Massacred by Their Own Army

February 25, 2024: The opening of the new year brought nothing but pain, suffering, and heartache for villagers in northwest Burkina Faso. On that fateful day, the soldiers of the Burkinabé Regime, led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, descended upon two villages and perpetrated one of the worst massacres in recent history.

According to Aradi (2024), between the villages of Soro and Nondin, approximately 220 civilians (including 56 children) were mercilessly killed. Soldiers ordered the village residents to exit their homes and line up. Then, the soldiers proceeded to kill them where they stood. Those who tried to escape, hide, or were witnesses were hunted down and shot. “A survivor was quoted as saying that before the shootings, the soldiers accused the residents of failing to cooperate with them by not informing them of the movements of the Islamist fighters” (Aradi, 2024).

The New Regime

Captain Traoré led the coup in 2022 to destroy the Islamist terrorist activity that has plagued Burkina Faso since 2015, something that his predecessor had failed to do. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 20,000 people have been killed due to Islamic terrorist activity between 2015 and 2024 (Deutsche Welle, 2024).

Why, then, would soldiers of a regime whose primary and stated purposes are first to protect its citizens from Islamist terrorists and second to uproot and destroy said groups perpetrate such a heinous crime against those whom they seek to protect? The answer lies in the facts on the ground.

Lack of Force, Lack of Presence

The Burkinabé land forces are woefully undermanned; The army has a meager 6,400 soldiers, and the combined strength of the gendarmerie and paramilitary forces stands at 4,450 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023). Similarly, their ability to deploy and adequately patrol the porous borders with Mali and Niger is greatly limited because they have only 138 wheeled/armored vehicles of varying types (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023). The combined Mali-Niger border is approximately 1,209 miles long (751 km), far too much space to be effectively policed by such a scant force.

The Open Door for Radicalism and Militancy

Since the border regions of Mali and Niger are both porous and lack effective, official government presence, the communities in these areas are susceptible to influence by radical Islamic organizations operating therein. The communities at risk of radicalization include ethnic minorities with resentments and grievances that seemingly cannot be met by an under-resourced government. Specifically, the “Arab tribes, Tuareg, Moors, Peul, Fulani and the Songhai communities in Burkina Faso [sic] Niger and Mali, have increased their vulnerability to join some of the armed groups in the region” (Nyadera & Massaoud, 2019, p. 273).

This highly unstable situation, fueled by public resentment, is the precise environment where radical organizations tend to flourish. They gain entry with easy answers, present themselves as the champion of the oppressed, gain trust, and draw the disenfranchised into their ranks, both as soldiers and those who provide material support for their cause.

Expanding violence by jihadist groups

The Bloodstained Logic of State-Sanctioned Terror

Lacking legitimate and effective answers, Captain Traoré and his regime authorized and oversaw the strategic or tactical use of violence upon the citizenry to ensure loyalty or grudging compliance. As stated by Downes (2008), civilian victimization “consists of a government policy of sustained violence against a noncombatant population, rather than haphazard outbursts of brutality by frustrated troops” (p. 15). Further, if “civilian victimization offers a chance of reversing a grim situation, or delivering a state’s goals at a cost it can afford to pay, leaders may take that chance rather than abandon their goals. Civilian victimization is thus a calculated risk, not an irrational gamble” (p. 39).

An unfortunate and sad truth is that fear is quite a potent weapon. In the case of targeted violence towards a noncombatant population, the fear generated has the propensity to crush rebellious behavior and ensure future compliance. To this point, when one compares a legitimate and conventional approach of counterinsurgency to that of a campaign of terror and fear, the latter is more successful by a factor of 71 percent to 60 percent (Downes, 2008).

Conclusion

It is the author’s belief that while terrorizing civilian populations tends to produce compliance, it will ultimately fail. In the case of Captain Traoré and his regime, he has far too few soldiers to secure his northern borders with Mali and Niger effectively. Additionally, terrorizing the residents within those northern border areas (rife with militant Islamic activity) will only drive them into the arms of the terrorist organizations that he seeks to destroy or deny entry.

References

Aradi, G. (2024, April 25). Burkina Faso army massacred 223 villagers in revenge attack, says HRW. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68879696

Deutsche Welle. (2024, April 25). Burkina Faso: Army accused of executing civilians, babies.  Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/hrw-report-burkina-faso-army-accused-of- executing-more-than-200-citizens/a-68916065

Downes, A.B. (2008). Targeting civilians in war. Cornell University Press.https://vdoc.pub/download/targeting-civilians-in-war-3vh35i8usvqg

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2023). The military balance: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group.

Nyadera, I.N., & Massaoud, M.H. (2019). Elusive peace and the impact of ungoverned space in the Sahel Conflict. Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi, 8(2), 271-288. DOI: 10.28956/gbd.646327

The Economist (2020, July 9) Jihadists in the Sahel threaten West Africa’s coastal states.

The Economist. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and- africa/2020/07/09/jihadists-in-the-sahel-threaten-west-African-coastal-states

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Author Bio

Christian P. Martin is a Michigan-based military researcher and writer. He earned his Master’s degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso. His professional interests are history, land, and naval warfare, both conventional and unconventional, with a focus on the developing world and an emergent China.