The cycling rate of fire for the KA-52’s Shipunov 24A2 cannons can be anywhere between 200-800 rounds per minute, depending on the upgrades and components. Anti-armor armaments are also fitted with the 52s, such as the Vikhrs and Atakas (laser guided). The attack copter also has the Izdeliye, guided surface-to-air missiles that can hit targets up to 14 KM away.

Prior Combat Operations

The KA-52 entered service in 2008 after eleven years of testing since 1997. The first mission of the 52’s occurred during the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War.

During the Syrian intervention, numerous 52s were spotted at the Khmeimim airbase, leased to Russian Forces indefinitely. The attack copter took part in operations in the Latakia countryside and desert operations, particularly in Palmyra. The helicopters have also played a role in search and rescue operations and close air support for Russian Special Forces and affiliated mercenaries.

Its Role in Ukraine

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the KA-52 provided close air support to Russian Forces in the occupied territories. Initially having some successes during the early months of the full-fledged invasion in the Donbas region, the 52s started to take a beating when Ukraine was provided with valuable anti-aircraft systems during their autumn offensives in 2022.

Nevertheless, the KA-52s have been valuable for Russian Forces entrenched in the Zaporizhzhia oblast. Along with numerous obstacles that have slowed the advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU), such as landmines and trenches, the KA-52 has targeted multiple armor assets, such as the American-made Bradley and German-made Leopards.

Russian Forces currently have an advantage in the Zaporizhzhia oblast due to the region’s flat terrain, which gives little cover or concealment of Ukraine’s military. To counter this, the ZSU have conducted night operations and have attempted to use inclement weather to their advantage. Wanting to preserve as many lives of their forces as possible, the ZSU command has extensively targeted Russian logistics, command centers, and airfields, especially those which house the KA-52s.

Kyiv has requested the US Apache attack copters and additional air defense systems to counter the Russian Alligators. Nevertheless, British defense intelligence stated that Russia currently has a temporary advantage in the South due to the long-range rockets employed on the 52s.

The Decimation of the KA-52 Fleet

Despite the Alligators’ crucial role in Ukraine, the rotary wing fleet has taken substantial losses. Before the full-fledged invasion, there were 133 KA-52s in the Russian fleet. According to the Oryx Blog, there are 38 visually confirmed losses of the Alligators, a nearly 30% loss of the overall fleet. In any other Western military, losing almost one-third of a rotary wing would make combat inefficient.

Where the KA-52s have played an instrumental role in the Zaporizhzhia oblast, the fleet has taken a beating in other sectors such as Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and the now liberated right bank of Kherson. The lack of success by the rotary wing in different sectors of the battlefield is because of the need to provide ever-more close air support to Russian Forces who have been embroiled in close-quarters combat in heavily fortified cities.

The logistical support of Western anti-aircraft systems, such as the British-made Martlet, has helped turn the tide against the deadly Alligator. Russian logistical issues have also indirectly caused significant losses against the 52s.

Combat fatigue, such as overuse during missions, has left the KA-52s overexposed. With Russia becoming the most sanctioned nation on earth, it is increasingly difficult for maintenance workers to replace components and chips needed to keep the fleet up to date. Inadequate repairs and poor leadership in the logistics department have also plagued the performance of the 52s to the point where numerous officers have been sacked from the logistics post.

The KA-52 Alligator is a formidable attack helicopter that has supported various missions of the Russian Air Force. Nevertheless, the more losses the rotary wing takes, especially under sanctions, the more likely the Alligators could become combat-inefficient for several years or even decades.