It is hard to believe, but it has been three years to the week when the United States, in a series of deadly errors and bad mistakes, pulled up stakes and left Afghanistan after two decades of war. The disaster was predictable and preventable. Thirteen US servicemembers and more than 60 Afghan civilians died on August 26, 2021, when a lone suicide bomber attacked those desperately trying to get a flight from Kabul to safety.
Hours before the deadly explosions, Western officials urged citizens to leave Hamid Karzai International Airport as they were aware that the Taliban would do everything in their power to prevent people from leaving Kabul. Unsurprisingly, these warnings went largely unheeded as thousands knew their only chance of life was outside of Afghanistan.
The rapid collapse of the Afghan government and security forces, culminating in the Taliban‘s swift takeover, highlighted several critical failures in planning and execution.
Poor Leadership Decisions
The withdrawal decision, announced by President Biden in April 2021, set a timeline for a complete pullout by September 11. However, the Taliban had already been making significant territorial gains throughout the country, taking advantage of a deteriorating security situation exacerbated by the drawdown of U.S. troops. By mid-August, Taliban forces had overrun several provincial capitals, leading to a frantic and disorganized evacuation of U.S. and allied personnel from Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport.
Leadership decisions at multiple levels have been criticized for contributing to the debacle, and to date, no one has been held accountable. The withdrawal was executed without a robust contingency plan, despite intelligence warnings suggesting the Afghan government could collapse swiftly.
In the weeks leading up to the fall of Kabul, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) struggled due to a lack of logistical support, diminished air support, and overreliance on U.S. contractors to maintain critical military equipment. This reliance became untenable as the Taliban’s advances disrupted supply lines and operations.
The Human Cost
The withdrawal turned deadly on August 26, 2021, when a suicide bombing at Kabul airport killed 13 U.S. service members and injured at least 170 Afghan civilians. The attack underscored the chaotic environment of the evacuation, where desperate crowds surrounded aircraft, leading to further casualties as some fell to their deaths from departing planes in a desperate bid to escape the Taliban regime.
This tragic outcome was not solely due to tactical errors but also stemmed from broader strategic miscalculations, including underestimating the Taliban’s strength and overestimating the resilience of Afghan forces and the government. The rapid decision to pull out all troops without securing a stable transitional government left a vacuum that the Taliban quickly filled. This should have surprised absolutely no one familiar with the situation at the time. To paraphrase Green Beret Tim Kennedy, “Every inch that we gave up, the Taliban quickly took it back.” I think that sums it up quite succinctly.
Calls for Accountability
The execution of the withdrawal sparked widespread calls for accountability. Many Americans and political leaders have pointed fingers at military and civilian leaders for failing to adequately prepare for or manage the withdrawal’s aftermath. A significant portion of the public believes those responsible for the poor planning and execution should face consequences for their roles in the crisis. The buck ultimately stops with President Biden, who, as we know, is a lame duck who will likely never face any repercussions for his disastrous decision-making during the evacuation.
USCENTCOM Supplemental Review Findings
SOFREP has recently uncovered the results of a second investigation of the original investigation of the disaster at Abbey Gate. We added the bold text in the bullet points.
Abbey Gate Supplemental Review Findings
USCENTCOM
April 15, 2024
Release Number 20240415-01
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
TAMPA, Fla. – In August 2023, the commander of U.S. Central Command directed U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) to conduct supplemental interviews to examine new information made available during public testimony and other public statements in 2023 related to the Aug. 26, 2021, terrorist attack at Abbey Gate outside Hamid Karzai
International Airport (HKIA) in Kabul, Afghanistan.
This supplemental review included interviews with more than 50 service members who were directly involved in evacuation operations at Abbey Gate, including 12 service members who were previously unavailable due to medical evacuation or treatment. The review sought to determine whether the new information would affect the
findings of the original Abbey Gate 15-6 investigation completed in November 2021.
The supplemental review specifically sought to determine the following: 1) whether an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) test run occurred near Abbey Gate on August 21, 2021; 2) whether, before the attack occurred, service members identified in the crowd the suicide bomber who committed the attack; and 3) whether service members posted at or around Abbey Gate had an opportunity to engage the bomber prior to the attack. The review also focused on the Taliban’s use of excessive force and the decision to consolidate the defensive perimeter around Abbey Gate before the attack.
Over five months, a team of 13 service members from both the Marine Corps and the Army travelled to 24 locations, conducted more than 50 interviews, and compiled more than 1,200 additional pages of documents, information, and imagery.
The supplemental review was completed on January 16, 2024. Senior departmental leadership were informed of the supplemental review’s findings and recommendations in February 2024. We are in the process of briefing Gold Star Families of the 13 service members on the review’s findings.
After a thorough review, the following findings were made or otherwise confirmed:
• The terrorist attack at Abbey Gate was not preventable at the tactical level without degrading the mission to maximize the number of evacuees.
• Leaders at Abbey Gate were present, engaged, and made sound tactical decisions.
• The suicide bomber was not previously identified in the crowd, nor was there an opportunity for service members to engage him prior to the attack on August 26, 2021.
• Though unable to be ruled out completely, it is unlikely that an IED test run occurred outside Abbey Gate on August 21, 2021.
• Taliban forces outside Abbey Gate used excessive force that resulted in civilian deaths.
• The new information obtained during the review did not materially impact the findings in the November 2021 Abbey Gate 15-6 investigation and the supplemental review team did not recommend any modifications to those findings.
For additional information on the Abbey Gate supplemental review, please contact U.S. Central Command Public Affairs.
Interpretation
One of the members of the 12-person joint supplemental support team is quoted as saying the following,
“With access to analysis from across the intelligence community, we were able to identify the Abbey Gate person-borne IED bomber as Abdul Rahman al-Logari, an [ISIS-K] member since 2016.”
Knowing his name doesn’t make a damn bit of difference, but this additional bit of information is interesting. An Army official piggybacked on the first statement by saying,
“Al-Logari was one of thousands of ISIS-K members the Taliban released from a pair of detention centers in mid-August 2021.”
A hot topic discussed at length during both investigations was whether an individual who came to be known as the “bald man in black” was, as Marine snipers thought me may have been, a target worth engaging.
Regarding that individual, government sources tell us:
“The battalion commander exercised sound military judgment to conclude that the ‘bald man in black’ was not a lawful military target … Any portrayal of these events showing the battalion commander did not understand these events [is] just not supported by the evidence. It is clear [the battalion commander] did not approve the snipers to engage the ‘bald man in black,’ and it was clear that this decision was understood.”
A facial comparison of the known Abbey Gate Bomber and the “bald man in black” shows they were not the same person.
It is important to note that both investigations involved leaders on the ground at the site, not those whose decisions would have kept them out of harm’s way in the first place. Those officers and elected officials will not be held accountable.
Regardless, this was a learning opportunity of what not to do. How not to leave a country after years of war.
But one would have hoped we had already learned that lesson from the Fall of Saigon.
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Disclaimer: SOFREP utilizes AI for image generation and article research. Occasionally, it’s like handing a chimpanzee the keys to your liquor cabinet. It’s not always perfect and if a mistake is made, we own up to it full stop. In a world where information comes at us in tidal waves, it is an important tool that helps us sift through the brass for live rounds.
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