The Intelligence Failures Leading up to October 7th, 2023

They say that hindsight is 20/20. That is, it is easy to figure out something after the fact, even if it was unclear at the time.

Look at 9/11. On August 6th, 2001, President Bush received a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”. Sounds pretty clear to us now, right? But think about it: the President of the United States probably has documents like this coming across his desk all of the time. It’s a big world and a lot of people out there don’t like us. That particular PDB didn’t mention anything specific about the 9/11 plots. It was just another radical out there looking to do harm to the US. Nothing new.

It’s a similar situation when people look back in hindsight at the intel Israel had in the days leading up to October 7th, 2023, the bloodiest day in Israeli history.

The intelligence failures leading up to the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, have sparked intense scrutiny within Israel. Despite its reputation for having some of the most sophisticated intelligence agencies in the world, such as AMAN (Israel’s military defense directorate) and Shin Bet (Israel’s security agency), Israel was caught off guard by the scale and brutality of the assault.

One of the major issues was a misinterpretation of Hamas’ goals and capabilities. Many in the Israeli intelligence community believed that Hamas, due to its quasi-governance role in Gaza, had shifted toward a more pragmatic stance. This assumption was reinforced by Hamas’ decision not to engage in armed clashes during recent conflicts between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israeli security officials viewed this as evidence that Hamas preferred to focus on maintaining its authority in Gaza rather than launching a full-scale attack. It is here where I stop and remind you of some of the best advice I ever got when I was a young military leader. “Assumptions are the mother of all screw-ups.” Remember that, because it’s true. Assume nothing.

The Consequences of Underestimating Hamas

A full year before the attacks of October 7th, Israeli intelligence obtained a 40-page document detailing Hamas’ attack plans. The document was codenamed “Jericho Wall” and was distributed among senior military and government officials. Ultimately it was dismissed as aspirational…wishful thinking. Leaders assumed Hamas could never successfully execute such an audacious plan.

This brings me to the profoundly wise words of Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, one of the first books I was given as a new military cadet:

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” 

Israel did not “know” Hamas. They underestimated their desire and abilities. This proved to be a fatal flaw. Always respect your adversary’s capabilities.

In the weeks leading up to the attack, critical warning signs were overlooked. Riots along the Gaza border, increased military exercises by Hamas, and public declarations of escalation from Palestinian militant leaders should have raised alarms. Meetings between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah leaders in Beirut, where they discussed plans for continued armed resistance, were further missed opportunities for Israel to reassess the threat.

Technologically, Israel also faced critical failures. The border security fence, surveillance systems, and military response plans were ineffective. On the 7th, Hamas was able to breach the heavily fortified border within minutes, rendering Israel’s high-tech defenses useless. Even worse, many of the country’s top commanders were on vacation due to the Jewish holiday, slowing the military’s reaction time. Hamas knew this would be the case and is partially why they choose to strike when they did.

Israel’s Intelligence Blind Spots: A Recipe for Disaster

Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the failure was the lack of actionable intelligence in the days leading up to the attacks. While there were reports and assessments indicating rising tensions, these were either not pieced together coherently or dismissed entirely by senior officials. Some have compared this failure to the lack of early warning before the 1973 Yom Kippur War​.

Probably the worst example of this was when, in July of 2023, Ronen Bar, head of Shin Bet, explicitly warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that “war is coming”. This warning was based on intelligence assessments of the “axis of resistance,” including Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah perceiving Israel as weaker due to internal political rifts.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the Israeli government faced harsh criticism for its slow response. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials failed to engage with the public effectively, leaving citizens feeling abandoned during the crisis. It took the military over 24 hours to regain control of the situation.

Despite these failures, a full year later, Israeli society is now grappling with how to recover and prevent such intelligence lapses from happening again. Although the war is ongoing, experts agree that there will need to be significant reforms within Israel’s intelligence and military institutions to ensure this does not repeat.

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Disclaimer: SOFREP utilizes AI for image generation and article research. Occasionally, it’s like handing a chimpanzee the keys to your liquor cabinet. It’s not always perfect and if a mistake is made, we own up to it full stop. In a world where information comes at us in tidal waves, it is an important tool that helps us sift through the brass for live rounds.