Weapons

The Navy Is Set to invest in Sea-Launched, Nuclear-Armed, Cruise Missiles: Here’s Why

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With regional conflicts escalating, the U.S. must address its tactical nuclear gap by deploying the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N) to maintain deterrence and protect its interests and allies effectively.

A U.S. Navy submarine cruises stealthily through the ocean, symbolizing the nation's formidable underwater nuclear deterrence capabilities. Original illustration by SOFREP.

Introduction

Nuclear weapons are the most fearful and powerful weapons to be designed, produced, and deployed by states seeking the ultimate form of deterrence.  Presently, the United States has nearly 4,000 active nuclear weapons of various types; this includes those that are currently deployed and those in reserve; the number increases when considering those that are set for retirement (Federation of American Scientists, 2024). Of this stockpile of nuclear weapons, a select amount is deployed aboard the Navy’s submarine fleet.

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The United States (U.S.) Navy operates two types of submarines: (1) the Ohio Class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and (2) attack submarines (SSN). The Los Angeles Class is the most prominent of the latter. While both types of submarines are formidable assets that the Navy can rely on during wartime, the two submarine classes serve vastly different purposes. The Ohio Class’ primary purpose is to lurk beneath the world’s oceans, serving as the ultimate and ever-present threat of nuclear retribution against a would-be foe who may be contemplating the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S.

On the other hand, the Navy’s attack submarines are purpose-built apex predators, charged primarily with seeking out and destroying the surface vessels of America’s wartime enemies. They are capable of deploying naval mines and launching tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and torpedoes. In the very near future, if research and production proceed, some of these attack submarines will be given the responsibility of carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

The Mid-Range Nuclear Weapon Threat

Below the level of potentially state-ending weapons are intermediate-range and tactical nuclear armaments intended for regional and battlefield use. States that are adversarial to the U.S. that maintain stockpiles of these weapons are Russia, China, and North Korea. Specifically, Russia has approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal, and China’s Rocket Force maintains another 2,000 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles (Harvey & Soofer, 2022).

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With these mid-range nuclear weapons, both China and Russia have a great deal more regional striking power at the nuclear level than the United States. While the aforementioned states have a combined 4,000 mid-range missiles that are or could become nuclear-armed, the U.S. has approximately 100 tactical bombs in secure storage sites located around Europe (Federation of American Scientists, 2024).

The Need for a Sea-Launched Cruise Missile – Nuclear (SLCM-N)

The glaring disparity in intermediate-range and tactical nuclear capabilities creates opportunities for China and Russia in their respective regions and a severe capability gap for the U.S. This gap could cause a breakdown in deterrence because these adversarial states may feel a “greater freedom to engage in regional, limited nuclear escalation as they question whether the United States would be willing to turn a regional conflict into a suicidal intercontinental nuclear war” (Harvey & Soofer, 2022 p. 5).

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Similar to the strategic deterrence provided by the Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the proposed SLCM-N would give the president options at the regional level, lowering or negating the possible use of intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons by a U.S. adversary.

To this point, Admiral Charles Richard (former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command) advocated for the deployment of the SLCM-N before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May 2022. He stated: “[A] low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter and respond without visible generation is necessary to provide a persistent, survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries, assure allies, provide flexible options, as well as complement existing capabilities” (Patterson, 2022).

In the event of a regional conflict, the deployment of the SLCM-N would send the unmistakable message that the U.S. has a reliable, survivable weapon system that can be launched at a moment’s notice, particularly if its personnel or allies come under limited nuclear attack or the threat thereof. For these reasons, “the House and Senate armed services committees have authorized for fiscal year 2024 about $190 million to the Navy to develop the SLCM-N for deployment early in the next decade, as well as about $75 million to the Department of Energy for the warhead” (Soofer & Slocombe, 2023).

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The Advantages of Deploying the SLCM-N

Deploying SLCM-Ns aboard attack submarines avoids possible host-nation issues, such as protests or a time-consuming and divisive political debate about nuclear weapons’ basing requirements. If basing rights are granted, launching an airborne nuclear strike against a peer or near-peer enemy could prove problematic.

Such an attack would require the commitment of additional aircraft for support, such as tankers for inflight refueling and fighter escorts to suppress enemy aircraft and ground-based air-defense systems (Cummings, 2024). There is also the added risk that a base hosting nuclear weapons could be preemptively attacked or destroyed by a retaliatory attack, risking the destruction of not only the military infrastructure but also, more worryingly, the deaths of civilians in the surrounding area.

In the event of a two-theater war, opposing forces may be tempted to use tactical or mid-range nuclear weapons against deployed U.S. military personnel or our allies. This could be due to their assessment that the U.S. doesn’t have a regional deterrent, thus leading to the perception that they have the ability to gain a battlefield advantage or strike a fatal blow that could lead to their victory. “If such a scenario arises, deploying nuclear-armed SSNs to the secondary theater would impose fewer logistics and security burdens than deploying aircraft, which in any case might be needed for conventional operations in the primary theater” (Cummings, 2024). Having the SLCM-N in the subordinate theater would make an enemy think very carefully about taking its mid-range or tactical nuclear weapons out of storage, much less using them against U.S. military forces or its allies.

A final and noteworthy advantage of deploying the SLCM-N aboard America’s attack submarine fleet is the available space on the new class of ballistic submarines (Colombia Class). The “14 Ohio-class boats will eventually be replaced by just 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each of which will have only 16 missile tubes, versus 20 per Ohio. Total SSBN tubes will decrease from 280 to 192—a little over 30 percent—putting a premium on magazine space that must be allocated to SLBMs for strategic deterrence missions rather than theater roles” (Cummings, 2024).

Will the SLCM-N Affect the Mission of the SSN Fleet?

According to defense experts Harvey and Soofer (2022), the readiness of the SSN fleet will not be affected because not all the SSNs will need to be armed with the SLCM-N. They assert that only a percentage of the SSN fleet will be required to carry the SLCM-N and, within those submarines, only a fraction of the crew would require nuclear certification (p. 9).

Concurring with Harvey and Soofer and testifying before Congress, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark A. Milley, stated the SLCM-N “wouldn’t be necessarily on each of those subs… some of those subs, a small percentage, may have a mission change, the others would not” (Harvey & Soofer, 2022, p. 9). Once onboard the selected SSNs, an enemy would have to assume would need to assume that all the SSNs in the theater are armed with the SLCM-N, creating uncertainty and adding to deterrence.

Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that “throughout the entire Cold War, the US Navy managed the burden of carrying nuclear weapons on surface ships and attack submarines; nuclear operational deployments and tactical load-outs did not then impede or impact the navy’s ability to perform its other missions” (Harvey & Soofer, 2022, p. 9).

Conclusion

As the adage goes, “The world is a dangerous place,” even more so when nuclear weapons are waiting for use in the arsenals and weapons platforms of adversarial states. While strategic weapons such as ballistic missiles provide the ultimate deterrent effect, America’s enemies may be tempted to use intermediate-range or tactical nuclear weapons due to their scaled-down destructive power. Additionally, their use in a distant theater of war would not necessarily warrant the retaliatory response of a ballistic missile attack on the aggressor state’s homeland.

This is a reality since Russia and China have numerous stocks of nuclear weapons of the intermediate and tactical variety, and they may be tempted to use them if hostilities commenced with the U.S. This is a glaring possibility as the U.S. does not currently have a commensurate, regional deterrent. For this reason, Congress, numerous specialists, and military officials have concurred that developing and fielding an SLCM-N is a stopgap solution. The SLCM-N would further regional deterrence, add another layer of protection for U.S. military personnel, and assure allies that the U.S. military has an answer for regional nuclear saber-rattling.

References

 Cummings, A. (2024). A better case for SLCM-N: Yes, the United States needs a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, but focusing on warhead yield ignores other important issues. Proceedings, 150(4/1, 454).                                               https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/better-case-slcm-n

Federation of American Scientists. (2024, May 7). America’s nuclear weapons arsenal 2024: Annual overview released by the Federation of American Scientists.

Harvey, J. R., & Soofer, R. (2022). Strengthening deterrence with SLCM-N. Atlantic Council. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep44945

Patterson, B.M. (2022). The Navy needs a now-yield nuclear weapon. Proceedings. 148(12/1, 438). Proceedings. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/december/navy-needs-low-yield-nuclear-weapon

Soofer, R., & Slocombe, W.B. (2023). Congress should fund the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. Atlantic Council: New Atlanticist. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/congress-should-fund-the-nuclear-sea-launched-cruise-missile/

Author’s Bio

Chris MartinAuthor Pic

Christian P. Martin is a Michigan-based military researcher and writer. He lived and worked in Vietnam for seven years, giving him a deep understanding of regional dynamics and Vietnamese culture. Additionally, he earned a Master’s degree in Defense & Strategic Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso. His professional interests are history, land and naval warfare and a keen interest in an emergent China.

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