The US Navy has announced that it will not buy additional San Antonio-class amphibious warships in its $842 billion FY2024 budget. This decision is significant as the San Antonio class (LPD-17 Flight II) is one of the largest and arguably most capable warships in the US Navy’s arsenal. It is seen as a critical element for force projection and power projection in the years to come. 

Why Has Production Been Halted?

The Navy has decided to pause production of LPD-17 Flight II warships due to a strategic pause for evaluating amphibious warships as part of its overall review of current shipbuilding capabilities and future requirements. This evaluation was prompted by Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger’s suggestion that the Marine Corps should examine ways of becoming more expeditionary, with smaller vessels that can be deployed faster than larger ships like aircraft carriers or LPD-17’s Flight II warships. 

“Depending on the length of a strategic pause, it risks the complete shutdown of a line. If a shipbuilding line shuts down, the risk to meeting future requirements greatly increases,” Maj. Josh Benson told USNI News. “Shipyards will be forced to cut workforce personnel. These losses will include skilled labor with years of experience that have been carried forward from keel to keel.”

As part of this evaluation, the Navy is developing a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) to assess potential future ship capabilities based on operational requirements rather than specific vessel types or quantities requested by individual commands or services within DoD.

“I am also confident that once we complete this year’s Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirements Study, we will also see a continuing need to build more LPD-like ships well into the future to support our Marine Corps and support Force Design 2030,” Del Toro said at the WEST 2023 conference, co-hosted by the U.S. Naval Institute and AFCEA.

Impact on National Security & Readiness

The decision to halt production of LPD-17 aircraft carriers means that there will be delays in getting these vessels into service, which could potentially jeopardize the entire production line if it cannot be sustained over time due to a lack of orders from potential customers such as foreign navies or military forces who may require them for their operations in future years. 

“This will provide the analytic underpinning of our review of the LPD Flight II, and what the next amphibious warfare ship should be. In the meantime, LPD Flight II is in production and programming additional ships will enable the Navy to retire legacy LSD platforms on a one-for-one basis,” Benson told USNI News. “Without a programmed replacement for LSD’s being decommissioned, substantial risk falls on the Combatant Commander as the requirement for 31 ships will not be met. This is unacceptable.”

This could lead to the loss of experienced personnel currently employed in producing these vessels, which could also impact readiness levels if they are needed for future operations or other missions requiring their expertise and experience with building such vessels for deployment or operations abroad. 

“My commitment to the future of these platforms is unwavering regardless of the Navy’s intent to strategically pause purchasing. This weakens our workforce to do this strategic pause and throws away the experience on the production lines, which at the end cost both the buyer and the builder additional dollars,” said Rep. Trent Kelly (R-Miss.) “We must ensure that we have the necessary assets to meet any challenge, especially with China lurking in the future. And amphibious warships are … I would say the key component to this readiness.”

Additionally, Congressional support from both sides has been strong for continuing production on these ships due to their importance for projecting American power abroad and protecting our national interests around the world, so any disruption in production could affect our ability to meet international requirements and commitments going forward depending on how long it takes for new orders for replacement vessels to come through once production resumes again after this evaluation period ends later this year or early next year.

The evaluation is timely due to reports indicating that amphibious ship readiness is 32 percent. This means the Navy has much work to do to increase this number. An analysis conducted by military generals suggests that the service cannot decommission the older Landing Ship Dock (LSD) vessels without having new ones coming online. To address this issue, the Navy must focus on developing more agile and efficient ships that can be more easily deployed expeditiously as current operations require. 

To bolster amphibious warfare capabilities, senior military leaders have suggested increasing investments in alternative solutions such as High-Speed Connectors (HSCs), Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSVs), and Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) vessels, all of which are designed with speed and agility in mind. These vessels have seen successful deployment in Operation Inherent Resolve and other operations across the globe, offering promising potential for increased efficiency in naval warfare. Additionally, high-ranking military officials suggest researching alternative unmanned solutions, such as unmanned surface vehicles (USV), which could provide increased maritime security without relying on personnel or crew onboarding during missions. 

“As these ships hit the fleet, we will continue to evaluate the requirements for vessels in production. However, we cannot afford to make wholesale changes that severely delay scheduled delivery,” he said of the LPDs.

“If LPD Flight II is not programmed, then the amphibious warfare ship industrial base will be forced to reduce the workforce starting in FY27.”

Another solution proposed by military leaders is leveraging infrastructure investments made by partner nations or allies, such as Italy’s LHD Trieste or France’s Auxiliary Aircraft Carrier Mistral ships, which could be leased out if necessary depending on operational needs across different theatres of operations. Senior officials could also suggest investing further research into technologies like Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning which could potentially improve amphibious operations through enhanced automation processes while reducing associated costs with personnel onboarding during missions. 

“Using tools like multi-year buys to make sure the taxpayers get their dollars worth – we have bought these one at a time. That’s not the way you do it. We do it. We do block buys for other platforms – and for all the right reasons – destroyers, submarines, aircraft carriers. All the right reasons. We need to do it also for amphibious ships. Why? You heard it. You all know it better. That’s the signal that tells you all we have 10, 15 years worth of work. This is not one at a time.”

As part of its evaluation process, the Navy must consider all possible options before making any decisions that may affect its overall shipbuilding capabilities. Technological developments and strategic partnerships with allies will undoubtedly be essential in unlocking the potential for improved efficiency and better mission readiness for Naval forces worldwide.

“We should start thinking about that collectively, in other words, between the Navy, Marine Corps, and industry. What … the next LPD might look like. But I was part of the study in 2014 that decided that the Flight II was exactly what the nation needed,” he said.

“So I don’t buy any argument … ‘I don’t know why we have Flight IIs because they’re not the viable platform.’ I went through a year and a half with the Navy of studying that. And we got to the right answer. LPD is today. The Flight II is what we need right now. But we should start planning – start thinking about next.”

Given all the factors involved, it remains to be seen whether this decision will pay off. However, Congress appears to support continuing work on these vital vessels despite the budgetary constraints faced by DoD today, thanks primarily due to its importance for protecting American interests worldwide, both now and in the future. 

It is clear that halting production on LPD-17 Flight II warship procurement has significant implications not only from a monetary perspective but also a strategic standpoint when looking ahead at what type of force projection capabilities we can provide going forward both domestically and internationally given budgetary constraints faced within DoD today; however, with solid congressional support from both parties, we remain hopeful that continued work can be done towards sustaining infrastructure necessary for building essential naval assets required by US Armed Forces moving forward so we can continue meeting our obligations abroad while providing critical protection against threats both now and into foreseeable future – all while staying within reasonable budgetary parameters set forth by DoD leadership across all branches today regardless of political party affiliations held by individual members throughout House & Senate chambers alike.

“We have to have the inventory not less than 31 [ships]. To me, that’s a combination of old and new. We cannot decommission a critical element without having a replacement in our hand,”

Berger said when asked how he argues to maintain the aging ships despite readiness issues.

“We can’t do that, or else, back to risk … we’re not going to have the tools or it’s not going to be available. So the decommissioning of the LSDs to me is directly tied to the inventory as fast as we can procure and field.”