Editor’s Note:  SOFREP is pleased to present this article from best-selling author Colonel Eric “Ferris” Buer, USMC (Ret). –GDM

—

Since the Russians invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian Federation has pushed its forces beyond the point of exhaustion and, in their lust for a quick victory, have left themselves vulnerable. The Ukrainian forces, having defended valiantly, are now themselves engaged in a risky counteroffensive. With the war in Ukraine often being fought with dated tactics, dated equipment, and highly centralized command and control, the destruction and devastation brought by both sides have been obvious.

Picture cities turned to rubble and the countryside set ablaze. It paints a drab landscape reminiscent of 1940s Europe. With no military or political end in sight, Ukraine needs a new strategy besides fighting Russian tanks with Ukrainian tanks and infantry squad against infantry squad. The need focuses on modern and available tactical aviation assets. With a limited supply of capable attack jet aircraft and even with a more expansive use of drones, Ukraine is without a credible means to project air power as a component in a combined arms strategy.

What can or should the Ukrainians bring to this ongoing counteroffensive outside of long-range artillery, unguided missiles, heavy machine gun, and tank fire? The answer is rotary wing or helicopter airpower beyond the highly touted modern strike fighter. These airpower assets need to be purpose-designed and built for a counteroffensive that will last months and likely bleed into next year. The Ukrainian air forces should focus spending, of the international community’s significant financial contributions, on procuring and employing both fixed-wing attack aircraft, such as the F-16C Fighting Falcon, and modern attack and special mission helicopters.

Mi-24 Hind Attack Helicopters in Action

Ukrainian air forces need to immediately begin converting their Cold War helicopter fleet into a modern, sustainable, and reliable inventory of Western-designed attack and special mission helicopters. For 70 years, helicopters have provided unparalleled mobility and capabilities to US and NATO forces. Mission-focused platforms equipped to execute precision attacks, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and special operations are what can accelerate Russian military and political exhaustion and their eventual expulsion from Ukraine.

While the Russians have used attack and utility helicopters during their initial invasion, they have been used sparingly over the past several months. Even with their moderate success against Ukrainian armor moving during this current counteroffensive, they face a dim future. Russian helicopters currently fly in obvious locations and in predictable patterns in support of Russian ground forces. Used as airborne artillery while flying primarily during daylight hours, the Russians are predictable. These employment tactics make them vulnerable to Ukrainian surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery fire.

Likely at the sole command of Russia’s senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant General Sergey Dronov, the Russians pulled their helicopters back from the front lines. A decision likely designed to spare their most relevant and modern attack helicopters. This includes the Russian Ka-52 Alligator, their premiere attack helicopter. The Alligator was removed from frontline service and only recently returned with improved survivability or defensive equipment. Even with these recent improvements, the Ka-52’s tactics and anticipated areas of operations make them susceptible to Ukrainian air defense systems. As of this week, the Russians have lost an estimated 301 helicopters.

Despite their moderate success this week, Russian helicopter forces, much like their ground units, remain over-extended while experiencing staggering losses. Beyond their dated tactics and limited night and all-weather capabilities, it’s their inept and micromanaging leadership that adds to their vulnerability. It is an astounding number of lost aircraft, more than triple lost in the years-long war in Chechnya. These losses reflect an institutional ambivalence to training and modernization while commanders employ them haphazardly across elongated and unsupported front lines.

Why would the Ukrainians fare any better than the Russians? The answer is less complex than some may imagine. Ukrainians would have the support of Western technical and tactical expertise. Instead of daylight operations over contested areas, Ukrainian pilots would notably be trained to circumvent Russian strongholds while striking at the time and place of their choosing. Attack helicopters are heavily armed and highly mobile. Attack helicopters, along with special mission helicopters, are well-suited to bypass a dynamic yet generally stagnant Ukrainian battlefield. Those same units could deliver small units to disrupt supply chains and strike communication nodes and key leadership positions while keeping the Russians guessing what their next target would be or when the next attack would occur.

The sound of attack helicopters and supporting special mission helicopters is terrifying. It causes confusion, depletes morale, and forces ground commanders to guess and second-guess their decisions in both offensive and defensive operations. Once those sounds are associated by the Russian conscripts with Ukrainian missile, cannon, and rocket fire along with Ukrainian special mission helicopters executing a wide range of special missions, it would cause further confusion and likely unanswerable problems for Russian commanders. Combined, these aircraft and mission profiles become a powerful tool for Ukrainian commanders while fighting Russian commanders ill-equipped to understand.

With Russian advances in stalemate, their long-range artillery and armored formations are now exposed to new and more capable NATO-provided Ukrainian ground systems. This included advanced radars to strike all Russian artillery and armored forces with more lethality and precision. It also includes capable unmanned aerial systems or drones. The Russians are attempting to change tactics by removing troops and equipment further away from the front lines and place a greater emphasis on longer-range missile fire and attack drones.  These changes and reliance on centralized control signify their continued failure and exacerbates their vulnerability to potential Ukrainian aviation assets.

How can the Ukrainians capitalize on Russia’s culmination with attack and special mission helicopters? Ukraine has, albeit a limited amount of, trained helicopter pilots flying 1980s technology-equipped Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters, with an estimated 30 helicopters in the entire fleet. These pilots, like the daring crew who attacked the Belgorod fuel depot in April of 2022, have shown talent, grit, and willingness to accept these types of missions. Unlike the request for F-16s, which some believe will further turn up the nuclear rhetoric of Vladimir Putin, helicopters are less internationally emblematic. The United States and other NATO members have large inventories of exceptionally capable attack and transport helicopters.

Available assets that could turn the tide in favor of Ukraine are US-made AH-64 Apache and AH-1Z Cobras to recently retired OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and AH-1W Super Cobras. NATO partners have the European-made Eurocopter Tiger along with a long list of aircraft capable of delivering Hellfire and other advanced long-range missiles. They include armed Bell 407s, Eurocopter EC-120/135, A-Stars even aged MBB BO-105 outfitted with a capable anti-tank missile to fill this role. They all can be easily equipped with night vision and FLIR technologies and fitted with long-range precision-guided missiles. This is the same for special missions and troop-carrying utility helicopters. NATO has a wide range of such aircraft, and the US has sold and licensed multiple variants of the dependable and capable Sikorsky H-60 Blackhawk.

A Closer Look at the Mi-24 Hind

Lastly, there are also Russian-built Mi-35s and Mi-17s operated by NATO and partner nations. Those are modernized versions of the Mi-24 and Mi-8. They were designed and sold by Russia, both aircraft would be familiar to Ukrainian pilots and ground maintenance crews. Training to fly and maintain any of these platforms is critical. This includes Ukrainian leaders and aircrews experiencing a mindset shift in how they employ these aircraft. These are not simple weapons designed to be tossed onto the battlefield haphazardly. Instead, these are highly trained crews serving a strategic role in the defense of Ukraine.

These next several months are critical in Ukraine. The defending Ukrainians can and should impose their will on the invading Russian forces through disruptive operations at multiple locations and times to refocus Russian surface-to-air, armored, and intelligence capabilities. Forcing the Russians to be reactive and defensive while dependent on a centralized control system greatly impacts their mobility and ability to attack and defend, and it destroys Russian morale.

Attack and specialized helicopters are one of the most effective aviation tools available to a Nation and a commander at war. Helicopters operating in small formations, day and night, elusive of traditional ground radars, are able to strike deep into enemy territory and achieve immediate impacts on the morale and capability of enemy forces.

A Ukrainian strategy that includes helicopter aviation is not the only answer, but it is a favorable answer that optimizes this Ukrainian counteroffensive. It will impact Russian commanders’ ability to react while causing them hesitation to exploit any gaps in the Ukrainian armed force’s capability. Russia remains alone and unsupported on the world stage through its unethical, immoral, and illegal activities in Ukraine.

The Russian president is isolated, likely frustrated, and clearly desperate for a victory that will never come due to an exhausted, decimated, and demoralized Russian army. The Russian president alone has crippled his economy and wiped out a generation of Russian youth. As the Russian generals adjust their defensive lines in this Ukrainian counteroffensive, the potent and effective use of helicopters may be exactly what brings this war to an end. Those same assets will also be needed to preserve the peace.

A post-war world in Ukraine will need to be defended, and an advanced helicopter force needs to be part of this plan. There will be new borders to be patrolled, sanctions to be enforced, and promises to be honored.

—

Eric F. Buer

A native Californian, Colonel Eric “Ferris” Buer, USMC (Ret), spent his formative years in rural New England before graduating from Ohio Wesleyan University with a degree in economics. After accepting a commission from the Marine Corps, he was trained to fly attack helicopters. His deployments took him to the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He commanded in combat, served on the staff of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as a professor of national security strategy at the National War College, and as an air group commanding officer. Eric is currently a senior executive for an aviation and training company. He is also a consultant and public speaker in the areas of military and commercial aviation and global conflict.

He is the author of the bestselling book Ghosts of Baghdad: Marine Corps Gunships on the Opening Days of the Iraq War, which you can purchase here.