Summer Offensive: The Russian Race to the Dnieper

The Puzzle of the Bridges

The Russians have not blown the bridges.

The bridges over the Dnieper River. For three years, they have been fighting a war of attrition in the east. They have accumulated forces and ground the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) down. They have rocketed, droned, and shelled AFU supply nodes and destroyed power generation facilities.
But they have not blown the bridges.

The bridges carry supplies from the Polish border in western Ukraine to the contact line in the east. Blowing the bridges would vastly simplify the Russians’ task.

The Russians are not above the destruction of infrastructure when it suits them. In the fall of 2022, the AFU was on a roll. The Russians had invaded Ukraine, intending to intimidate the Ukrainian government into negotiating. It worked for a time, and a peace agreement was reached (the Istanbul Agreement of 2022), but the UK’s Boris Johnson talked Zelensky into walking away. NATO then pumped the AFU full of weapons, and the Ukrainians went on the offensive.

No strangers to trading space for time, the Russians conducted an orderly, strategic withdrawal and stabilized their lines. In the south, General Surovikin withdrew the VDV airborne from Kherson City, crossed the Dnieper, and dug in.

Then the Nova Kakhovka dam, just northeast of Kherson City, was destroyed. The breach flooded the Dnieper and the surrounding land all the way to the Black Sea. The Russians were in possession of the dam. The Ukrainians blamed the Russians, and the Russians blamed the Ukrainians. In this particular case, I believe the Ukrainians, because destroying the dam made it impossible for the AFU to cross the Dnieper and attack the VDV.

For three years, the bridges have stood. I can only conclude that the Russians have not destroyed the structures for their own reasons. There are two possibilities:

First, when the Russians begin their decisive offensive, they may blow the bridges to trap AFU troops on the east side of the river, where they can be annihilated.

Second, the Russians may intend to use the bridges themselves.

Both possibilities make sense. The question is – do the Russians intend to stop at the river, or do they intend to cross the river into western Ukraine?

The Russians have the force structure to pursue either option. The outcome of the war is not in doubt. The AFU does not have sufficient manpower to adequately defend all points of weakness, no matter how much money and equipment they are given. We will discuss this further later in the article.

The Axes of Attack

We live in the day of ubiquitous ISR – intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – available to both sides. America has made it clear that they are supplying Ukraine with intelligence. Therefore, it is not possible to mass troops in any one sector for an offensive without being detected.

The Russian solution has been to apply pressure from all sides. They keep their cards close to their vest. With six hundred thousand troops surrounding Ukraine on the north, south, and east, they can mount offensives on at least three axes. The AFU cannot cover them all. Figure 2 shows the southern axes.

In the north, they can strike from Kursk to Sumy, and thence to Kiev. This is the option that keeps Zelensky awake at night. This is why Zelensky keeps his bags packed. They could also strike at Kharkiv, but this is unlikely. It is too large a city and would divert too many resources. Kiev, as the seat of government, is a worthwhile target.

The second axis is to strike west from Donbas directly at the industrial city of Dnipro. Even today, the Russians practically have a clear run. They just want to clear out Chasov Yar and the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk conurbation first.

The third axis is to strike from the south against Zaporizhzhia. Kherson is also a possible target.

Securing these cities and the eastern bank of the Dnieper would destroy Ukraine’s viability as a country. It would leave a purely agricultural economy, with or without possession of the Black Sea port of Odessa. It must be said that if Russia takes these cities, it will probably seize Odessa as well, although that may take as long as another year.

Ukraine cannot cover the whole front. Its troops have not stopped fighting for three years. Recently, Zelensky diverted two brigades from the Kursk salient to the Donbas. The Russians overran Kursk. Zelensky rushed one brigade back – too late. He then sent that brigade east to attack Belgorod – to steal some Russian land for prestige value.

The AFU no longer has the forces to mount an offensive. Last week, in testimony to the Senate, NATO Supreme Commander General Christopher Cavoli stated that Ukraine was in no position to mount an offensive.

Which is not to say the AFU does not have fighting ability. Although heavily outnumbered, the AFU drone capability is first-rate. The AFU has recently mounted battalion-sized attacks in Chasov Yar and Tokmak. These were primarily to break out AFU units that had been encircled, and some of these attacks were successful. The Russians took casualties among their blocking forces and withdrew. Later, they returned with overwhelming force and took back the territory.

In one or two cases, the AFU forces coming to the rescue were themselves encircled.

Such is the ebb and flow of war on the contact line.

The point is, Russia has overwhelming superiority in men and materiel. It waits for a moment of weakness, then pushes hard on the weak spot. The AFU rushes forces from elsewhere to defend, leaving another weak spot for the Russians to exploit.

General Cavoli described the Russian offensive as “flowing lava.” I think that is a very apt description. The lava flow is slow at the beginning, but in the end, it overwhelms everything in its path.

The Ground

For three years, the Russians have been fighting their way through built-up areas in Donbas. This is Ukraine’s industrial heartland. Mines, mills, metalworks, foundries, factories, and townships where the workers and their families live. Every factory is a fortress, and the AFU has had eight years to fortify it all. The Russians, casualty-averse, blow them out of their dugouts with glide bombs and artillery before sending in the infantry.

The last strongholds are now falling. When they have been taken, the ground will be a flat steppe all the way to the Dnieper River. It still won’t be easy. The Ukrainians are very good with drones. Columns crossing that open ground will need to be heavily covered with drone defense. The Russians have had a long time to prepare, developing a mobile 30mm autocannon loaded with anti-drone shotshells.

What happens when they get there?

The Peace Deal & The Campaign at the River

The odds of a peace deal are waning. This writer believes that the bellicosity of the Kiev Regime and the Europeans, combined with the unwillingness of the Trump Administration to control their proxy, are convincing the Russians to cross the river. Kiev, the Europeans, and the Trump administration want a ceasefire. Russia has said for three years that there will be no ceasefire until a peace deal has been signed that addresses the root causes of the war. Specifically, Ukraine’s neutrality and protections for Russian speakers in Ukraine. At the moment, both sides are talking past each other. Russia and the US continue to mend fences on a bilateral basis without addressing the Ukrainian conflict.

Since when have winners accepted a ceasefire in the middle of a battle?

It is likely that the Trump administration wishes to disengage from the conflict. It is simply having trouble “pulling the plug.” However, it remains unlikely that they will plunge in with the same commitment that the Biden administration offered. It is difficult to imagine President Trump going to the U.S. Congress to request another $60 billion for Ukraine.

Should Russia stop at the river, the AFU will fortify the west bank, NATO will pump Ukraine with more weapons, and the AFU will mobilize and train as many remaining citizens as possible. Meanwhile, they will continue strikes on Russian territory with drones and other long-range weapons.

Unless there is a peace deal – not a ceasefire – a peace deal, Russia will cross the river. This year, next year, or the year after. Ukraine is an existential war for Russia. It will not stop.

The AFU will retreat across the river and blow the bridges behind them.

Russia will attempt to secure as many bridges as possible and hold them.

Where bridges cannot be secured, Russia will mount river crossings and build their own bridges (see Figure 3). They are very good at building bridges. Building bridges under fire is rather dangerous. They will need counter-battery fire and drone defense. They have developed this capability in both the EW space and the artillery space.

This is where the Russian Navy’s Dnieper Flotilla may play a role. Last year, Russia reconstituted the Dnieper Flotilla by transferring seven Project 1204 Shmel missile boats from the Caspian Flotilla (see Figure 5). It also transferred the Project 1206 Kalmar hovercraft (see Figure 4). The Shmel missile boats are equipped with 76mm guns and MLRS at the stern. The Kalmars are capable of transporting two platoons of infantry plus two IFVs. If the IFVs are left behind, capacity may be stretched to a full company.

The best way to take a bridge is from both sides at once. Kalmars’ landing troops on the west bank, and ground forces attacking the eastern approach. The Kalmars would be covered by anti-drone artillery, EW assets, heavy artillery like the 130 mm Bereg (see Figure 1), and missile boats like the Project 1204 Shmel (Figure 5).

Conclusion

The coming Russian offensive is unlikely to look like what Western planners expect. This is for the simple reason that they have misunderstood Russia’s thinking from the beginning. They have refused to listen to Russian pronouncements (e.g. “There will be no ceasefire until negotiations are complete and a deal is signed”), they have underestimated the quality and strength of Russian armed forces, they have dismissed Russia’s peace proposals (e.g. the June, 2024 Istanbul Plus proposal, aka Istanbul plus 4), continue to operate under the assumption that sanctions will destroy the Russian economy (they have only destroyed Europe’s), and ignore Russia’s warnings that neither NATO nor European troops in Ukraine will be tolerated.

The coming offensive will look like General Cavoli’s description of Russian operations as “flowing lava,” only the pace of the flow will accelerate.

It is not too late to agree to Istanbul Plus.

About the Author

You may reach Cameron at: cameron.curtis545@gmail.com

Cameron Curtis has spent thirty years in the financial markets as a trader and risk manager. He was on the trade floor when Saddam’s tanks rolled into Kuwait, when the air wars opened over Baghdad and Belgrade, and when the financial crisis swallowed the world. He’s studied military affairs and warfare all his adult life. His popular Breed series of military ad-venture thrillers are admired for combining deep expertise wit/h propulsive action. The premises are realistic, the stories adrenaline-fueled and emotionally engaging.

Check out the books here: Cameron Curtis’s Amazon Page

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