Read this Translation of an Interview with General Kryvonos of Ukraine’s Special Forces

The Ukrainians at War Translated gave us their permission to use their translation of a recent interview by Mark Solonin of Ukrainian General Serhiy Kryvonos.

The translation was prepared by VolodyaTretyak.

General Kryvonos has served in the Ukrainian Army for over 32 years and is the creator of their Special Operations Forces. On March 12, 2019, Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Serhiy Kryvonos was appointed NSDC Deputy Secretary by then President Petro Poroshenko. In December 2020, Kryvonos was dismissed from this post by incumbent President Volodymyr Zelensky.  The dismissal appears to have been motivated the public criticism of the Zelensky administration by Gen Kryvonos while still Deputy Secretary of Ukraine’s security forces.

General Kryvonos stated this in a Facebook post on June 5th, 2021,

When the invasion began in February of this year General Kryvonos was hunting for ammunition and went by car an airport looking to obtain some from the security services there. When he arrived he found a leaderless mixed bag of various units including airport guards and even a detachment of the Presidential Honor Guard. With the arrival of a group of volunteers formerly in the Ukraine Special Forces, General Krynonos(now a civilian) took over the successful defense of the Sikorsky International Airport inside the capital of Kyiv. It is about 7km from the Presidential Palace.

In certain places this interview contains commentary by SOFREP

Interviewer (I): Generally speaking, it appears to ordinary people that the military leadership of the country, roughly speaking, overslept the beginning of the war. Is that wrong or what?

Gen. Kryvonos (K): Let’s get this straight: the country’s military-political leadership (overslept the beginning – remark). The military clearly knew that there would be a Russian attack plus or minus, tying in specific timelines to within two to three days.

But, precisely 72 hours before the war started, there was a 100% certainty there would be a war. Plus-minus, understanding in which directions the offensive would be. So you are absolutely right. Did the word oversleep, or did they pretend to oversleep the offensive?

That’s the question. I think someone else will have to tell you eventually. Why didn’t they respond at all to warnings from not only Western partners? Western partners have been warning us since the fall of 2021.

In the spring of 2020, I told from where and how the Russians would attack. And in principle, it all coincided 100% told us how the offensive would come, specifically, named the targets that Russian troops would be interested in.

And our colleagues from Western countries were telling us more clearly. In January, some Americans of the extremely high level came, and right on the maps, they were telling us what would happen and how.

But the political leadership said it was all lies, nonsense, and provocations. Why? Well, because the pro-Russian agents are probably in the president’s office.
There’s no other way to justify this. To say that they didn’t know. That’s an outright lie. Ukrainian and foreign intelligence agencies officially reported to the leadership about the Russian offensive.

(SOFREP-  Ukraine has recently arrested two high-ranking officials in their intelligence and military branches for suspected espionage against the State.  The two officials were Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova and State Secret Service (SBU) director Ivan Bakanov.  In the US, it would be akin to arresting the Attorney General and the Director of the CIA. In the months before the war, the Zelensky government did not believe an invasion was imminent citing their own intelligence service as contradicting information from the US which had stated for months that it would happen at any moment. The more months that went past without an invasion, the more credible the SBU’s assessment appeared.  Now it would seem Ukraine’s intelligence service was riddled with Russian agents from the FSB including its Director, Ivan Bakanov.) 

(I): One thing is a military analysis by a professional, and it is another thing to know that such plans are written in the headquarters in Moscow.

If I understood you correctly, it was a piece of specific information about the actions of the Russian command.

(K): Of course. And we have informants.

(I): Well, I’m not asking for last names.

(K): Well, no, but no one has forgotten them. Nevertheless, at a high level, there were these reports.

And very often, there were such examples when officers of the Russian General Staff, generals of the Russian General Staff called their classmates, friends, and brothers who were serving here and warned that in 24 hours, Russia would attack.

“And there in 72 hours, we will attack”, for example. There was just no reaction. The people, who got the information from us, immediately reported upstairs, saying don’t panic, don’t tell tales, everything will be ok.

(I): Terrific. Practically concluding this block of questions, I once heard from many people, whom I am not authorized to name, that the Ukrainian air force was dispersed and moved to previously prepared, fielded airfields on the eve of strikes and so on.

As a result, what should have been, according to Russian plans, a command, first destroying strike against Ukrainian aviation, went through almost empty places. Why didn’t we notice any of that if that’s the case?

As I recall, there was also no deployment of Ukrainian ground troops on the night of 02.24. Or didn’t I see something I was not supposed to see?

(K): Well, most likely the second option. You didn’t see the actions of certain military personnel. You have to give credit that the air force command reacted clearly, regardless of any questions.

And to disperse, planes and helicopters moved even within their airfields. And in principle, very often, in the first 24 hours, Russian missiles were hollowed out. The same was true for most of the ground forces.

Although there were examples when the flights were relatively trivial, one of the examples was when the command of the special operations forces, despite their subordinates’ demands and requests, the commander did not decide to move the base and the principle.

On the morning of the 24th, Russian missiles hit the special operations forces command building. There were casualties; although there were warnings about it, there was no reaction.

It is elementary unprofessionalism and an elementary thing that a person was unable or was afraid to take the decision.

Unfortunately, it happens because sometimes, the formation of command staff in certain branches of the armed forces, especially in the last two years, is done by selecting people who are silent and committed to something personal and who have their own opinion.”

(I): The following question has been discussed many times, but I need to ask it because it interests everyone. Interest is not the right word, serious concern. During the first three days, the enemy in the south passed 400 kilometers from Perekop through Melitopol, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, if you measure by the map in a straight line. Such distance in three days is a forced march. This is not an offensive, but it is a forced march. I have a simple question. I do not expect a long answer. May there be another explanation for such a march other than criminal negligence?

(K): It’s not negligence; It’s treason. The question is, who gave the command to demine the bridges from Crimea? That is the question that worries everyone. And the stories that a Security Service of Ukraine involved (SBU), well… the military laughs with these stories that the SBU turned in the maps of minefields and the order of mines. But people who know, i.e., who have access to such things, perfectly understand: SBU will not be permitted to these things even closer than one kilometer. And there is no way people, even in high general’s shoulder straps of the SBU, can have these documents.

Moreover, these people certainly cannot give the command to demine particular objects. It is simply an information manipulation. It is called the creation of false targets, to which everything is distracted. It’s nothing. Therefore, it is pure treason. And who is the traitor the public has yet to hear? And it is very interesting because we don’t have the information. There are no comments from top leadership. Accordingly, there is a certain distrust toward the leadership. To lose such a massive chunk for nothing, just for nothing.

In 2014, from March to mid-May, I was in charge of anti-subversion activities in the Kherson region, and just as I knew exactly about the mining of all the bridges, bridges, even stakes, which allowed us to feel at ease. And the people who were with me did the research; the military engineers participated too. I had absolute confidence. Excuse me, it was a shock when we rudely f***** up a vast chunk of territory, without a single shot being fired or a single Russian tank being burned. That’s a betrayal.

(I): Massive shock. But demining is one thing; bridges, crossings, and dams are on the way out of Crimea. Well, that’s not all, but it came out of Crimea. Further, it is 300 kilometers to Mariupol. You have to drive through the steppe. But there, too, as I understand it, there must have been some lines of defense, some troops, some firepower, and nothing happened. Did everyone receive a command not to shoot? What happened?

(K): Well, that’s a question that we also wanted to… It also concerns you and me in quite a big way. So I think the investigation after our victory will show who is to blame for this failure.

(I): Now I want to go back to 24-25 February, when the enemy was also in Irpin, Vorzel, on the morning of February 25. So these are already the suburbs of Kyiv, practically the dacha suburbs of Kyiv. In this case, too, you would probably say that the enemy should not have gone 100 kilometers through the forest roads with the proper organization of UA combat operations.

(K): Absolutely correct. And the fact that the attack will come from the side of Belarus is one hundred percent. A year before the start of the war, I warned the country’s leadership, and, in principle, I was fired for that. They did not want to hear what they did not want to hear. That’s the first thing. Second, even in December 2021, I asked, demanded, and proposed to hold maneuvers on dangerous tank routes along the Russian-Ukrainian border, and on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, about the presence of Russian troops in Belarus and their accumulation was known to everybody. But there was no reaction. So was it negligence or carelessness? I do not know what to call it. I do not have 100% access to that information, and I have not interviewed the people who were responsible for it. It’s tough to draw such conclusions. So let’s say that yes, there can be negligence. But all the same, probably a large proportion of the betrayal of not deciding on the subject of referral can be justified by only one thing: lack of effort and resources to solve it or with the command to do nothing.

(SOFREP- These references to tanks passing down roads with forests on both sides is of great interest.  For tank commanders sending tanks down a single road with forest on both sides is pretty much suicidal. It is the perfect place for an ambush with anti-tank weapons or artillery and tanks can only go forward or backward, they cannot drive through a dense forest. Generally, you would want aircraft to surveil the road ahead and send infantry down the road first to clear out any ambushes that were emplaced.  The Russians didn’t do any of that, they just barreled down the road. Either they were tactically inept and were incredibly lucky the Ukrainians didn’t have their act together in the first 3 days of the war, or Ukraine’s troops were intentionally sent to other areas to clear the way for the Russian advance, which is what Gen Kryvonos is suggesting here.  It may be a combination of both)

(I): Right. Nevertheless, the enemy did not pass Bucha in a day, not in two, not in a week, not in a month. And in particular, as far as I understand, they did not manage to capture and use the landing craft(airport) for landing. As far as I know that none of them has four airfields near Kyiv. That’s the whole story with the airfields. I know you weren’t just observing it; you were involved in it. How is it that the Russian command didn’t succeed here?

(K): The one they took was the Hostomel airfield. Thank God, thanks to the reasonably quick reaction of the organization of work, on all the other airfields, the Russians were burned. There was an attempt to land Russian paratroopers at Vasylkivsk airfield, but the planes were shot down. Some Russian paratroopers even managed to land from (an) Il-76. There were about 20 people there, but they were surrounded and eliminated. About 20 had time to land, to assemble, and then AFU destroyed them. It happened due to the precise right actions, who were in charge of the defense of those airports, those airfields. We did not allow the Russians to work out the operation. Do you know what the specifics are? You, as a military historian, probably pay attention to that. I think you paid attention to it a long time ago.

The Russians often try out previously existing patterns of action of the Russian and Soviet armies. It just already imposes the nuances of modernity. So what the Russians did in the Kyiv direction very often reminds me of the actions of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in 1968 in the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The same. Airfields, robust tank columns, rapid advance. It worked there. It didn’t work here. Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia did not want to go into conflict. They didn’t fight. And the Ukrainians, regardless of the country’s political leadership position, were instantly self-organized, having already had enough experience. And they started to burn Russian tanks wherever they could. Only afterward was it taken under the control of the military leadership and became more or less normally managed.
It was the case in Hostomel, but unfortunately, the Russians captured it afterward anyway. The units at the Hostomel airfield put up a decent resistance, although they were conscripts and support units. Nevertheless, they shot down more than one Russian helicopter. And the Russians had planned first to land the landing party, launch the runway clearing, and suppress the Ukrainian air defense system. And then they wanted to land military transport aviation planes. In principle, they were planning to do that, in Vasylkiv, in Gostomel airfield. They planned to build it up at Zhulyansk airfield Sviatoshyn Airfield afterward. The next target was the city of Boryspil (Kryvonos means the airport in Boryspil – remark). But this plan failed.

(I): About Hostomel. Just a private question. It is of little importance. But I want to clarify that since you are aware of it, I still saw some footage of the landing on the Internet: A significant plane lands, a camera shooting placed on a soldier’s helmet, and Russian paratroopers run out onto the runway. Did they manage to land the aircraft in Gostomel, or was it only an attempt to land a large helicopter?

(K): In the beginning, it was an attempt to land a helicopter.

(I): They didn’t manage to land a plane there. Is that correct?

(K): I don’t have that information, so I’m not going to fantasize. According to my knowledge, when I interviewed those who took part in the first 24 hours of fighting at the Gostomel airfield, they did not tell me about the landing of the Russian military transport aircraft.

(I): It’s clear. Regarding the airfield Zhulyany, if I understand correctly, you are very well aware of events and who defended it in the first two or three days. Were Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) involved there? The neighborhood men, the army, special forces, or air defense? What was there at Zhulyany?

(K): [Laughing] Zhulyany was a wild hodgepodge (a mixture, originally “solyanka” – remark), from different power structures of Ukraine. And on the 25th, absolutely accidentally, well, conditionally, I accidentally stopped at Zhylyansk airfield; we had to get ammunition there to go to another area. I saw many border guards, officers, and soldiers of the National Guard present. A few soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) were present.
When I asked, “what will we do? What were we waiting for?”
– “We are waiting for the Kirov landing party.”

– “What are we doing?

– “We are not doing anything. We are waiting. “

– “Who is the man in charge?”

– “No one in charge.”

Understanding the importance of Zhulyany airport – It was the air gateway for the Russians, for the success of the takeover of Kyiv. There were people, but the task was not completely clear to them. In general, these were not members of the AFU but other security forces. And they have another specificity. Now they are not even trained; they don’t understand what to do. They gathered, and I introduced myself, “I’m general Kryvonos. I am taking the command”. Then I set some tasks. I had some experience in defense and successful experience in defense of airfields. In 2014 during the 47 days, I defended in Kramatorsk. Additionally, I knew how to seize airfields because of the specifics of my service as a Special Forces soldier. Accordingly, I also knew how to prevent capture. There were cadets from the military institutions of the Shevchenko University. There was a small unit of the presidential regiment. Again, even just an honor guard company. You understand, these are just the guys who absolutely do not know how to fight.

But here, we have to give credit to both the commander of this combined unit and these guys; they did everything right; as I told them, they were quick to learn, as well as the border guards and the national guard. There was no TDF(Territorial Defence Forces), unfortunately. Another composite unit came to the airfield at my call, but they had nothing to do with TDF and armed forces then. They were veterans with experience from the previous war, 2014 through 2022. And these guys were the guys who had served and fought in the Right Sector unit (Pravyi sector in Ukrainian – remark)  at one time, then fought in the Third and Eighth Special Operations Regiment. So these guys also understood everything. And they were my brothers-in-arms, who did everything very clearly and quickly.
The first airfield’s defense task is to block the runway to prevent the landing. Then it was mined, and as we created a system of fire and a system of engineering barriers, we were already absolutely at ease. What and how would we do next? We were only increasing our efforts, let’s say, polishing the diamond we held in our hands.

(I): I get the creepy impression that if you went by car on February 25 to get ammunition in another place, the enemy could have taken Zhulyany airfield. And who is not aware, and it is within the city limits; it is not even a suburb of Kyiv. The enemy could have occupied it immediately. Is it so?

(K): Well, not immediately, but let’s say it could have been seized by an enemy airborne landing and secured landing by Russian Federation military transport aircraft. And it would have been much harder to beat it out of there in the middle of the city.

(I): There are less than 10 kilometers from the airport to the president’s office.

(K): It is seven kilometers only in a straight line and within the city limits, where there weren’t that many troops because all of them moved in the direction of Irpin.

(I): Okay, we’re done with the beginning of the war, and we go straight to the conclusion of the first phase, which is the end of March. The enemy withdrew and liberated significant, vast areas of territory north of Kyiv, the Chernihiv region, and the north-northeast of the country. So there are all sorts of opinions on this. Excuse me, I believe it was still an organized retreat, not a retreat under the blows of the pursuing Ukrainian troops. Do I understand the situation correctly? And why were they allowed to leave quietly if that is the case? Although another component is just as important: Why did they go?

(K): Well, let’s start with the word “why”. RU forces bogged down in the battles in the Kyiv direction.; thanks to the AFU and their persistence, Russians had already lost the offensive initiative and were partially exhausted. Our army just fought for every meter of land on the outskirts of Kyiv. Russians realized that they did not have enough forces and means to blockade Kyiv. Their logistics system was never really created. The Russians decided that it was better to shift their efforts and move those troops that were still there, that were not demoralized yet, to other directions, including Kharkiv and Donetsk. So it was decided that, given Mr. Putin’s appetites, it was impossible to be satisfied with one coverage. That is, Russia’s mouth turned out to be too small for big Ukraine, so they decided to bite off Ukraine in pieces, not to swallow it whole, as it was initially, according to the plans of the Russian General Staff, according to Putin’s decision. So they organized a retreat from the Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions. Where the Ukrainian armed forces could, they hit the advancing Russian troops. But the problem is that the Ukrainian armed forces had severe shell hunger(shortages) from the end of March – early April 2014 (probably K. means 2022 – remark).

(I): Already at the end of March?

(K): I’ll put it this way, even as early as the middle of March, it was this hunger(shortage); it was pretty severe. Although many spoke, including me, warned that by the experience of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war, when Azerbaijan, with all its enormous financial resources, faced shell hunger on the 35th day of the war. In Ukraine, it started much earlier because of not building and not creating a powerful ammunition factory in Ukraine. On my understanding, there had to be several of them. We found ourselves in such a strange time of need. We knew the intelligence was working great. We just received a considerable amount from our informants from the territory of Ukraine, a vast amount we transferred to the senior intelligence agencies, who reported it in time and laid it out. And accordingly, the commander in chief gen. Zalyzhnyi made clear decisions. But when you have 100 targets and only 20 shells to destroy targets, you can’t do it. So you can’t jump over your capabilities no matter how great a general you are. The desire is there, but the abilities don’t allow it. So that is one of the problems why it didn’t happen.

Because there were no means of reliably large numbers of means, of defeat, and of providing those means of loss, there would have been projectiles; there would have been artillery systems, and it would have been different. These forces would hardly have reached the Russian-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Belarusian border by now.

That’s the first thing. The second: In 2012 and 2013, at the expense of diversion, properly organized by the Russian secret services, the armed forces, at the behest of the country’s leadership, shot hundreds of thousands of artillery shells every day. Simply into the void. Under the guise of utilization. What did it lead to?

(I): Hundreds of thousands?

(K): Yes, per day, at all the ranges.

(I): The barrels can’t take that kind of fire.

(K): Right. On all the ranges. I remember those morning reports well, “How many shells we shoot”. So, if you put it together, it was like firing, like machine gun belts. It led to just extreme wear and tore(tear) on our resources, our artillery pieces. And a tremendous amount of rockets and rocket systems were shot, too. So we started to feel already in 2014 because the accuracy of the artillery systems was very much in question. But so far, there has been no investigation in this direction, even though it was clear two years later. Why? Because those who decided to conduct such actions were participants in the process and are still in certain positions of power, raising this issue is highly uncomfortable for many politicians and military still on Ukraine’s territory. But this is precisely what I call a super, properly organized sabotage. I assess it as a military man. I understand how well Russian agents worked it out. Unfortunately, they did. Therefore: We knew we could have, we had information, but we had nothing to shoot and nowhere to shoot (regarding the retreat from Kyiv – remark).

(General Kryvonos is claiming here that the Russian intelligence services had infiltrated the Ukr general staff resulting in exercises that expended hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds in training that wore out the barrels, breeches, and components of their artillery, which were not replaced. Worn barrels will reduce the accuracy and range of expended rounds. When the invasion began, Ukraine found itself critically short of not just ammunition but also of guns in good working order.)