadequate leadership and communication at the senior military level. Senior leaders must prioritize and emphasize the importance of interoperability, establishing a culture that promotes collaboration and joint operations. However, the need for effective communication channels and platforms for dialogue between senior leaders from both branches often fails to identify and address interoperability issues.

Conventional Senior Leaders: Limited Adaptability:

Conventional senior leaders, primarily trained in conventional warfare, struggled to adapt their approach to the unique challenges posed by the Afghan conflict. Their reliance on counterterrorism, large-scale military operations, and firepower failed to recognize the importance of winning the support of the Afghan people, an essential aspect of counterinsurgency warfare. The inability to effectively engage with local communities, build trust, and provide sustainable development projects further alienated the Afghan population, ultimately fueling support for insurgent groups.

Failed Strategy and Operational Plan:

The cumulative effect of the shortcomings in special operations and inadequate senior-level leadership resulted in a flawed strategy and operational plan. The absence of a clear and achievable end state, coupled with a lack of defined objectives, rendered the overall mission in Afghanistan ambiguous and unfocused. Additionally, the failure to prioritize stability, governance, and development in war-torn regions allowed insurgent groups to flourish and gain support among the disillusioned population. The absence of a comprehensive and integrated approach that addressed both the military and non-military aspects of the conflict further contributed to the failure of the strategy and operational plan.

The consequences of the failure of special operations senior leaders and conventional senior leaders in Afghanistan have been far-reaching. The prolonged conflict has resulted in the loss of countless lives, both military and civilian, as well as the squandering of significant financial resources. Moreover, the failure to achieve a stable and secure Afghanistan has allowed extremist groups to regroup and pose a continued threat to regional and global security.

Divergent Organizational Cultures:

Another significant factor contributing to the failure of solving the interoperability problem is the divergence in organizational cultures between special operations and conventional military units. Special Operation Forces (SOF) often prioritize innovation, flexibility, and adaptability due to their unique operational requirements. On the other hand, conventional military units emphasize hierarchy, adherence to standard operating procedures, and a more rigid command structure. These contrasting cultures hinder effective communication, hampering joint operations and interoperability.

In conclusion, the failure to solve the interoperability problem between senior military leaders in special operations and conventional military has hindered effective collaboration and joint operations. The lack of combined training, divergent organizational culture, and inadequate leadership and communication are key factors contributing to this failure. Only through a concerted effort to bridge the gap and prioritize interoperability can we ensure a more effective and unified military force capable of meeting the challenges of modern warfare.

Donald C. Bolduc