General Haftar’s Mötley Crüe

Within the bleak desert wastes of eastern Libya, work is ongoing to improve and professionalize the Libyan National Army. By Western military standards, this is essentially an army in name only. In reality, this 25,000-strong force is primarily a patchwork of militias bound together by their ardent loyalty to the 80-year-old strongman, General Khalifa Haftar (Delalande, 2019). At the core of this motley force is General Haftar’s regular army, consisting of 7,000 soldiers (Delalande, 2019).

At the disposal of this patchwork force are a variety of vehicles including aged T-54 and T-55 tanks, BM-21 Grad missile launchers and self-propelled howitzers (Delalande, 2019). Additionally, a great number of Toyota pickup trucks (referred to as “technicals” once armed) are employed because they can be outfitted with various weapons, including lite antiaircraft cannons, recoilless rifles, and mortars.

Flashback: Arab Spring

The year was 2011. From North Africa to the Middle East, regional leaders were shocked and swept up by popular protests aimed at authoritarianism, corruption, and poverty. The protests threatened their regimes’ stability, albeit briefly. Libya was no different. Its dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, witnessed mass protests spring up against his iron-fisted rule, protests he vowed to crush without mercy.

The United Nations responded with Resolution 1973. This provided NATO with the green light to intervene in Libya to protect civilians under threat. Despite the limited mandate of Resolution 1973, it became clear that the military intervention was primarily designed to cripple and topple the Gaddafi regime (Mezran & Miller, 2017).

 Operation Odyssey Dawn (March 2011)

With the passage of Resolution 1973, NATO states deployed and struck Libya with a combined force that totaled 20 naval vessels and 350 aircraft. As the greatest contributor, the U.S. deployed 12 naval vessels and approximately 150 to 175 aircraft (Bell & Witter, 2011).

From “March 19 to March 31…U.S. aircraft had flown 1,206…of the 1,990…total coalition sorties over Libya and conducted 463…of the 952 total coalition strike sorties” (Bell & Witter, 2011, p. 27). In addition to the overwhelming and destructive use of airpower, the U.S. launched 221 tomahawk cruise missiles at Libyan targets (Bell & Witter, 2011). The result was the swift destruction of Gaddafi’s military as a capable and functioning military force.

Once the dust had settled and the smoke had cleared, the Gaddafi regime was in ruins, and anarchy quickly set in. Islamist militants moved in, and domestic militias began to entrench themselves in towns and villages across the country.

General Haftar Strikes Back

With the country in shambles, and no NATO occupation and reconstruction plan in place or on the table, by 2014 Libya was effectively been split in two. The west was governed by the UN-backed Government of National Accord based in Misratah, while General Haftar, headquartered in Tobruk, ruled the east. On May 16, 2014, General Haftar launched Operation Dignity, designed to sweep up and destroy rebel militias, radical Islamic groups. This would have culminated in the capture of Benghazi, thus securing Libya under his rule.

Although General Haftar succeeded in securing the east, its oil fields, and terminals, he, however, fell short of taking Benghazi. This was due to Turkey’s intervention and its rapidly deployed drones and mercenaries commanded by Turkish Army personnel.

The Irish Connection

Following the stagnation that set in after Operation Dignity, and a failed bid to take Tripoli in 2019, General Haftar has within the last year brought in the Irish private military company (PMC), Irish Training Solutions (ITS), to raise his army’s level of readiness and operational capabilities. ITS is staffed with former Irish special forces from its elite Army Ranger Wing, and it has been contracted to train General Haftar’s 166th Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

The contracted training includes a special forces course with sniper training, close-quarter battle (O’Leary, 2024), and reconnaissance instruction. Additionally, there is general firearms and mortar training and courses in raiding tactics for targeting drug smugglers (The New Arab Staff, 2024).

Since top-tier PMCs are staffed by highly trained former military (in many cases former special forces) personnel, they have the ability to alter the reality on the ground. If the training is thoroughly executed and implemented, the 166th has the potential to become a much more potent combat force. As they will have a unified tactical doctrine, greater cohesiveness and will be far more effective with weapons-handling skills and discipline. This could be enough to tip the balance in favor of General Haftar in a future campaign.

Into the (Near?) Future

Given that competent and highly trained military outfits seldom sit around and knit sweaters or bake apple pies (or rice pilaf in their case), with the high-end training the 166th has received, it could be used in a variety of ways.

For example, the 166th could train other units within General Haftar’s army to raise their readiness levels and general soldiering skills. It could also aid in establishing further special forces units. Additionally, the 166th could be used as a rapid-response strike force for internal security and stability. In this role, it could be called upon to quickly take out terrorist cells within eastern Libya or rival militias that refuse to bend the knee to Haftar’s leadership. Similarly, the 166th could shut down drug- and human-trafficking corridors as well as the groups that engage in these illicit practices.

A final and probable use for the 166th  would be as the spearhead of another march on western Libya for reunification. As this is a proxy war, General Haftar would need an answer for the direct involvement by the Turkish army, drones and 2,000 to 4,000 mercenaries (Guzansky, Rakov, & Lindenstrauss).

Presently, the Turkish military is minimally involved, but Tayyip Erdoğan has threatened to formally enter the conflict if need be. Were this to happen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, all who are backing General Haftar, might similarly double down with further military involvement, both in terms of equipment and personnel. This is due to the government of western Libya’s ties to fundamentalist Islamic groups – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood – the three aforementioned countries view it as a threat. This, then, is another flashpoint that could drive the Middle East into further chaos, a situation that the overextended U.S. is keen to avoid, particularly with China gaining strength and extending its global influence.

References

Bell, A., & Witter, D. (2011). The Libyan revolution: Escalation & intervention (Part 2). Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Libya_Part2_0.pdf

Delalande, A. (2019, May 13). The rise of Libya’s renegade general: How Haftar built his war machine. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/rise-libyas-renegade- general-how-haftar-built-his-war-machine

Guzansky, Y., Rakov, D., & Lindenstrauss, G. (2020). The use of mercenaries: A new recourse to an old practice for waging war in the Middle East. Institute for National Security Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23525

Mezran, K., & Miller, E. (2017). Libya: From intervention to proxy war. Atlantic Council. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03495

O’Leary, N. (2024, April 3). Training of rogue Libyan forces by ex-Irish soldiers ‘deeply shocking,’ Tánaiste says. Irish Times. https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2024/04/03/training-of-rogue-libyan-forces-by-ex- irish-soldiers-deeply-shocking-tanaiste-says/

The New Arab Staff. (2024, April 3). Ex-Irish soldiers training Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya amid UN arms embargo. The New Arab. https://www.newarab.com/news/ex-irish- soldiers-training-haftars-forces-amid-un-embargo

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Author Bio

Christian P. Martin is a Michigan-based military researcher and writer. He earned his Master’s degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso. His professional interests are history, land, and naval warfare, both conventional and unconventional, with a focus on the developing world and an emergent China.