Workmen repair a substation in Tacoma Washington following a Christmas Day attack. Photo by Ken Lambert
On April 16, 2013, unknown attackers opened fire on a massive Pacific Gas and Electric substation located in a remote part of Metcalf, California. At approximately 1:00 AM PST, attackers disabled AT&T telephone cables in an underground vault leading to the facility. Close by, another vault containing cabling for an internet service provider was sabotaged, and lines cut. About 30 minutes later, at least two gunmen (based on 120 recovered 7.62 x 39mm shell casings and the location of muzzle flashes seen on video) methodically sprayed the substation with gunfire, knocking out 17 large transformers which provided power to nearby Silicon Valley. Tellingly, all the recovered shell casings were devoid of fingerprints. By the time law enforcement arrived some 20 minutes later, the snipers were gone. The attack caused transformers in the substation to crash, and power to a wide area was briefly knocked out. For 27 days, crews labored to restore power and replace damaged equipment. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, the attack was labeled “the most significant incident of domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever occurred” in the U.S. by Mr. Jon Wellinghoff, at the time chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Although a spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in San Francisco did not link the attack to a terrorist organization, no arrests have been made – a decade later. Total damage was estimated at $15 million.
On May 10, 2019, Mr. Stephan McRae pled guilty to a 2016 substation attack, receiving 96 months in federal prison for one count of destruction of an energy facility in a case brought by the FBI. Mr. McRae admitted using his Springfield 30-40 Model 1898 rifle to fire shots into the cooling fins, rupturing the radiator piping. The resultant damage caused the substation to overheat and fail, costing nearly $400,000 to repair. As a part of the plea, Mr. McRae admitted he damaged other energy facilities, but for which he will not be charged.
On February 23, 2022, Mr. Christopher Cook, Mr. Jonathan Frost, and Mr. Jackson Sawall pled guilty to a plot to attack the power grid, and on April 21, 2023, Cook was sentenced to 92 months in federal prison, while Mr. Frost received a term of 60 months. (Mr. Sawall has yet to be sentenced.) The FBI arrested the trio on charges of providing material support to terrorism. The men, all in their early twenties, were documented white supremacists. According to the press release, “[T]hese three defendants admitted to engaging in a disturbing plot, in furtherance of white supremacist ideology, to attack energy facilities in order to damage the economy and stoke division in our country.” As part of the conspiracy, each defendant was assigned a substation in a different region of the U.S., with the plan being to attack with rifles. The men believed, according to their plea agreement, that their plan would cost the government millions of dollars and cause unrest for Americans in the region. They also had conversations about how the possibility of power being out for months could spark a race war and cause another Great Depression.
On December 4, 2022, unknown shooters in Moore County, North Carolina, attacked two electric substations, blasting them with rifle fire, causing an estimated millions in damage, and leaving more than 45,000 without power for days. The FBI offered a reward of $25,000 for information leading to the conviction of the perpetrator(s)
On Feb 6, 2023, Ms. Sarah Clendaniel and Mr. Brandon Russell were arrested on federal charges of plotting to attack multiple energy substations with the goal of damaging Baltimore, according to a press release from the U.S. Department of Justice. Russell was the founder of the neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen, and was on federal probation when the attack occurred. The special agent in charge of the FBI’s Baltimore division stated both of the would be attackers “had extremist views.”
Is this part of an actual increase in attacks or is more attention simply being paid to the issue? According to a September 2022 study from the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, between 2016 to 2022, white supremacist plots targeting energy systems “dramatically increased in frequency.” Researchers found 94 federal cases charging individuals with planning to conduct violent extremist attacks, and more than a third of them (35), were planning to or did attack critical infrastructure systems. 19 of the adjudicated federal cases are associated with the Salafi-jihadist movement, while 16 of the defendants were white supremacists. Of the 16 white supremacists, 13 were charged for planning attacks on power facilities during the examined time frame, with a shocking 11 of 13 defendants charged after 2020.
In December 2022, following the North Carolina attack, the aforementioned FERC directed a study be done by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to reassess existing security rules and determine what can be done about the problem. While this sounds promising, the NERC has no actual authority to compel energy providers to do anything.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), while lacking law enforcement jurisdiction over non-DOE affiliated facility attacks, nonetheless tracks power infrastructure reports from states. In a review done by USA Today covering from 2014 to present, DOE noted 723 of what they call “human-related disturbances and unusual incidents” at U.S. electrical facilities, with the number of attacks topping 100 in 2022 for the first time, and it appears that 2023 will be even worse.
Looking specifically at more direct action, the numbers are foreboding. According to 2023 data released by the DOE and highlighted in a recent Politico article, attacks and threats against the nation’s grid doubled in the first quarter of 2023, and the same DOE data indicate that to date, nine attacks from 2023 have resulted in actual losses of electrical power. Looking back over the last three years, in 2022 there were 26 incidents of what DOE labels “actual physical attack” or “sabotage.” In 2021 the number was 8, and in 2020 the number was 9. Clearly, this trend warrants concern.
On April 16, 2013, unknown attackers opened fire on a massive Pacific Gas and Electric substation located in a remote part of Metcalf, California. At approximately 1:00 AM PST, attackers disabled AT&T telephone cables in an underground vault leading to the facility. Close by, another vault containing cabling for an internet service provider was sabotaged, and lines cut. About 30 minutes later, at least two gunmen (based on 120 recovered 7.62 x 39mm shell casings and the location of muzzle flashes seen on video) methodically sprayed the substation with gunfire, knocking out 17 large transformers which provided power to nearby Silicon Valley. Tellingly, all the recovered shell casings were devoid of fingerprints. By the time law enforcement arrived some 20 minutes later, the snipers were gone. The attack caused transformers in the substation to crash, and power to a wide area was briefly knocked out. For 27 days, crews labored to restore power and replace damaged equipment. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, the attack was labeled “the most significant incident of domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever occurred” in the U.S. by Mr. Jon Wellinghoff, at the time chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Although a spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in San Francisco did not link the attack to a terrorist organization, no arrests have been made – a decade later. Total damage was estimated at $15 million.
On May 10, 2019, Mr. Stephan McRae pled guilty to a 2016 substation attack, receiving 96 months in federal prison for one count of destruction of an energy facility in a case brought by the FBI. Mr. McRae admitted using his Springfield 30-40 Model 1898 rifle to fire shots into the cooling fins, rupturing the radiator piping. The resultant damage caused the substation to overheat and fail, costing nearly $400,000 to repair. As a part of the plea, Mr. McRae admitted he damaged other energy facilities, but for which he will not be charged.
On February 23, 2022, Mr. Christopher Cook, Mr. Jonathan Frost, and Mr. Jackson Sawall pled guilty to a plot to attack the power grid, and on April 21, 2023, Cook was sentenced to 92 months in federal prison, while Mr. Frost received a term of 60 months. (Mr. Sawall has yet to be sentenced.) The FBI arrested the trio on charges of providing material support to terrorism. The men, all in their early twenties, were documented white supremacists. According to the press release, “[T]hese three defendants admitted to engaging in a disturbing plot, in furtherance of white supremacist ideology, to attack energy facilities in order to damage the economy and stoke division in our country.” As part of the conspiracy, each defendant was assigned a substation in a different region of the U.S., with the plan being to attack with rifles. The men believed, according to their plea agreement, that their plan would cost the government millions of dollars and cause unrest for Americans in the region. They also had conversations about how the possibility of power being out for months could spark a race war and cause another Great Depression.
On December 4, 2022, unknown shooters in Moore County, North Carolina, attacked two electric substations, blasting them with rifle fire, causing an estimated millions in damage, and leaving more than 45,000 without power for days. The FBI offered a reward of $25,000 for information leading to the conviction of the perpetrator(s)
On Feb 6, 2023, Ms. Sarah Clendaniel and Mr. Brandon Russell were arrested on federal charges of plotting to attack multiple energy substations with the goal of damaging Baltimore, according to a press release from the U.S. Department of Justice. Russell was the founder of the neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen, and was on federal probation when the attack occurred. The special agent in charge of the FBI’s Baltimore division stated both of the would be attackers “had extremist views.”
Is this part of an actual increase in attacks or is more attention simply being paid to the issue? According to a September 2022 study from the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, between 2016 to 2022, white supremacist plots targeting energy systems “dramatically increased in frequency.” Researchers found 94 federal cases charging individuals with planning to conduct violent extremist attacks, and more than a third of them (35), were planning to or did attack critical infrastructure systems. 19 of the adjudicated federal cases are associated with the Salafi-jihadist movement, while 16 of the defendants were white supremacists. Of the 16 white supremacists, 13 were charged for planning attacks on power facilities during the examined time frame, with a shocking 11 of 13 defendants charged after 2020.
In December 2022, following the North Carolina attack, the aforementioned FERC directed a study be done by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to reassess existing security rules and determine what can be done about the problem. While this sounds promising, the NERC has no actual authority to compel energy providers to do anything.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), while lacking law enforcement jurisdiction over non-DOE affiliated facility attacks, nonetheless tracks power infrastructure reports from states. In a review done by USA Today covering from 2014 to present, DOE noted 723 of what they call “human-related disturbances and unusual incidents” at U.S. electrical facilities, with the number of attacks topping 100 in 2022 for the first time, and it appears that 2023 will be even worse.
Looking specifically at more direct action, the numbers are foreboding. According to 2023 data released by the DOE and highlighted in a recent Politico article, attacks and threats against the nation’s grid doubled in the first quarter of 2023, and the same DOE data indicate that to date, nine attacks from 2023 have resulted in actual losses of electrical power. Looking back over the last three years, in 2022 there were 26 incidents of what DOE labels “actual physical attack” or “sabotage.” In 2021 the number was 8, and in 2020 the number was 9. Clearly, this trend warrants concern.
Additionally, both right and left-wing extremists have targeted critical infrastructure for decades. In the 1970s, the anti-capitalist New World Liberation Front carried out more than 20 bombings on California’s energy facilities. Again, not new.
According to a December 30, 2022 story in USA Today, the grid includes more than 7,300 power plants, 160,000 miles of high-voltage power lines and 55,000 transmission substations. Within a substation, transformers either raise the voltage of electricity so it can travel hundreds of miles on high-voltage lines, or reduce voltages when electricity approaches its destination. This massive amount of infrastructure, often located in rural areas, is difficult to safeguard.
A February 14, 2014 article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) noted the country’s roughly 2,000 very large transformers are expensive, often costing millions of dollars each and hard to replace, with few spares on hand. Each transformer is custom made, and weighs up to 500,000 pounds. Dennis Blake, general manager of Pennsylvania Transformer in Pittsburgh (one of seven U.S. manufacturers) told the WSJ he can only build 10 units a month.
Remember Mr. Wellinghoff from FERC? He wrote a FERC analysis which found that if a surprisingly small number of U.S. substations were knocked out at once, it could destabilize the system enough to cause a blackout that could encompass most of the country. Sobering.
Power companies with facilities in isolated areas have limited options to defend substations from physical attack, and urban substations have even fewer choices. Masonry walls or fencing providing actual ballistic protection are two options for any facility. There are also rubber-faced metal sheeting products on the market, although their use in high-power electrical facilities can be problematic. One rather unique product is the Modular Interlocking Ballistic Barrier System (MIB²S) by K.F. Armory Defense (KFAD). Based on a conversation the author had with the president of K.F. Armory, Mr. Jin Kim, one large utility has expressed interest in his products and has moved to the purchasing phase. Protection like MIB²S and other ballistic barrier technologies from KFAD can be configured to stop large-caliber small-arms fire, with some versions of MIB²S effective against rocket-propelled grenades, as proven in Department of Defense testing. Less costly techniques such as opaque fencing provide concealment so that a would-be gunman might not have a clear target line of sight, but they offer no physical protection, acting more like camouflage than a barrier. Additional setbacks might work on some substations, but that is impractical in many locations given urban encroachment and power company right of ways. Finally, high-quality cellular-enabled cameras looking not just inwards but outwards could provide useful information in the event of attack and have the advantage of functioning in very low light. Unless coupled with cellular-backed alarms and battery backup, they are more in the vein of deterrence.
Conclusion
The vast U.S. power grid is undeniably vulnerable to physical attack, and it appears there is no agency or organization able or willing to take command of and fix the situation. Congress has provided no meaningful solutions, and utility companies have been slow to respond. With so many agencies, and nobody really in charge of coordinating defense, the grid in general and substations in particular are ripe for attack. As these incidents increase, the motivation of the attackers is less important than their frequency, especially given the chaos a concerted and widespread series of attacks could cause nationally.
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